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Abstract 
 
 
The aim of this explorative dissertation, consisting of four essays and a summary, is to 
increase understanding of: 1) business networks as the structure of exchange in the 
healthcare market, 2) related relationship-management practices and 3) their interplay with 
the institutional environment. This is of topical interest in that Western European and 
especially the Nordic Beveridge-style healthcare systems, have repeatedly been subject to 
reform and deregulation in recent years. The public sector is opening up its service 
production to other providers, and abandoning its monopoly and hierarchical exchange 
structure. Emerging new technologies, increasing innovation and commercial pressures are 
changing the constituent relations in the pharmaceutical industry. Business networks are 
emerging as the new structure of exchange in the healthcare market. 
 
So far, environmental conceptualizations have not attracted major interest among 
researchers investigating the healthcare market, business networks or relationship 
management. The task-environment view has dominated and the impact of the institutional 
environment on relationship-management practices and relational structures has not been in 
focus. Further, neo-institutional theory is conceptually rich, but poor in managerial 
implication. Research on how institutions, business networks and relationship-management 
practices interpenetrate and influence each other could enhance understanding of the 
healthcare industry and its marketization. 
 
Industry-specific rules, norms and cognitive templates legitimate the codes of conduct and 
structures for interaction in markets characterized by knowledge-intensive co-operation and 
strong institutional order. As a result, various relationships with existing and emerging 
institutions are crucial to the business, and form the basis of customer-relationship-
management practices and the building up of customer portfolios. Relationships in the 
pharmaceutical business are typically managed across customer-facing functions as 
portfolios. These functions tend to operate under business-specific institutional rules in the 
form of legislation and explicit codes of conduct, and with systemic relational structures. 
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Dynamic institutional environment, the associated disruptions and institutionalization 
processes exert pressure on economic actors. This results in changing business networks, 
and transient perceptions of legitimacy and isomorphism to which the actors adapt by 
changing their relationship-management practices and restructuring their relationship 
portfolios. On the other hand, institutional dynamism could create new business 
opportunities. This study thus underlines the importance of understanding the influence of 
the dynamics of the institutional environment on business relationships. It also sheds light 
on how companies can utilize this influence to some extent by acting as institutional 
entrepreneurs while driving their business aspirations and interests through collective action 
via strategic networks, for example. 
 
However, management can never know for sure or fully control what the counterpart will 
or can do. Certain types of reactions can only be anticipated especially in the case of 
business relationships in the public interest with all the potential socio-political aspirations 
and economic gains (e.g., unmet medical needs and their public funding) involved. The 
findings of this study indicate that when there is mutual interest and intention, and the 
ability to jointly develop and utilize relationships as channels of influence and adaptation, it 
is easier to foresee the reactions of counterparts. The network could then be co-
operationally managed, to a certain degree, with reciprocal relationship-management 
activities drawn from institutionalized mechanisms and arrangements that coordinate and 
control the market. 
 
 
Keywords: business networks, relationship management, institutional environment, 
healthcare and the pharmaceutical industry. 
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PART I: Overview of the dissertation 
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1. Background 
 
Western European healthcare systems have been subject to repeated and thorough market-
driven and market-style reforms in recent years (see Lister, 2005; EHMA, 2000). Finland‟s 
Beveridge-style system (the public provision of services with financing from general 
revenues, for more details see the appendix of essay 1) is no exception to this development: 
marketization proceeds through the contracting out of tax-funded services, or shifting 
service-provision responsibility toward insurance-funded private providers. As a result, the 
basic institutional elements of our healthcare system are changing (Häkkinen and Lehto, 
2005; Häkkinen, 2005). Quasi-markets are created when the public sector opens up its 
service production to other providers by abandoning its monopoly and the hierarchical 
production process. Research on these reforms typically investigates quasi-markets as 
intermediate hierarchical and market forms (e.g., Kähkönen, 2007). Over time, the 
emphasis has shifted to contractual relationships presumably relatively well-informed 
actors, and then to performance monitoring and information sharing within complex 
networks (Touhy, 2003). 
 
Networks as a third form of economic structure have received less attention in research on 
the healthcare business (e.g., Stremersch and Van Dyck, 2009; Zollkiewski, 1999). There is 
a knowledge gap in terms of how the evolution of the basic institutional elements and the 
market forces influences the formation of business networks as an economic structure in the 
healthcare and how this influence is reflected in relationship-management practices and 
vice versa. The aim of this explorative dissertation, which comprises four essays and this 
summary, is to increase understanding of business networks as the structure of exchange in 
the healthcare market, and of related relationship-management practices and their interplay 
within the institutional environment. Figure 1. illustrates this interplay. 
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Figure 1. Institutional interplay between healthcare business networks and relationship-
management practices 
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The development of companies and their businesses can be studied from different 
explanatory perspectives on economic structures: markets, hierarchies and networks (e.g., 
Ebers, 1999; Powell, 1990). Markets are transactional and are characterized by atomistic 
actors, whereas networks are co-operational and are characterized by connected actors and 
reciprocal business practices. Despite this contradiction, both perspectives are competitive. 
They emphasize the importance of adopting genuine strategies and acquiring the underlying 
organizational capabilities and resources required for survival and long-term performance. 
In other words, being different helps companies to avoid excessive competition from their 
rivals (Laurila and Lilja, 2002). In the case of networks it could be argued that unique 
resources or capabilities also enhance actor connectivity and co-operation with others. Yet, 
companies still confront institutional pressures, the outcome of which is an isomorphic 
tendency; they become similar in order to secure legitimacy. This set-up constitutes an 
interesting field of research concerning how business practices and processes in networks 
are influenced by institutional forces, and how companies cope with isomorphic pressures 
and legitimacy, and simultaneously differentiate themselves with unique resources and 
capabilities. 
 
Stremersch and Van Dyck (2009) point out in their resent meta-analysis of life-sciences 
marketing and the pharmaceutical companies involved, that some industries require 
industry-specific knowledge development because they have unique characteristics that 
yield specific challenges for marketers. In the case of healthcare and the pharmaceutical 
business institutions could be seen as such unique characteristics. They have an influence 
on the economic structure: institutional bases are imported into business networks and 
companies or other service-production organizations as underlying invisible assumptions 
that shape their performance (e.g., Häkkinen and Lehto, 2005; Touhy, 2003; Järvelin, 2002) 
and management practices (Lukkari and Parivinen, 2007). A review of major academic 
marketing journals revealed a gap in the literature on institutional influence on healthcare, 
pharmaceutical business networks, and the relationship-management practices involved. 
The major medical and health-economics and management journals do not address this 
phenomenon either. 
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The key findings of this study indicate that relationships and networks mediate institutional 
forces into business-practice processes. The outcome is isomorphism in relationship-
management practices and relational structures. Institutional disruptions have an impact on 
perceptions of legitimacy and the tendency to change organizational fields, and this creates 
new business and institutional-entrepreneurship opportunities for agile actors in healthcare 
and pharmaceutical business networks. On the other hand, network heterogeneity creates 
the structural potential for partial optimization. The marketization of the Finnish Beveridge-
style healthcare system is a spontaneous change process that is fuelling habits of partial 
optimization. There is a need for orchestration across levels, given that heterogeneity and 
spontaneity create significant inefficiencies (e.g., Lauridsen et al., 2007; Nguyen and 
Häkkinen, 2005; Häkkinen and Joumard 2007; Lister, 2005, Häkkinen and Järvelin, 2004). 
Theory building in this field could therefore support socio-political decision-making 
concerning the orchestration of networked business in our Beveridge-style healthcare 
system. 
 
1.2. Research gap 
 
Until the introduction of the institutional concept, organizations were viewed primarily as 
production and/or exchange systems, and their structures as being shaped largely by their 
technologies and transactions, or the power-dependency relations growing out of such 
interdependencies (Scott, 1987). Accordingly business organizations were typically 
modeled as entities embedded in task environments, which operated in varying exchange 
contexts. Some researchers have questioned this mainstream view, suggesting that an 
institutional environment is an inherent feature of business organizations and their 
networks, and influences not only their economic and socio-political structures and 
processes but also their strategic choices (e.g., Zucker, 1986; Salmi, 1995; Oliver, 1997, 
Hoffman, 1999; Grewal and Dharwadkar, 2002; Jansson, Johanson and Ramström, 2007). 
Oliver (1997) compared the differences between task and institutional environments (see 
Table 1 below). Her comparison is a compact presentation of the relevant dimensions of 
and differences between these approaches. Supplementing the environmental context in this 
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research is the network approach, conceived of as a distinctive form of coordinated 
economic activity. 
 
Table 1. A comparison of the relevant dimensions of the institutional and task 
environments (Oliver, 1997, p. 102). 
 
Relevant dimensions 
Institutional 
environment 
Task environment 
Environmental context Political and legal Market 
Key demand factor Legitimacy Resources 
Type of pressure 
Coercive, mimetic, Competitive 
normative   
Key constituents 
State agencies and Sources of scarce 
professional 
associations production factors 
Mechanisms of external 
control 
Rules, regulations, Critical exchange  
inspections dependencies 
Organizational success 
factors 
Conformity to  Acquisition and  
institutional rules  control of critical 
and norms resources 
Dominant threat to autonomy 
Government Resource-exchange 
interventions partners 
 
 
Conceptualizations of the environment have not thus far constituted a major field of interest 
among researchers focusing on business networks and relationship-management. Task-
environment considerations (e.g., the resource-based view as presented in Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978 and Parolini‟s (1999) value-net approach) have dominated the research on 
industrial business networks and the exchange context. What does this mean? The majority 
of these approaches fail to give a fully formed picture of business networks and partner 
activities in dyadic relationships characterized by strong institutional order and influence 
(e.g., healthcare and the pharmaceutical business) in that the analysis of relationship 
management tend to focus on access to resources and on how actor positions influence this 
access, for instance. The impact of the institutional environment on relationship-
management practices and processes is often ignored in these types of study or modeled as 
a secondary function (Anderson, Håkansson and Johanson, 1994; Hadjikhani and Thilenius, 
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2009). There is thus a need for management-oriented theory-building research that extends 
neo-institutional theory to the realms of strategic management and marketing. 
 
There is a vast amount of research on industrial business networks and relationships, and it 
has been shown on the general level that there is interplay between institutions and 
enterprises (e.g., Hadjikhani, Lee and Ghauri, 2008; Low and Johnston, 2008; Jansson, 
Johanson and Ramström, 2007; Keillor and Hult, 2004; Salmi, 1995) and that relationships 
other than those established for the exchange of resources should be integrated into the 
business network (e.g., Easton and Araujo, 1992; Halinen and Törnroos, 1998; Araujo, 
Dubois and Gadde, 2003; Welch and Wilkinson, 2004; Mouzas, 2006). It is typically 
assumed in these studies that companies rely on the fact that socio-political actors or 
ancillaries do not engage in direct economic transactions, because by virtue of their 
legitimate position in the society they may support or act against them (e.g., better or worse 
trading conditions). Socio-political actors depend on companies because their investments 
tend to have a positive influence on society and the economy. When such a view is applied 
to analyses of industrial business networks it typically relies on the perception that dyadic 
relationships in a business-network setting involve either 1) two markets: the business and 
the socio-political market (e.g., Hadjikhani and Ghauri, 2001; Ghauri and Holstius, 1996), 
or 2) two functions: the primary and the secondary (e.g., Anderson, Håkansson and 
Johanson, 1994; Hadjikhani and Thilenius, 2009). There is nothing wrong with such views, 
but they are somewhat lacking in comprehensiveness in that institutions and actors in 
specific institutional settings could be seen as an inherent feature of the primary healthcare 
business (Simon, Mandjak and Szalkai, 2009). They have an influence on the economic 
structure (e.g., marketization has resulted in complex business networks in Finnish 
healthcare), which further influences management practices: a physician could have 
multiple roles as a customer for a pharmaceutical company, for example - prescriber, 
shareholder, opinion leader in a medical society, and/or authority in a government office. 
 
This dissertation explores the reasons for and the means of reciprocal influence between the 
institutional environment, economic structures and relationship-management practices. The 
theoretical approach is built on marketing theories of industrial networks, amended in 
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accordance with neo-institutional theory and conceptualizations of the institutional 
environment. The focus is on the interplay between institutions and both networks and 
relationships, and the interaction between the actors involved. Analysis of this interplay is 
based on a combination of neo-institutional theory, and theories of business networks and 
the management of inter-organizational relationships as portfolios. Neo-institutional theory 
comprises three tenets (the organizational field, isomorphism and legitimacy) and three 
pillars (the regulative, the normative and the cognitive), together with the respective 
institutional processes (regulating, validating and habitualizing). The aim is to extend 
marketing theory by adopting the concepts of institutional theory in the analysis of 
qualitative data. Further, this should shed light on the complex relationship between 
management practices and related business networks in the form of an economic structure. 
 
The healthcare market and the pharmaceutical business are thus modeled as networks of 
actors embedded in a social system of economic and socio-political forces, which jointly 
operate to condition the actions of actors, their relationships, and the outcomes they may 
achieve (Low and Johnston, 2008; Håkansson and Ford, 2002; Halinen and Törnroos, 1998; 
Håkansson, 1992). The actors are typically organizational entities, such as multinational 
pharmaceutical corporations (MNCs), trade association and healthcare organizations, all of 
which operate in business networks and healthcare markets. Accordingly, institutions and 
institutional arrangements are considered an inherent feature of these business networks 
and industrial markets. Institutional aspects are imported into the business networks in the 
form of underlying assumptions, codes of conduct (e.g., Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006), 
and roles with specifically designated rights and duties (Hurwicz, 1993). 
 
1.3. Research questions, levels of analysis and structure 
 
The aim of this dissertation is to increase the theoretical understanding of business 
networks as a market structure, the related relationship-management practices, and their 
interplay with the institutional environment. The approach is explorative and descriptive, 
and the research addresses following research questions: 
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1) Why and how does the institutional environment influence and is influenced by 
market structures at the healthcare system level (essay 1 “Marketisation and the 
Orchestration of Healthcare Networks in Finland”)? 
2) Why and how does the institutional environment influence and is influenced by 
business-relationship-management practices (essay 3 “Pharmaceutical Marketing through 
the Customer Portfolio: Institutional Influence and Adaptation”)? 
3) Why and how do institutionalized market structures (strategic networks and network 
organizations) influence and are influenced by business-relationship-management practices 
(essay 2 “Strategic networks and the institutional environment: A case study of Pharma 
Industry Finland (PIF)” and essay 4 “Merger: Institutional interplay with customer 
relationship management”)? 
 
These research questions are deliberately broad in scope in order to incorporate micro-, 
meso-, and macro- levels of analysis. They allow flexibility in terms of conducting theory-
building research in an unexplored area (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). As argued above, 
the phenomenon under study is complex. The existing research inadequately explains the 
institutional interplay: how the institutional environment (macro level of analysis) 
interpenetrates business networks (meso level of analysis) and relationship-management 
practices in companies (micro level of analysis), and vice versa. The justification for the 
study rests on its novel insight into complex events, which are re-described and 
conceptualized in the light of neo-institutional and business-network theories. The aim is 
thus to develop existing theory by extending neo-institutional theory into the field of 
strategic management and marketing. 
 
This dissertation comprises two parts. Part I summarizes the four essays presented in Part 
II. The summary introduces the scientific problem addressed in the dissertation and the 
goals of the research, reviews the subject, the research methods and the findings, and 
discusses the results. The subject review includes an analysis of prior theories of business 
networks and the management of inter-organizational relationships as portfolios. The focus 
in the latter is on the influence of the dynamic institutional environment (institutional 
mechanisms, entrepreneurship and deinstitutionalization). Each essay (Part II) examines the 
institutional interplay between market structures and relationship-management practices 
 from somewhat varying perspectives, but with an overlapping theoretical focus. Further, 
the levels of analysis and the empirical foci differ. Table 2 below summarizes these 
aspects. 
 
Table 2. The theoretical bases, levels of analysis and empirical foci of the essays 
comprising Part II. 
 
Theoretical basis Level of analysis Empirical focus 
Essay 1:                                       
Dynamism and market order, 
institutional entrepreneurship, 
orchestration of networks  
Linking the macro-
level (institutional 
environment) with 
the meso-level 
(business network) 
The Finnish healthcare 
market 
Essay 2:                                      
Strategic networks,           
institutional disruptions and 
entrepreneurship 
Linking the meso-
level (strategic 
network) with the 
macro-level 
(institutional 
environment) 
The pharmaceutical 
industry in Finland 
Essay 3:                              
Relationship portfolios, 
institutional disruptions and 
entrepreneurship 
Linking the micro-
level (focal actor) 
with the meso-level 
(business network) 
Pharmaceutical 
companies 
Essay 4:                                    
Merger: Institutional interplay with 
customer relationship 
management 
Linking the micro-
level (focal actor) 
with the macro-
level (institutional 
environment) 
A multinational 
pharmaceutical 
company 
 
 
 
2. Theoretical perspectives: relationship management in business 
networks, the institutional environment and their interplay 
 
The study at hand draws from both business-network and neo-institutional theory. This 
chapter comprises a literature review, which positions the study in the field of academic 
research in terms of the theory content, the research context and the key concepts. The 
review begins with a presentation of the interaction and network approach from the 
perspective of industrial marketing management, and considers the literature on 
management of interorganizational relationships as portfolios. The focus then shifts to the 
application of institutional theory in business-relationship management. The chapter ends 
9
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with a review of the literature on dynamic institutional environments, entrepreneurship, and 
deinstitutionalization. This interpenetration of theories and relationship-management 
practices at different levels of economic structures is modeled in Figure 2 below. 
 
Figure 2. Theoretical model: the theoretical perspectives covered in the dissertation 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1. The industrial-network approach as a form of marketing management in healthcare 
business networks 
 
Powell (1990) argues that if economic exchange is embedded in a particular social-
structural context, then networks could be seen as a distinctive coordinated form of 
economic activity. In particular, when the items exchanged between buyers and sellers 
posses qualities that are not easily measured (e.g., improvement in the quality of life in the 
case of new medicines), and when the mutual obligation is such that the actions are 
interdependent (e.g., purchasers and providers of healthcare services which are caught in 
long-term, symbiotic relationships), the relations are so long-term and recurrent that it is 
difficult to speak of the parties as separate entities (e.g., purchasers and providers of 
healthcare services, caught in long-term symbiotic relationships). (Powell, 1990) 
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Möller and Halinen (2000) follow Powell‟s line of thinking and propose that there is a 
relationship between relational complexity and the characteristics of the exchange context, 
and this has an influence on relationship marketing. They distinguish between market- and 
network-based relationship marketing, which are needed in more market-like and 
respectively in more network-like contexts, respectively. Figure 3 below illustrates their 
view, which is acknowledged in this research. The regulative, normative and cognitive 
dimensions of institutional environment typically call for different kinds of relationships-
management practices in network-like contexts in which the relational complexity is high. 
For example, pressures created on the regulative dimension could be coercive and call for 
immediate adaptive measures, whereas normative or cognitive pressures may be less 
coercive and give actors more time to adapt themselves in network-like contexts. 
Nevertheless, all institutional pressures could potentially induce environment-influencing 
measures, instances of institutional entrepreneurship when actors exploit the high relational 
complexity in order to exert influence via some relationships and to adapt via others. 
 
 
Figure 3. Market- and network-based relationship marketing (Möller and Halinen, 2000, 
43) 
 
 
 
 
The industrial network approach focuses on connectedness and exchange in industrial 
markets, relationships being understood as reciprocal processes that develop and evolve 
over time (e.g., Batt and Purchase, 2004; Ford et al., 1998; Möller and Wilson, 1995). In 
other words, the interaction sheds light on the interdependencies in dyadic and connected 
Low relational complexity High relational complexity 
Market-based 
relationship 
marketing 
Network-based 
relationship 
marketing 
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business relationships between businesses and non-business organizations (Waluszewski, 
Hadjikhani and Baraldi, 2009). Accordingly the notion of a relationship covers the „total‟ 
interaction between actors in networks - the material, economic and social content (Ellis 
and Higgins, 2006). As Håkansson and Snehota (1998, p. 24) observe, „It is the means of 
handling the texture of interdependencies that shape the very existence and development of 
companies…‟. This perspective is close to the tenet of neo-institutional theory, which 
underlines that organizational survival is subject to its alignment with its environment. 
 
The literature on the industrial-network approach typically conceptualizes and 
models business networks in line with the seminal work of Håkansson and Snehota 
(1995) and their “ARA model”. According to the model business networks have three 
dimensions: actors, resources and activities. The actors are restricted by the resource 
constellations and activity patterns that make up the industrial network. The present 
research extends this line of thinking in positing that institutions are an inherent 
feature of healthcare business networks as they have on influence on actors through 
pressures coming from the institutional environment, for example. Institutional 
thinking is imported into companies and other service-production organizations in 
the form of underlying invisible assumptions that shape their performance (e.g., 
Häkkinen and Lehto, 2005; Touhy, 2003). 
 
The industrial-network approach fits well with the healthcare market and its business 
networks, especially in Beveridge-style healthcare systems that combine public 
provision, ownership and financing from general revenues in order to provide 
universal coverage with limited user contributions (for further details of the Finnish 
Beveridge-style healthcare system see the appendix of essay 1). The purchasers and 
providers are typically long-term partners caught in symbiotic long-term 
relationships that develop because of 1) the nature of the product (e.g., sizable, long-
term investments on facilities and/or R&D), or 2) the wishes of the partners (e.g., the 
political will for public financing and ownership), or 3) a combination of both of these 
factors. (EHMA, 2000) 
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The industrial-network approach evolved from the interaction approach. It could be 
described as a broad school of thought originating in and borrowing ideas from various 
other interaction-focused theories such as Austrian economics (e.g., Hayek, 1937 and 1945; 
Schumpeter, 1942; Foss, 1997), social exchange (e.g., Hallén, Johanson and Seyed-
Mohamed, 1991; Rao, Morrill and Zald, 2000) and new economic sociology (e.g., 
Granovetter and Svedberg, 1992; Ferlie, 1992), resource dependency (e.g., Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978), political economics (e.g., Stern and Reve, 1980; Achrol, Reve and Stern, 
1983) and transaction-cost theory (e.g., Williamson 1975, 1981 and 1985). Two distinct 
streams have emerged in contemporary research of industrial-networks, namely the 
Industrial Marketing and Purchasing Group (IMP) and the social-exchange school of 
thought (e.g., Möller and Wilson, 1995). They both aim at enhancing understanding of 
inter-organizational interaction: how it develops and what constitutes it. 
 
Research on social exchange has contributed to the development of social-network theory 
within business relations in addressing such important issues such as structural holes, 
closed networks and bridging ties (e.g., Uzzi, 1997; Andersson, Forsgren and Holm, 2002). 
The IMP group, on the other hand, have contributed significantly to the development of 
theories concerning the nature and development of inter-firm relations and networks in 
business markets, as well as to the production of methodologies for researching such 
phenomena (Wilkinson, 2001). The theories emanating from this group and associated 
researchers have also drawn widely on developments taking place in sociology, business, 
history and politics (Araujo and Easton, 1996), the aim being to advance understanding of 
exchange and buyer-seller relationships in industrial settings (Håkansson, 1992; Håkansson 
and Snehota, 1998). However the majority of this research has adopted the task-
environment approach in the analysis of relationship management, and the influence of the 
institutional environment has received surprisingly little attention. The purpose of this 
research is to narrow this gap in knowledge through the exploration of relationship-
management practices and their interplay with the institutional environment in the 
healthcare business. 
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In the present research networks are defined as “modes of organizing economic activities 
through inter-firm coordination and cooperation” (Grandori and Soda, 1995, p. 184). This 
approach “provides networks an instrumental role; they are instruments of organizing 
activities and as such the behavior of actors is intentional and goal oriented” (Järvensivu 
and Möller, 2008, 4). The instrumental role is highlighted in this dissertation. For example, 
in essay 2 (p.268) strategic network is defined as an intentionally developed and managed 
interorganizational cooperation between organizations for the pursuit of mutually beneficial 
strategic business goals. 
 
According to the industrial-network approach, the unique and vital resources actors 
possess, are activated during reciprocal interaction with other actors, thereby creating 
interdependence and connectedness and resulting in the formation of networks in business 
markets (Håkansson and Snehota, 1998; Turnbull, Ford and Cunningham, 1996; Johanson 
and Mattsson, 1991). The core assumption in this study is that the reciprocal interaction and 
the network formation are subject to the influence of the institutional environment. It is 
meaningless or impossible to disconnect a network actor from the relational context given 
that interdependence plays a major role and organizational boundaries are blurred (Ritter, 
Wilkinson and Johnston, 2004). In other words, relationships are perceived to form the 
context in which actors act and environmental changes are transmitted through them 
(Halinen, Salmi and Havila, 1999). Relationships function as the channels of adaptation and 
influence for actors in networks. This view is highlighted throughout this research. 
 
The concept of embeddedness in this research refers to an actor‟s relations with and 
dependence upon networks, which exist in various spheres of social life including the 
economic and the political. These networks form the environment and operate to condition 
the actions of the actor (an individual or an organizational entity, such as a company or an 
institution, with an active role in the network), its relationships, and the possible outcomes 
(Håkansson and Ford, 2002; Halinen and Törnroos, 1998; Håkansson, 1992). Institutions 
are seen as the fabric or frame, shaping, constraining, facilitating and allowing actions and 
interactions including those of an economic nature in these networks (Djelic and Quack, 
2003; Granovetter, 1985 and 1992). Hence, in the context of studying changes in the 
healthcare market and pharmaceutical industry the focus is on the institutional disruption, 
and pressure, that restrict but also orientate and facilitate interaction in these industrial 
networks, and also on the interplay between networks and both local / national and 
transnational institutional settings. These national and transnational institutional structures 
and pressures could conflict, converge or interact, leading to mixed responses on that actor 
and network levels. 
 
There are contradictory views within the industrial-network approach on the manageability 
of business networks and inter-organizational relationships. This dissertation highlights the 
functional view of management in networks (e.g., Brito and Roseira, 2005) and how co-
operational network-level manageability is built on organizational functions, institutional 
arrangements and the related activities the actors carry out. A trade association, for 
example, functions as a strategic network and carries out institutional entrepreneurship 
activities (essay 2), and pharmaceutical companies build their customer-relationship 
portfolios across organizational functions (essay 3 and 4). As such, management is about 
coordinating and controlling (e.g. Westerlund, 2009). The following section examines 
various conflicting views on the manageability of business networks, placing them in three 
different categories, and considers the institutional influence. 
 
The manageability of healthcare business networks 
 
Given the nature of intra-network dynamics (e.g., Westerlund, 2009) and the variety of 
inter-organizational connections (e.g., Hadjikhani and Thilenius, 2009), researchers in the 
fields of business networks and inter-organizational relationships hold contradictory view 
on the opportunities and control they bring to a company. There is controversy about 1) 
what constitutes management and 2) to what degree networks can be managed. Typically 
these views are built on the task-environment approach: the management challenge 
concerns the actors involved, their resources, and the skills, activities or organizational 
functions whereby these resources could be utilized within a network of inter-
organizational relationships (e.g., Möller and Svahn, 2003; Batt and Purchase, 2004). The 
influence of the institutional interplay is often ignored, and some constituent parts of 
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management are unaddressed. How, for example, could institutional influence change the 
prevailing business norms or standards, and build up institutional capacity among the actors 
in order to enhance the co-operational management of relationships and to a certain extent 
the management of business networks? 
 
Some researchers argue that network organization or  manageability is contingent on 
having clear boundaries and a focal “hub actor” (i.e. Jarillo, 1988). Others build their 
arguments on opposing views: network organizations and networks cannot be managed or 
controlled by a single actor or group of actors because they represent the outcome of the 
deliberations, aims and actions of some of the members, and no single actor is likely to 
have complete control (i.e. Håkansson and Ford, 2002). It is proposed in this study that in 
the pursuit of shared goals or outcomes (Klint and Sjöberg, 2003) and/or with particular 
institutional arrangements some relationships could be co-operationally managed to a 
certain extent (Möller, Rajala and Svahn, 2005). This latter view is based on contingency 
theory: there is no universal best way to enact the management function (Järvensivu and 
Möller, 2008). In other words, the performance of management is contingent upon the 
organizational environment and its subsystems (Miles and Snow, 1978). Management is 
understood in this study as a co-operational activity coordinated by an actor or actors in 
particular network. It is deliberate and purposeful action where by networked actors seeks 
to create and extract value. This is close to Dhanaraj‟s and Parkhe‟s (2006) definition of 
network orchestration as the set of deliberate, purposeful actions undertaken by the hub 
firm as it seeks to create value and extract value from the network, although this study 
emphasized the co-operational and reciprocal characteristics of the management function. 
 
Different types of norms and related sanctions have been suggested as potential 
mechanisms for plural forms of governance in industrial marketing. Ott and Ivens (2009) 
propose a link between marketing management and two norm dimensions: 1) rule norms, 
which are called into existence by an authority structure based on agreement making, and 
2) social norms, which are centered on mutual belief (Tuomela, 1995; Tuomela and 
Bonnevier-Tuomela, 1995). Their suggestion is based on the idea that the type of exchange 
considered (relational versus discrete) is subject to the expectation and sanctioning 
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characteristics of norms (Opp, 2001; Williamson, 1996; Macneil, 1980). Further, Japp and 
Ganesan (2000, 241-242) found in their study that relational norms are particularly 
important control mechanisms during the transition phases of business relationships (i.e., 
buildup and decline), because “these norms act as emotional and procedural buffers that 
minimize the stresses associated with change in these phases”, whereas explicit contracts as 
rule norms could reduce flexibility and subsequently lower relationship performance in the 
exploration and buildup phases. 
 
Much has been written about the theoretical basis of the governance and manageability of 
healthcare networks, and their special features (e.g., Maguire, Hardy and Lawrence, 2004; 
Touhy, 2003). Lunt, Mannion and Smith (1996) provide a comprehensive review of change 
and manageability in their research on primary care. They suggest that four schools of 
thought contribute to our understanding:  neoclassical economics (e.g., Culyer, Maynard 
and Posnett, 1990), transaction cost theory (e.g., Propper, 1993), Austrian economics (AE) 
and the new economic sociology (e.g., Ferlie and Pettigrew, 1996). The last two lie close to 
the industrial-network approach with their focus on social-network relations, interaction 
processes, and non-price competition as the influencing factors of network change (Easton 
and Poad, 2003). This line of thinking is referred to in essay 1, which discusses the 
coordination of change and manageability in the Finnish healthcare market, organized in 
six national networks according to service provision. The aim of this study is to enrich the 
conceptual understanding about the mechanisms of planned order in spontaneously 
evolving contexts by drawing from the similarities between the AE and the industrial-
network approaches. It is presented that the Finnish healthcare is tentatively categorized as 
a layered system with individual, organizational, network and institutional levels. Further, 
there are various trajectories of change between these levels. Institutional-entrepreneurship 
activities and the weaving of strategic nets represent planned order, and are carried out in 
order to orchestrate change in the management of service-provision networks. 
 
Conflicting views on the manageability of industrial networks also characterize the M&A 
literature. Relationship connectivity and reciprocity create ambiguity among scholarly 
views. There are various answers to the question of whether the relationships can be 
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governed and managed by one party, merged or acquired (Dhanaraj and Parkhe, 2006; 
Havila and Salmi, 2002; Anderson, Havila and Salmi, 2001; Lubatkin et al., 1998; 
Sudarsanam, 1995). As stated above, it is suggested in this research that networks and 
network organizations could be co-operationally managed to a certain extent. Accordingly, 
it is argued that some relationships could be taken over during an M&A process. Firstly, 
some institutional arrangements, such as the ownership of property rights, could put some 
actors in a position to manage the network, the network organization and some 
relationships to certain extent, for example, through the exercise of coercive power or by 
inducing a certain type of behavior by means of rewards. Secondly, the capability to 
manage relationships and network organizations could derive from the unintended (Miller, 
2007) or purposeful utilization of the free actions of actors who are motivated by an 
implicit and/or a latent collective end. For example, members of healthcare network 
organizations might be committed to a certain collective good (i.e. the improvement of 
public health and the advancement of pharmaceutical science) as an explicit collective end, 
which could put some actors in a position to manage the networks to a certain extent 
through the exploitation of the commitment to the collective good. 
 
2.2. The management of inter-organizational relationships as portfolios 
 
The literature on inter-organizational relationships is vast and represents various schools of 
thoughts (e.g., Payne and Frow, 2005). As argued above exchanges involving a range of 
complexity and duration could be understood as a relationship. A relationship is broadly 
defined in this research as “mutually oriented interaction between two reciprocally 
committed parties” (Håkansson and Snehota, 1995, 25). As Blois (2002) points out, 
however, the exchanges that relationships seek to facilitate are built up of numerous 
attributes, which might be different on the micro and macro levels. The norms that apply to 
these attributes within a given exchange may also differ significantly, some being more 
relational than others (Blois, 2002). 
 
The focus of this research is on how interorganizational relationships are managed as 
portfolios, and how the pressures of the institutional environment influence them. In order 
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to keep focused, literature of general relationship management is not review in this part I. 
Relationship management is assumed to be context dependent, for example with regard to 
how disruptions in the institutional environment affect the form and content of customer-
relationship portfolios in the pharmaceutical case companies. Practices of customer 
portfolio analysis in different task environment exchange contexts, for example, are not 
covered (Terho and Halinen, 2007; Srivastava, Shervani and Fahey, 1998), because the 
analyses concern the institutional environment and its pressures. 
 
The theoretical framework of this research is built on the view that relationships are 
reciprocal channels of interaction, which evolve and take time to develop. Moreover, as 
Hunt (2002) points out, there is significant ambiguity surrounding relationship and 
customer-portfolio management: the portfolios are not selected at a particular point in time, 
and take time to develop. Much of the research on business networks highlights the time 
aspect of relationship management. Relationships form over time, and both the history and 
the future expectations of the parties involved are seen as factors influencing how they 
evolve (Anderson et al., 1998). There is another side to this time aspect, however. As 
pointed out thorough this research the healthcare market is characterized by strong 
institutional order and institutional processes tend to stabilize in them (e.g., Greenwood, 
Suddaby and Hinings, 2002; Garud, Sanjay and Kumaraswamy, 2002). Industry-specific 
rules and norms begin to take the form of legislation as explicit codes of conduct emerge 
covering interaction and legitimate relationship management, such as between 
pharmaceutical MNCs and physicians. Essays 3 and 4 highlight 1) how institutional 
interplay influences relationship-management practices, and 2) how institutional 
disruptions are potential moments for relational changes in networks. For example, it is 
being argued that cognitive institutions preserve existing practices within the network and 
slow down the process of restructuring relationship portfolios during disruptions. 
 
Portfolio models were widely introduced in the context of relationship management in the 
early 1980s and so far over 20 models are reported in the marketing literature (Terho 2008, 
45). The aim in all them is to achieve efficient resource allocation among various 
relationships by differentiating between the business relationships in the company‟s 
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customer base and the value of the customer for the focal company (ibid.). Even though 
some authors (e.g., Ryals, 2002; Cunningham and Homse, 1982) emphasize the fact that in 
general not all relationships are equally profitable and therefore attention should be paid to 
the resource allocation, they do not specifically refer to institutionalization, which could 
significantly influence value and profitability estimations. 
 
Johnson and Selnes (2004) argue that investments in a customer portfolio should be a 
function of the underlying firm and industry characteristics. Further, they separate the 
economic, sociological, psychological and operational perspectives on relationship-
portfolio management in their task-environment approach (Johnson and Selnes, 2005). This 
line of thinking is applied in this research, but from the institutional-environment 
perspective. The pharmaceutical and healthcare industries are typically 1) highly regulated, 
2) tightly and highly organized by normative professions and 3) fundamentally influenced 
by industry-specific actor cognitions (e.g., pharmacotherapy will not develop in the absence 
of knowledge flow between the drug industry and the physicians‟ professional body). These 
industry characteristics have an influence on how pharmaceutical companies structure their 
relationship portfolios (see essays 3 and 4) and on how they value the single relationship as 
part of the overall portfolio. As Terho and Halinen (2007, 723) point out that “…Different 
kinds of customer portfolio analysis are likely to take place in different contexts.” 
 
So far the majority of empirical studies on customer-relationship and portfolio management 
lean on B-to-C context or B-to-B context derived from supplier management literature, 
concentrating almost entirely on company-internal factors of performance and ignoring the 
role of other contexts (Terho, 2008; Reinartz, Kraft and Hoyer, 2004; Payne and Frow, 
2005; Plakoyiannaki and Tsokas, 2002). As Terho (2008) points out, most of these studies 
concern individual relationships and their view of customer value is fairly narrow, focusing 
on customer satisfaction, profitability and strongly on lifetime monetary value. It is argued 
in this research that analysis of the contextual substance, and of the pressures created by the 
institutional environment, could increase understanding of relationship-management 
practices and how they create value (see also Storbacka, Strandvik and Grönroos, 1994). 
Various types of relationships and their utilization as channels of influence or adaptation to 
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institutional entrepreneurship activities could contribute in different ways to current and 
future value. As discussed in essay 3, these could be actions of a single actor in a network 
that are beneficial in themselves, or they could be collective in nature (see essay 2: 
activities in a strategic network). 
 
2.3. Applications of institutional theory in business-relationship management 
 
Institutional theory has been widely applied in studies on the adoption of particular 
organizational practices or strategies (e.g., Scott, 1995 and 2001). Contemporary research, 
especially on multinational corporations (MNCs), has been dominated by neo-institutional 
theory, which could be described as a school of thought originating from the wider realm of 
older institutional conceptions (Dacin, Goodstein and Scott, 2002). Neo-institutional theory 
aptly amends marketing theories of relationship management well. It allows considerations 
of  institutions as social constructs outside of traditional economics (e.g., Munir, 2005; 
Munir and Philips, 2005; Berger and Luckmann, 1966), explaining, for example, how 
social reality becomes reinforced through regulatory processes involving state agencies and 
professional bodies. Such processes normatively and/or coercively impose conformity upon 
constituent communities resulting in isomorphism (Greenwood, Suddaby and Hinings, 
2002) and alignment with the institutional environment (Kostova, Roth and Dacin, 2008). 
 
Neo-institutional theory has been criticized for placing too much emphasis on “statics, 
outcomes, cognition, and the dominance and continuity of the environment” and for 
losing the focus on “old” institutional theory which emphasizing a more subjective, 
agency-dominated view (Hirsch and Lounsbury, 1997, p. 406). However, in the case of 
healthcare and pharmaceutical businesses there is a growing body of literature in 
both academic and policy-making circles tracing a “new governance” paradigm. The 
emphasis is on the ability of the state to hold providers accountable through either 
agency agreements (requiring long-term relationships and trust) or contracting 
(requiring the provision and verification of detailed information), and not only 
through the traditional exercise of hierarchical authority (Tuohy, 2003). There has 
also been criticism of the neo-institutional model, which essentially holds that 
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organizational survival is determined by the extent of alignment with the institutional 
environment; hence, companies have to comply with external institutional pressures 
(Kostova, Roth and Dacin, 2008, p. 997). Institutions are conceived of in this study as 
the outcomes of social processes in which companies are actively involved, and not 
merely as exogenous constraints on pharmaceutical companies, for example. 
Companies shape and build them by acting as institutional entrepreneurs. A 
prerequisite of institutional entrepreneurship is sufficient institutional capacity 
among the actors: the availability of the instruments required to take action (White, 
2003) and the capability to utilize them in response to a defined problem. 
 
The other two key tenets of neo-institutional models referred to in this analysis of 
relationship-management practices, in addition to the above-mentioned isomorphism, are 
the organizational field and legitimacy. These three together provide a rich theoretical 
basis for a marketing-theory based analysis of relationship-management practices in 
the healthcare and pharmaceutical business. They are considered separately and in 
some detail below. 
 
Legitimacy 
 
Suchman (1995) points out in his extensive analysis of the literature on organizational 
legitimacy that the conceptual basis in surprisingly fragile and seems to follow two distinct 
paths – the strategic and the institutional. The strategic tradition follows the thinking of 
Dowling and Pfeffer (1975) and adopts a managerial perspective, “emphasizing the way in 
which organizations instrumentally manipulate and deploy evocative symbols in order to 
garner societal support” (Suchman, 1995, 572). The seminal works by DiMaggio and 
Powell (1983), Scott and Meyer (1983) and Zucker (1983), on the other hand, characterize 
the institutional tradition: structuration dynamics generate cultural pressures, and these 
pressures over-ride any single organization‟s purposive control. 
 
This research leans on both of the above-mentioned traditions. Organizational legitimacy is 
broadly defined as the acceptance, approval and congruence of organizational actions in 
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accordance with an external, socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and 
definitions (e.g., Low and Johnston, 2008; Kostova and Zaheer, 1999; Suchman, 1995). 
Therefore, in the case of business organizations legitimacy could be understood as a 
generalized perception or assumption that the actions of a business entity are desirable, 
proper and appropriate. Inherent in this assumption of alignment with the context is the 
notion that companies have to cope and comply with institutional and socio-political 
pressures in order to survive (Hadjikhani and Ghauri, 2001; Hillman and Wan, 2005). On 
the other hand, interorganizational relationships are perceived in this study to be the media 
through which companies cope and comply with institutional pressures, thereby functioning 
as channels of communication and co-operation. A proper relational structure and related 
interaction processes thus provide the means to build legitimacy in the eyes of social 
stakeholders. 
 
From a business-network perspective, this process of legitimation refers to the generation 
of business, social, technological, and political activities connecting the companies‟ 
resources with other resources in the network (Low and Johnston, 2008; Savage et al., 
1991). Resources have neither value nor inbuilt legitimacy. The ability to transform them 
directly or indirectly through network activities adds value and generates profits, and the 
quality of transforming actions lends legitimacy. The management of these activities 
involves numerous tasks (e.g., the sourcing of materials and participating in value-adding 
R&D or other types of investment programs) and interactions (e.g., influencing public 
opinion, lobbying for key social and political initiatives). Over time these activities and 
related interactions become accepted as legitimate, provided that they confirm to the 
socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions in a given institutional 
setting. 
 
Companies are typically judged according to what they accomplish, and consequential 
effectiveness is celebrated. In the case of the pharmaceutical industry, it should be 
emphasized that its outputs and innovative achievements are socially defined and valued 
(e.g., in the areas of fertility and contraception). Further, some of the outputs are inherently 
difficult to measure at the time of their inception (e.g., improvements in public health and 
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increased life expectancy as a result of new innovative products). As Suchman (1995, 580) 
points out, “in such settings, consequential claims may serve primarily as signals of 
disposition.” The industry therefore tends to foster procedural legitimacy in the eyes of its 
social stakeholders by embracing socially accepted procedures in its relationship 
management. 
 
On the other hand, it is difficult for pharmaceutical MNCs to achieve and maintain 
legitimacy because of the multiplicity and complexity of the legitimating environments, 
intra-organizational complexity, and ambiguity in the whole process (Kostova and Zaheer, 
1999). They have to conform to the myriad of regulatory, normative and cognitive 
institutional pressures coming from multiple socio-political sources and a variety of 
healthcare systems. These pressures may be conflicting. Public interest and globalized 
economic activity are at stake, evidenced in the competing social, political and functional 
pressures that jointly influence the construction of legitimacy. Under such conditions, a 
political process of interaction, communication, and exchange could jointly create socially 
constructed perceptions and a legitimate status for MNCs and their subunits (Kostova and 
Roth, 2002; Mittra, 2006) in industrial networks of various healthcare systems and markets. 
 
Isomorphism 
 
According to the neo-institutional school of thought, legitimacy is primarily achieved 
through isomorphism: organizations become similar to other organizations in their field 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), which are open to structuration (Giddens, 1979) and 
involvement in the common domain (Hoffman, 2001). In his recent review of large-scale 
pharmaceutical M&As Mittra (2007) analyzes the merger waves and changes in the 
industry. He refers to the concept of “institutional isomorphism” (Kondra and Hinings, 
1998; Scott, 1987; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), and the mimetic process through which 
bureaucratic organizations come to appear increasingly similar as rational actors adopt 
standard responses to uncertainty, suggesting that they nicely capture the ongoing third 
wave of mergers. According to him, this wave of “corporate imitation” became evident 
when all the major pharmaceutical companies invested heavily in promissory genomic 
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technologies in order to match their competitors in facing unexpected industry shocks 
resulting from the emerging new technologies and deregulation. The outcome was a rash of 
oligopolistic mergers (Goldberg, 1983; Allen, Ramlogan and Randles, 2002), which “are 
defensive response to internal weakness, particularly the innovation deficit and managerial 
concerns about R&D efficiency and productivity” (Mittra, 2007, p. 283). 
 
Mittra‟s account of the concept of institutional isomorphism is amended in this research 
with reference to competitive isomorphism, which as a constraining process could result in 
the homogenization of organizational (Kostova, Roth and Dacin, 2008; Hannan and 
Freeman, 1977) and managerial practices. Market competition, investors‟ expectations and 
fitness measures for publicly listed companies characterize decision-making in the global 
pharmaceutical business. Decision makers have learned the appropriate responses and have 
adjusted their behavior accordingly, as evidenced in the search for emerging technologies 
in research-based industries. On the other hand, Laurila and Lilja (2002) suggest in their 
study of the Finnish-based forest industry that in order to achieve competitiveness on the 
company level, companies need to deviate from some institutionally legitimate practices on 
the functional level. For example, strategic repositioning aimed at enhancing growth 
opportunities and future earnings, or at cutting costs through reorganization, tends to 
supersede functional-level isomorphic pressures (ibid.). There is a dominance of company-
level competitive pressures over functional-level institutional pressures, resulting in 
company-specific practices that help companies to avoid excessive competition from their 
rivals. In the case of the research-based pharmaceutical industry and with regard to 
prevailing patent regulations, there tends to be a clear first-mover advantage in a market 
that is typically built on unique company-specific practices and functions, which are non-
isomorphic. As the findings of this study indicate, these practices and functions are 
nevertheless constrained by tight institutional order and isomorphic pressures. Still, agile 
actors manage to realize their company-level competitive interests and to differentiate 
themselves from their rivals. 
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Organizational field 
 
DiMaggio and Powell define an organizational field as “those organizations that, in the 
aggregate, constitute a recognized area of institutional life: key suppliers, resource and 
product consumers, regulatory agencies and other organizations that produce similar 
services or products” (1983, p. 148). This definition highlights the functional aspects in 
particular areas of institutional life, where distinct patterns of organizational action emerge 
and become institutionalized. It also encompasses both competing organizations and inter-
organizational relationships (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991). 
 
Neo-institutional models typically conceptualize the environment as organizational fields in 
which organizational action is subject to institutional pressures, and legitimacy is granted to 
environmental alignment. Increasing the interaction and the development of mutual 
awareness of coalitions and inter-organizational patterns define the field boundaries and 
create a common domain (Hoffman, 2001; Meyer, Scott and Deal, 1981). Theoretical 
modeling on these premises is somewhat problematic in the case of MNCs given the 
multiple and sometimes conflicting institutional environments of their sub-units (Kostova, 
Roth and Dacin, 2008). For example, according to neo-institutional thinking, sufficient 
inter-organizational interaction is fundamental to the formation of the organizational field, 
which could be precluded by the spatial, economic, cultural and socio-political conditions 
of healthcare. Inconsistencies between these conditions could hinder the emergence of 
shared patterns, which is necessary in order to define a consistent field. 
 
Kostova, Roth and Dacin (2008) suggest that it might be more instructive in the case of 
MNCs to conceive of social environments as evolving rule systems that are the 
products of a continuous process of sense making, enactment, and negotiated socio-
political interactions. Their approach conceptualizes organizational fields as systems 
of shared meaning, which emerge as actors coalesce around issues and shared logics 
or ideologies. Field boundaries are illuminated and differentiated via observed 
conflicts (e.g., research-based vs. generic companies). Furthermore, central to this 
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institutional process are social agents that are internal and external to the 
organization (e.g., the strong healthcare professions or the cultural aspects of care). 
 
In sum, it could be stated that the tenets of neo-institutionalism provide a rich theoretical 
foundation for the examination of a wide variety of critical issues, and allow theorizing on 
multiple levels: this is essential in business research (Djelic, Nooteboom and Whitley, 
2005). The neo-institutional premise that organizational success depends on factors 
beyond technical efficiency, and that these other factors are essentially socially 
constructed, fits well with the interaction and business-network approaches. Nevertheless, 
in spite of their wide acceptance, the tenets of neo-institutionalism and their meaningful 
application in studies on relationship-management practices and business networks should 
be critically reviewed. For example, the neo-institutional model essentially holds that 
organizational survival is determined by the extent of alignment with the institutional 
environment and well-defined organizational fields. The outcome of this emphasis on 
environmental dominance and continuity is the development of models incorporating a 
nominal amount of agency: organizations have to comply with external institutional 
pressures, and legitimacy is achieved through isomorphism (Hirsch and Lounsbury, 1997). 
However, rather than emphasizing the static and deterministic view of an 
environment with well-defined fields, in which legitimacy and isomorphism prevail 
over economic interests, one could also conceptualize business networks and their 
actors as active social agents who shape their environment. As merely exogenous 
constraints that business organizations have to consider, institutions could be viewed in 
terms of enacted and socially constructed shared understandings, and outcomes of 
processes in which business-network actors are actively involved as institutional 
entrepreneurs, especially during times of institutional disruption. 
 
2.4. The dynamic institutional environment and institutional entrepreneurship 
 
The institutional environment is broadly defined here as a dynamic entity within the 
institutionalization process, as corresponding institutions, or as the mechanisms and 
channels of influence (control and co-ordination) that relate to legitimacy in a particular 
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market; a network of actors embedded in a social system of economic and socio-political 
forces (e.g., Anderson, Håkansson and Johanson, 1994; Hurwicz, 1993). It comprises three 
pillars: the regulative, the normative and the cognitive (Scott, 1995). 
 
Dynamism is conceptualized as the process of constant change, the outcome of which is 
that things are perceived to be different than before (Hargrave and Van de Ven, 2006). This 
process of change in markets and networks could be either 1) orchestrated or otherwise 
coordinated, managed, planned or 2) spontaneous. Accordingly, the outcomes of the 
process could be markets characterized by planned or spontaneous order (Hayek, 1937; 
Castells, 1996; Tikkanen and Parvinen, 2006). As discussed in essay 1, change in networks 
and in their characteristics (orchestrated by institutional entrepreneurs, for example, or 
otherwise coordinated and planned) is subject to „rivers of activity‟ and actors‟ managerial 
cognitions. Such mechanisms influenced the emergence of planned order and challenged 
the orchestration of changes in the marketization of Finnish healthcare networks. 
 
Contemporary institutional theory favors a dynamic approach, according to which 
institutions and the institutional environment gradually evolve over time and the role of 
individual and organizational activity is highlighted (Meyer and Scott 1992). Moreover, it 
is assumed in this research that business networks and their actors tend to adapt to 
institutional pressures through renewing their governance logics, forms and practices 
(Grewal and Dharwadkar, 2002). For instance, essay 1 posits that there are different 
marketization rivers (managerial perceptions of dynamisms and change) within the 
different Finnish healthcare networks. Essay 2 describes how the Pharma Industry Finland 
strategic network struggled to adapt and to find cohesiveness following changes in the 
regulations and according to the findings reported in essays 3 and 4, the specific 
connectivity of the institutional context in the pharmaceutical business affected the 
restructuring of relationship patterns following the institutional disruptions. In sum, it is 
concluded that relationship-management practices in industrial networks are closely related 
to the dynamism of the institutional environment. 
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The dynamics of the institutional environment and of organizational change are mainly 
analyzed in this research in terms of institutionalization processes: regulating, validating 
and habitualizing (Grewal and Dharwadkar, 2002). This approach is well suited to the 
analysis of relationship management and customer portfolios in that such processes 
influence management decisions and induce change when actors adapt to environmental 
pressures. This adaptation to environmental dynamism reflects the underlying firm and 
industry characteristics, and should motivate investment in a particular customer portfolio 
(Johnson and Selnes, 2004). 
 
Regulatory processes represent evident interaction with regulatory institutions that exist to 
ensure the stability, order and continuity of societies and social welfare. Such processes are 
manifested in a market as imposition and inducement mechanisms, which influence 
different market mechanisms. Regulatory institutions can impose direct constraints in the 
form of authoritative orders, or indirect constraints in the form of rigorous rules and 
regulations (Grewal and Dharwadkar, 2002). If they do not possess the institutional 
capacity to initiate constraints, they may provide strong incentives and thereby induce the 
desired performance. This exercising of coercive power or will is often beneficial to society 
at large (Oliver, 1991; Baron, 1989), but is likely to force actors in business networks to 
make changes in their relationship patterns and interaction processes. The impact of 
regulatory processes is the central theme in all of the four essays, but essays 2 and 3 in 
particular analyze these disruptions and highlight them as potential drivers of institutional-
entrepreneurship activities. 
 
Validation processes involve interaction with normative institutions and give rise to 
standards of socially acceptable behavior (Baum and Oliver, 1991; Pfeffer, 1972; Pfeffer 
and Salancik, 1978), and are manifested via authorization mechanisms and mimicking 
behavior (Grewal and Dharwadkar, 2002). Mimicking occurs through the organizational 
imitation or modeling of norms or practices: it is shown in essay 1, for instance, how in 
recent years Finland has followed the general European-wide convergence towards “new 
public management” (NPM) through imitation on the health-care-network level, and 
through modeling in accordance with the norms of “quasi-markets”. Authorization involves 
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the development of rules and codes of conduct that are deemed appropriate and require 
companies to voluntarily seek the approval of the authorizing agents (see essay 2 on the 
role of the Pharma Industry Finland trade association). 
 
Habitualizing processes are the base-level institutional processes that give rise to cognitive 
institutions: shared cognitive templates (Meyer and Rowan, 1991) in which repeated 
actions are cast in a pattern, reproduced with minimal effort, and recognized by the actors 
as that particular pattern (Pentland and Rueter, 1994; Zucker, 1983 and 1977; Gill and 
Stern, 1969; Berger and Luckman, 1966). The two primary mechanisms that facilitate these 
processes are imprinting and bypassing (Grewal and Dharwadkar, 2002). Imprinting refers 
to the preservation of structures and processes over time. According to Baum and Oliver 
(1991), organizations acquire characteristics at the time of their inception, and subsequent 
inertia preserves these features and results in particular structures and processes. As the 
organizations mature they may find it difficult to change or to understand the need for 
change, given that some of the structures and processes will have become “sacrosanct”, or 
even symbolic. Cultural control is often used as a substitute for structural control in highly 
institutionalized organizations and environments, which may result in the bypassing of 
formal structures and processes (e.g., Zucker, 1977). These issues are addressed in essay 4 
through an analysis of the deinstitutionalization of relationship-management practices in the 
pharmaceutical division of a global corporation undergoing fundamental change during the 
merger and acquisition (M&A) process. The customer is redefined, relationship portfolios 
are restructured, and some relationship-management practices are questioned and possibly 
terminated. As a result, some habitualized practices are deinstitutionalized. 
 
Institutional entrepreneurship 
 
DiMaggio‟s (1988, 14) definition of institutional entrepreneurship is widely used: “New 
institutions arise when organized actors with sufficient resources (institutional 
entrepreneurs) see in them an opportunity to realize interests that they value highly.” 
Garud, Sanjay and Kumaraswamy (2002) refer to institutional entrepreneurship as the 
active formation of institutions as they emerge (see also Fligstein, 1997). This literature 
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discusses systems of meaning that tie the functioning of institutions (Aldrich and Fiol, 
1994) with the socialized, macro-biased perspective. On the other hand, some authors 
highlight individual actors as the creators of new institutions (Zucker and Darby, 1997; 
Déjean, Gond and Leca, 2004; Dorado, 2005). These studies typically focus on actors who 
break with the rules and practices associated with the dominant institutional logic(s), 
creating legitimacy among diverse stakeholders and thereby developing alternative rules 
and practices (Sundin and Tillmar, 2008; Battilana, 2006). 
 
Studies on institutional entrepreneurship typically address the “paradox of embedded 
agency” (Battilana, 2006; Giddens, 1984 and 1990). This implies that the actor as the 
entrepreneur is both constrained and enabled by the institutional environment, and at the 
same time contributes to changing it (Sundin and Tillmar, 2008; Ritvala, 2007; Ritvala and 
Granqvist, 2006). Lowndes (2005) proposes that embeddedness is not always a constraint 
on institutional entrepreneurs in that the environment may provide resources that make 
institutional change possible, for example. On the individual level, entrepreneurs must have 
the ability to foster co-operation, forge alliances and partnerships, and attract sponsors (e.g., 
socio-political decision makers and opinion leaders). On the organizational level it is not 
only the prevailing rules and practices, but also the degrees of turbulence at the specific 
time and place that have an impact on the institutional entrepreneur‟s contribution to 
change (Sundin and Tillmar, 2008). Disruptions such as emergent industry rules and new 
legislative norms have been identified as facilitating change in institutional systems 
(Selznick, 1957), and therefore potentially provide the momentum for institutional 
entrepreneurs. 
 
Institutional-entrepreneurship activity is described in essay 1 as a form of orchestration in 
networks resulting in some sort of planned order. It is pointed out that orchestration is 
traditionally considered an organization-level issue related to matching the competitive and 
societal strategies of firms in competitive environments (Karreman and Alvesson, 2004; see 
also Miller and Whitney, 1999). Planned order, on the other hand, is mostly related to the 
planning of structures, norms and rules on the societal and institutional levels. There is a 
gap in the research, which the modest study reported in essay 1 addresses by exploring 
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institutional entrepreneurship as the orchestration of change processes on the network level 
(e.g., the intentional weaving of strategic nets). 
 
Institutional processes tend to stabilize in mature and regulated industries (Greenwood, 
Suddaby and Hinings, 2002) as institutional rules begin to take the form of legislation, 
explicit codes of conduct or systemic structures. Where there are heavy institutional 
regulations and constraints marketing success is contingent not only on adhering to current 
rules, but also on reacting to opportunities created by institutional disruptions. Institutional 
entrepreneurs can yield results through partaking in institutional (re)formation and reacting 
to the changes in order to establish new institutions around the changed setting (e.g., 
Hensman, 2003). It is pointed out in essay 3 that marketing success through institutional 
entrepreneurship requires incorporating two value-creation perspectives. Both relate to the 
fact that, on the relationship level, marketing-oriented institutional-entrepreneurship 
activities are subject to the influence of a diverse network of actors (Maguire, Hardy and 
Lawrence, 2004). Firstly, such activities need a degree of legitimacy among the actors in 
order to prevail. One way of increasing perceived legitimacy is to form a strategic network 
and to utilize the power of collective action to promote a joint good and/or a collective end. 
Again, this is particularly true in the case of marketing-oriented activities, given the 
aggravated sense of agency in the high-powered and politically flavored healthcare and 
pharmaceutical business contexts. Maintaining legitimacy could be a constraint, but it could 
also add to the value creation by revealing the need to visibly expand the market to be 
divided among the actors. Secondly, as emphasized in prior marketing research (e.g., Salmi, 
1995; Garud, Sanjay and Kumaraswamy, 2002), institutional-entrepreneurship activities 
need to correspond with actor cognitions. Actors and their actions are critically dependent 
on the surrounding processes of structuration, and this favors emergent strategies and 
practices (Lawrence, 1999; Lawrence and Phillips, 2004). Both marketing and institutional 
entrepreneurship are „regulated‟ by the way socially constructed realities perceive efforts, 
and thus institutional interplay needs to be sensitive to actor cognitions. 
 
However, the institutional environment may be fairly turbulent, as described in this 
research (essays 1 – 3), and give rise to institutional-entrepreneurship activities either as a 
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form of collective action (essay 2) or as an activity of a single company (essay 3). Both 
forms of action were found to be potentially successful in serving business interests, but as 
proposed in essay 2, legitimacy traps and the maintenance of collective institutional 
entrepreneurship are strongly linked to strategic cohesiveness in networks. If the Pharma 
Industry Finland network had been strategically cohesive – i.e. if its members had had a 
mutual understanding of and had accepted a future vision and game plan – it would have 
been able to initiate and maintain collective action. However, legitimacy traps undermined 
the strategic cohesiveness (e.g., generic companies viewed some of the proposed 
entrepreneurship activities as self-interested and not in the best interests of the field as a 
whole). 
 
2.5. Deinstitutionalization and the restructuring of relationship portfolios 
 
Much of the neo-institutional literature relies on a punctuated equilibrium model that builds 
on the premise of long periods of institutional stasis periodically disrupted by some sort of 
exogenous, spontaneous shock (Hargrave and Van De Ven, 2006; Streeck and Thelen, 
2005). The possibility of endogenously generated change that is more than just an adaptive 
measure is often ignored because institutions and institutional arrangements are seen as 
self-enforcing equilibria (De Figueiredo Jr., Rui and Weingast, 2005). The majority of these 
types of models describe how new institutions or arrangements emerge in consecutive 
stages in which deinstitutionalization results in re-institutionalization. However, these 
theoretical frameworks pay hardly any attention to the relational outcomes of 
deinstitutionalization, which may be an important precondition for the development of new 
institutional initiatives influenced by the planned order through interaction in the network 
(Easton and Poad, 2003; Tikkanen and Parvinen, 2006). Moreover, there is a tendency in 
this literature to understate the extent of the change for an actor, or alternatively to code all 
observed changes as minor adaptive adjustments to altered circumstances in the service of 
the continuous reproduction of existing practices and institutional paths (e.g., Häkkinen and 
Lehto, 2005; Streeck and Thelen, 2005). These older frameworks are thus fairly ill 
equipped to capture the deinstitutionalization processes triggered by the M&A and their 
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relational outcomes, and this may fundamentally affect the connectivity, the relationship 
structure, and management practices. Essay 4 addresses this gap in the existing research. 
 
Several authors have formulated explanations of organizational change on the basis of 
changing interpretive schemes and/or institutional resistance to organizational 
transformations influenced by a set of environmental pressures (e.g., Barley, 1986 and 
1990; Tushman and Romanelli, 1985; Zucker, 1988; Greenwood and Hinings, 1988; 
Oliver, 1992; Seal, 2003). Although these frameworks have contributed significantly to our 
understanding of fundamental transformations, they shed less light on how business-
network organizations cope with changing actor connectedness emanating from an M&A 
process (in terms of changed perceptions of the market and the customer due to the 
increased know-how and product range, for example). In addition, prior literature typically 
conceptualizes de- and institutionalization processes on the institutional-field or market 
level, but in this research (essay 4) they are used as concepts for the analysis of a network 
organization and its fundamental change during M&A. As pointed out, it is essential to 
recognize the impact of institutional mechanisms in the analysis. For example, imprinting 
could have a substantial effect on the success of the M&A process and on the future 
performance of the new organization. It could also have a negative influence on integration 
processes. When organizations mature they may find it difficult to change, or to understand 
the need for change, given that some of the relational structures and processes could be 
taken for granted or have even become symbolic. Furthermore, bypassing practices could 
lead to the preservation of existing interaction practices and relationship patterns. 
 
The restructuring of relationship portfolios in the M&A is conceptualized in essay 4 as 
deinstitutionalization. The integration of resources resulted in a redefinition of the customer 
and consequent targeting. In addition, a set of organizational factors related to institutional 
processes were identified as institutionalized relationship-management practices, which 
challenged the notion of the isolated building up of practices across related functions in the 
new organization. The outcome was that some management practices began to 
deinstitutionalize, some habitual processes and related actor roles were re-classified, and 
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new activities and positions were associated with various types of actors (internal network 
members, customers and other related actors). 
 
 
3. Research methodology 
 
This chapter discusses the research approach and the related methodological issues and 
concerns of the study. It begins with an explanation of how the chosen research strategy 
addresses the research questions in the context of critical realism, and goes on to describe 
the semi-structured interview method reported in essay 1 and the case studies on the 
pharmaceutical industry from essays 2-4. 
 
3.1. Research approach 
 
The research strategy is built on critical realism. As a philosophical position critical realism 
seeks to re-describe objects of explanation in a theoretically sound way by postulating the 
existence of generative mechanisms that are potentially responsible for the workings of real 
social structures and their potential causal capabilities rather than regularities (Tsoukas, 
1989; Easton, 2002). Three research issues are addressed in the four essays: 1) a description 
of events, 2) the identification of entities that are embedded in a theoretical framework, and 
3) a description of possible causal mechanisms. Table 3 below gives examples of the 
events, entities, and possible causal mechanisms identified in the essays. 
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Underpinning the above propositions is Bhaskar‟s (1978) transcendental argument. The 
premise is that something called science exists, and in order for it to exist the world/reality 
must be observed in a particular, stratified way – that is, through mechanisms as casual 
powers governing the level of events (the actual) and experience (the empirical) (Easton, 
2010). In other words, the social phenomena under study are real, existing and concept-
dependent, since the researcher can only know these real things under particular concepts, 
or descriptions of them (Fawcett and Hearn, 2004). This study is thus built on theory (the 
development of concepts and descriptions) and empirical data (experiences, interpretations 
of the events), and the theory and particular concepts are developed prior to the data 
collection. For example, the explorative research process described in essay 1 started with a 
pure theoretical treatment of the phenomenon: marketization and the orchestration of 
healthcare networks. The core propositions were formed on the basis of the selected 
theories and then reflected in the findings from a round of interviews. 
 
There are three core assumptions on which a layered ontology is built (Contu and Willmott, 
2005). First, the phenomena to which research and explanation are directed are the 
underlying structures and mechanisms that produce empirical events (Bhaskar, 1978). 
Second, these underlying structures or mechanisms are not directly accessible to sense 
experience and have to be theoretically constructed and modeled through a process of 
conceptual abstraction (Blakie, 2000). Third, as theoretically reconstructed models and 
explanations of underlying structures or mechanisms that contingently generate actual 
evens and outcomes, scientific theories offer provisional descriptions and accounts of 
phenomena that are always open to revision and reformulation (Bhaskar, 1978). These 
ontological assumptions have guided the research strategy of this dissertation: the four 
essays with somewhat different theoretical bases, levels of analysis, and empirical focuses 
generate the theoretical modeling and descriptions of the phenomena under study. The 
theory, the interpretations of the empirical data and the conclusions presented in the essays 
have been subject to revision and reformulation during the research process. For example, 
they have been thoroughly debated and discussed among our community of researchers, 
and the alternative explanations evaluated. 
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The epistemology of this study could be summarized in the statement that there is a process 
of interpretation that intervenes between two domains: 1) the empirical (in which 
observations are made and experienced by researchers) and 2) the actual (in which events 
occur and may or may not be observed by researchers, or may be differently understood) 
(Easton, 2010). All theoretical descriptions, explanations and evaluations are grounded in 
knowledge-generating and diffusion processes that are temporally and spatially located in 
historical and social settings that make them fallible, contested and revisable (Reed, 2005). 
As with this research, it is unlikely to reveal completely or lead to a full understanding of 
the phenomena under study and the related research questions, given that the theory 
building is for analytic generalization according to which “the investigator is striving to 
generalize a particular set of results to a broader theory” (Yin, 1994, p. 36). The aim is to 
provide some evidence that supports a theory but does not necessarily prove it (Perry, 1998; 
Halinen and Törnroos, 2005): the social world exists in open systems in which events do 
not invariably follow a determined and recurrent pattern, and are subject to diverse causal 
variation (Harrê, 1986). Causality is therefore considered to refer to the inherent powers or 
capacities of mechanisms or structures to generate certain tendencies or regularities, which 
may or may not be contingently observed in empirical events or outcomes (Reed, 2005). 
Accordingly, the research strategy of this study is built on the relation between theory and 
empirical data. The process could be described as retroduction: “a mode of inference that 
aims at discovering the underlying structures or mechanisms that produce tendencies or 
regularities under certain conditions through a process of model building, testing and 
evaluation” (Reed, 2005, p. 1631).  Although researchers following the critical-realist path 
tend to differentiate between retroduction and abduction as methodological logics (e.g., 
Reed, 2005), the ideas presented by Danermark et al. (2002, 96) are adopted in this 
research, whereby the two are considered to be closely connected - even to that extent that 
they seem almost indistinguishable in concrete research practice. 
 
All the cases in this study call for inductive theory building in their analysis. The principles 
of prior theory are difficult to apply outright because the accepted constructs of business 
networks within task-environment modeling seem to be inadequate. Prior theory is 
therefore viewed as evidence that can be used to triangulate the external reality and to re-
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describe it (Lewis and Grimes, 1999; Perry, 1998; Olsen and Ellram, 1997). It is recognized 
that pure induction without theoretical reference might prevent the researcher from 
benefiting from previous work, just as pure deduction might prevent the development of 
new and useful theory (Carson et al., 2001; Miles and Huberman, 1994). Therefore the 
more prominent inductive theory building was systematically combined with deduction 
from prior theory (Dubois and Gadde, 2002; Coffey and Atkinson, 1996) in the case 
research. As such, the process involved moving from the conception of a given 
phenomenon to the conception of a different kind of phenomenon that could have generated 
it. The process was “moving backwards” (retroduction: Easton, 2010). 
 
Given these ontological and theoretical presuppositions, a number of methodological 
consequences follow. The phenomena (inter-organizational relationships and nets of 
connected organizations) under study are relatively clearly bounded, but complex. The 
three research questions call for the analysis of the associated events that take place as a 
result of actors acting in networks. The research method therefore needs to be flexible, a 
vehicle for collecting multi-source data and extensive protocols for analysis on different 
levels (e.g., the network level in essay 2 and the focal-actor level in essays 3 and 4). A case 
approach was chosen as the main mode of inference. It is an intensive method (Sayer, 
2000) that “…focuses on individual agents in context using interviews, ethnography and 
qualitative analysis, asks the question of “what produces change?”, employs causal groups, 
produces causal explanations which are, however, limited to the situation studied so that 
testing is by corroboration” (Easton, 2010, p. 123). 
 
3.2. Semi-structured interviews on marketization 
 
The modest aim of the semi-structured interviews reported in essay 1 was to explore 
whether the theory-based propositions of marketization and orchestration would emerge 
spontaneously in dialogue, and therefore the propositions were not presented to the 
interviewees. According to Holstein and Gubrium (1997), a dual interest in the „hows‟ and 
the „whats‟ of meaning production implies an appreciation of the constitutive activeness of 
the interview process. The „hows‟ refer to the interactional, narrative procedures of 
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knowledge production, not merely to interviewing techniques, whereas the „whats‟ pertain 
to the issues covered in the interview, the content of the questions, and the substantive 
information communicated by the respondent. The focus in essay 1 was more on the 
„whats‟, and on the marketization information communicated by 39 key decision makers in 
Finnish health-care service organizations or closely related professional organizations. The 
choice of interviewing as a research method could be characterized as an attempt to better 
understand the patterns of meanings that “guide managers in their interactions with others 
in the increasingly complex networks in which they operate” (Turnbull, Ford and 
Cunningham, 1996, p. 59). 
 
3.3. Case studies of the pharmaceutical business 
 
The case studies that constitute part of this dissertation (essays 2-4) addressed research 
questions two and three. The aim was to give the reader an objective and commensurable 
picture of how institutions and institutional processes influence the strategic choices in 
pharmaceutical companies by shaping economic structures and relationship-management 
practices, and vice versa. This calls for rich data from multiple sources covering themes 
such as organizational decision-making (mechanisms influencing the strategic choices 
involved in relationship management), relationship patterns (structures), and inter-
organizational interaction (relational processes). The studies presented in essays 2-4 feature 
different numbers of cases. The selection of the cases and the determination of their number 
for this research were guided by theoretical considerations: replication and contrary 
replication (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007), and information richness 
enabling deeper exploration of the research questions and theoretical elaboration (Patton, 
1990; Yin, 1994). The theoretical sampling for the single case (essay 4) was 
straightforward. It was chosen because it is unusually revelatory and there was a unique 
opportunity for research access (Yin, 1994). 
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 Pharma Industry Finland 
 
Essay 2 comprises a study on the trade association Pharma Industry Finland (PIF), which 
looks after the policy interests of the research-based pharmaceutical industry in Finland. 
The Finnish pharmaceutical market was fairly “closed” during the 1980s, and personal trust 
in and the power of local opinion leaders were notable. Since then, however, the market has 
opened up in accordance with EMEA (the European Medicines Agency), the EEA 
agreement and EU membership. Pharmaceutical companies have also recently developed 
great industry concentration (see Mittra 2006 and 2007), and this cohesion of information 
and interest reveal an increasing capacity to face regulators with system trust and power 
(Studdert, Mello and Brennan, 2004; Bachmann 2001; Luhman, 1979). As a result, the 
pharmaceutical industry has created a “mandate” to participate in the dialogue, and the 
capability to act as an institutional entrepreneur. However, regulators and normative 
institutions in the business are also subject to unavoidable political endowment and the 
cognitions inherent in healthcare systems (e.g., the control of costs in publicly financed 
Beveridge-type systems (Leppo, 2002). PIF‟s mission is therefore to develop the 
competitiveness of the industry and the relevant research, as well as the operating 
environment both in Finland and in the EU. Its main target of influence is the economic, 
industrial, and sociopolitical legislation that governs the pharmaceutical industry. 
 
In accordance with the ideas of Jarillo (1988), Gulati, Nohria and Zaheer (2000), and 
Möller, Rajala and Svahn (2005), PIF is defined as a horizontally aligned strategic business 
network, which promotes intentionally developed and managed inter-organizational 
cooperation between pharmaceutical companies in pursuit of mutually beneficial strategic 
business goals. The pursuit of such goals and benefits motivated its establishment, and it 
acts as an institutional entrepreneur. It adapts to institutions, modifies them, and seeks an 
advantageous network position in order to fulfill its members‟ aspirations (Maguire, Hardy 
and Lawrence, 2004; Garud, Sanjay and Kumaraswamy, 2002; Lawrence, 1999; Lawrence 
and Lorsch, 1967). 
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Data was collected during 2004-2005. The primary data comprises interviews with 25 key 
persons from PIF‟s internal and external networks, including representatives of 
pharmaceutical companies, patient organizations, physician‟s associations, and government 
agencies. Secondary material was also collected, such as memos, annual reports, and 
company-specific information. The data analysis involved finding themes and patterns 
(Miles and Huberman, 1994), and theories of business networks and the institutional 
environment comprised the theoretical framework and the analytical lens (Gioia and Pitre, 
1990). The expertise of the researcher following12 years in the industry, including working 
with PIF and in institutional relationships with regulative authorities in Finland, facilitated 
access to the informants and documents, as well as helping to deepen the analysis. 
 
Pharmaceutical companies and their relationship portfolios 
 
The focus in essay 3 is on the pharmaceutical market in a fairly turbulent institutional 
context. Institutional disruptions, such as new legislative norms, have been identified as 
facilitating system changes (Selznick, 1957). As such, they are potential moments of 
adaptation and influence for institutional entrepreneurs. Figure 4 on the next page depicts 
the recent major disruptions that have had a significant effect on the marketing practices of 
pharmaceutical MNCs operating in Finland. 
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Figure 4. Disruptions in the institutional environment influencing the marketing practices 
of pharmaceutical companies operating on the Finnish market 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Essay 3 covers three cases of pharmaceutical MNCs, all of which operate in Finland. The 
cases concern how the managers structure their relationship portfolios and how various 
industry- and firm–specific characteristics drive the dimensions on which they are 
developed across evolving economic and socio-political structures and processes. The focus 
is on the interdependencies between various management decisions, with an emphasis on 
an integrated approach to the management of the company‟s various business units in the 
achievement of its long-term objectives (Turnbull, 1990). As in the case of ethical 
pharmaceuticals, the product pipeline and the current product range drive customer-
portfolio management, which functions as a prescriptive guide to the development and 
maintenance activities of relationship management under institutional disruption. 
 
An explicit sampling strategy was adopted in order to identify three comparative cases of 
pharmaceutical MNCs and institutional actors in the Finnish market. The unit of analysis 
was the case company and its network-customer portfolios, and the boundaries were limited 
to the organizational field: organizations that, on the aggregate, constituted a recognized 
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that it directs attention to the totality of relevant actors and incorporates both connectedness 
and the structural aspects of influence and adaptation via intentional networking. 
 
The case companies were deliberately selected on the basis of the postulated theory, and 
could be characterized as: 
(1) major players in the Finnish market (active actors with a joint market share of 26.3% in 
2005) with 
(2) somewhat different product portfolios and company profiles and 
(3) an interest in the focal study. 
 
This selection was considered sufficiently representative in that the companies shared some 
homogeneous (they were all members of PIF and followed the same normative code for the 
marketing of medicinal products, for example) and some contrasting characteristics: one 
was strong in generics and was largely owned by local health-care professionals, the second 
dominated certain therapeutic fields, and the third covered all major therapeutic sectors. 
This type of combination is believed to produce information of greater depth than would be 
the case with homogeneous selection (Knodel, 1993), and some generalizing is justified 
when general phenomena are under investigation (Stake, 2000; Mason, 1996). 
 
In business studies, the “asymmetrical encounter” of the interview (Green and Thorogood, 
2004; Hiller and DiLuzio, 2004; Facett and Hearn, 2004; Holstein and Gubrium, 1995) is in 
imbalance with the research object, which is usually relatively more powerful than the 
researcher and strictly controls access to the data. The management‟s interest in this case 
facilitated access to the primary and secondary data and provided the basis for the 
interviewing. The interviews were encounters characterized by the interviewees‟ 
descriptions and perceptions of 1) inter-organizational relationships, 2) management-
relationship practices, and 3) the impact of the institutional environment and its changes on 
customer portfolios and their management practices. Thirty-seven interviews were 
conducted between November 2005 and February 2006, all of which were recorded for 
analysis. Typically, the dialogue was opened by the interviewer with a short presentation of 
the framework of the study (approximately three-and-a-half minutes of the average 44-
 45 
minute sessions). Then the lead was given to the interviewees, although the interviewer 
asked questions when necessary in order to ensure that all three themes were adequately 
covered. 
 
The data-analysis process constituted five phases: 1) interpretation and coding, 2) 
categorization and thematization, 3) the identification of patterns and the drawing of 
preliminary conclusions, 4) generalizing the conclusions within the data, and 5) considering 
the generalizations in the light of existing knowledge (Miles and Huberman, 1994). It was a 
reasoned decision not to build the analysis on the use of a software program as a technical 
tool for pursuing arguments about data, since it did not yield any new insights or value. The 
significance of the data was typically established throughout the whole interview dialogue 
in the diverse examples and descriptions of practices, which were intertwined and rich in 
descriptive key words, multilingual phrases and metaphors. It was therefore appropriate to 
preserve the flow of the dialogue in this analysis and not to break it up too much. 
 
In taking this approach, it was advisable to build various devices into the research design in 
order to ensure the accuracy of the data interpretation (Silverman, 2005). The interviews 
took in “both sides of the dyads”. The first interviewees were representatives of 
pharmaceutical companies and included 29 members of senior and middle management, 
chosen according to their position and responsibilities in the organizational structure, and 
the function and/or area of pharmacotherapy they represented: eight interviews in company 
A, seven in company B, and 14 in company C. Secondly, eight interviews were conducted 
with institutional representatives, including the CEOs of patient organizations, presidents of 
associations and senior civil servants and directors from government agencies. 
 
The merger of two MNCs 
 
Essay 4 reports an explanatory, single case study of the merger of two pharmaceutical 
MNCs. It addresses the third research question, “How do institutionalized market structures 
influence and are influenced by business-relationship-management practices?”, but the 
level of analysis is different than the network level of analysis in essay 2.  A focal-actor 
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perspective was adopted and the focus was on the change in and the outcomes of CRM 
practices arising from the merger, rather than on the merger process per se. 
 
Various types of strategic alliances, collaborative agreements and licensing strategies are 
increasingly driving contemporary innovation and marketing management in the 
pharmaceutical industry and related application areas, thereby creating complex 
relationship networks (Luukkonen, 2005). There are 150 countries in which the case 
company‟s products are commercialized by subsidiaries and marketing-authorization 
agreements with other companies. Accordingly, the focal case, which operates in a 
therapeutic area of the pharmaceutical division of a global chemical and pharmaceutical 
corporation, is conceptualized as a business network. The integration process primarily 
involves coping with a variety of customer relationships (Anderson et al., 2003) and their 
management as portfolios (Lukkari and Parvinen, 2008). 
 
An explicit sampling strategy was adopted, since the opportunity to access the data opened 
up shortly after the launch (January 2007), when the processes of integration and 
reorganization were under construction. The pharmaceutical business of the case 
corporation was spread over six therapeutic areas. The unit of analysis used in the study 
was one of these areas, in which the product ranges of the merging corporations were 
considered complimentary and synergies were expected in terms of the integration of 
relationship management and other sales and marketing activities (e.g., cross-selling). 
Particular reliance was placed on the interviews. Nevertheless, in order to decrease 
dependence on the whims of the organizations‟ gatekeepers in the asymmetrical encounter, 
who could potentially seek to limit and control what could be investigated (Silverman, 
2005; Green and Thorogood, 2004; Hiller and DiLuzio, 2004; Facett and Hearn, 2004; 
Holstein and Gubrium, 1995), information was acquired from a variety of sources. 
 
The marketing management in the focal therapeutic area is organized under a global team, 
which is responsible for the marketing strategies of various product franchises, and 
supports the subsidiaries and other business partners with their regional or country-specific 
marketing activities. The interviews with members of the global marketing team covered 
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the participants‟ descriptions and perceptions of 1) customer relationships, 2) related 
management practices, and 3) the impact of the merger on both. Six interviews were 
conducted at the end of October and in early November 2007, all of which were recorded 
and transcribed for analysis. In each session the interviewer opened the dialogue by giving 
a brief presentation of the study and describing the institutional context, which was not 
familiar to the interviewees. (This description of the main concepts might have biased the 
study somewhat, but on the other hand it helped the subjects to describe and present their 
perceptions of habitualized practices, for example.) The floor was then given to the 
interviewees, and questions were asked only when necessary in order to ensure that all 
three themes were covered. The interviews lasted 36 minutes on average. 
 
All seven interviewees were members of the global marketing team and senior managers 
with extensive experience (10-20 years) of marketing in the merging corporations. They 
were chosen on the basis of their position and responsibilities in the organizational 
structure, and the function and/or area of pharmacotherapy they represented. Consequently, 
all major product franchises in the therapeutic area were covered. Isomorphism was 
identified from the interview data in the form of descriptions of mimicking the behavior 
and/or adoption of CRM practices and relational patterns that were perceived to be a 
standard in the business or which resembled competitors‟ CRM behavior. 
Deinstitutionalization was identified from the interviewees‟ responses to questions 
concerning why some relationships or practices had been terminated. Additional 
information came from corporation documents and personal correspondence with some key 
persons involved in relationship-portfolio management and related actor-facing functions in 
the HQs and in the Nordic subsidiaries (e.g., R&D, medical information and regulatory 
affairs). This verified some conclusions drawn on the basis of the interviews, and filled in 
some of the gray areas that remained. 
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4. Research explanations and key findings 
 
This dissertation consists of four essays, which are either published or forthcoming in 
refereed international journals. Following chapters present the summary of their 
contributions: conceptual findings and the key aspects of managerial recommendations. 
The original papers are in the part II. 
 
4.1. Conceptual findings 
 
Contemporary neo-institutional theory and industrial network approach favor dynamic 
approach to environment. This dynamism and constant change are analyzed by focusing on 
the institutionalization processes and how they create pressures toward economic actors, 
dynamisms in the organizational field and changing perceptions of legitimacy and 
isomorphism. The conceptual findings of this study describe how business networks and 
interorganizational relationships function as mechanisms which mediate institutional 
pressures into management practices and economic structures. In addition, the findings of 
this study highlight how relationships function as channels of influence for institutional 
entrepreneurs. 
 
The examples given in Table 4 on the following pages illustrate the outcomes of this 
institutional interplay along two conceptual dimensions, namely: 1) the three types of 
institutionalization process and the related pressures (regulating, validating and 
habitualizing), and 2) the tenets of neo-institutional theory (see Chapter 2.3). These 
findings contribute to marketing theory in describing how business networks as economic 
structures are influenced and shaped by institutional pressures. In addition, they are 
particularly relevant to applied research on business networks in that they are examples of 
management practices that could be generalized in the form of some moderate managerial 
recommendations. 
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4.1.1.An expanding organizational field shapes relationships and CRM portfolios 
 
The issue at stake in the healthcare and pharmaceutical business is the relationship between 
public interests and globalized economic activity, which jointly define the organizational 
field: What are these organizations that constitute an area of institutional life interplaying 
with business? Dynamism in this organizational field and the interplay with business are 
characterized by: 1) changing regulations and the authorities‟ institutional arrangements, 2) 
a strong normative order in terms of co-operation between the pharmaceutical industry and 
the professions, and 3) slowly changing actor cognitions. 
 
The regulative dimension 
 
On the regulative dimension the EMEA, the EEA agreement, and the EU have had a 
profound influence on the business networks of pharmaceutical companies in terms of 
expanding the organizational field. Their procedures and processes of marketing 
authorization, wholesale and factory licenses, pharmacovigilance and the provision of 
medical information became the subjects in the wider European context. The organizational 
field expanded as new authorities and novel institutional arrangements emerged, resulting 
in the restructuring of relational patterns in healthcare and pharmaceutical business 
networks. In addition, new channels of influence for institutional entrepreneurs were 
created. For example, the following comment was made by a medical director who had 
worked for 28 years on regulatory assignments in the industry (for more details see essay 
3): 
“The Finnish pharmaceutical market was fairly “closed” during the 1980s and local 
physicians‟ associations had strong control over publicly accepted pharmacotherapy 
practices. Personal trust in and the power of opinion leaders were notable. Since 
then, however, the market has “opened up” in accordance with EMEA, the EEA 
agreement and EU membership… The business has changed.” 
 
However, social and healthcare are national issues in the EU. Local socio-political interests 
have an impact on the regulation of business and economic structures. Business networks 
are still strongly shaped by the local authorities, and some of them have enough 
institutional capacity to enable them to exercise coercive power over other actors in the 
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field. For example, Finnish regulations on the factorization of marketing-authorization and 
price-application processes raised the expertise in the local institutional environment and in 
relationship-management practices in MNCs. Nevertheless, the importance of co-operative 
relationships and interactive channels of communication is highlighted in the findings of 
this research. One of the interviewees from the regulative, institutional side (a National 
Health Insurance (NHI) director quoted in essay 3) stated: 
“It is essential that we have channels of communication, so that we hear the 
arguments of others in this field. Otherwise we could easily make decisions that 
could harm the whole business…” 
 
The normative dimension 
 
The development of healthcare and pharmacotherapy is extremely knowledge-intensive. 
The business is characterized by interactive marketing measures and constant knowledge 
flow between the industry and the physician‟s profession in the fields of clinical research 
and further occupational education, for example. Professional associations in Finland are 
traditionally considered objective, scholarly opinion leaders and therefore carry weight as 
far as recommendations for pharmacotherapy are concerned. State agencies ask for their 
expert opinions on marketing authorization and reimbursement issues, for example, which 
have a direct impact on market penetration and sales volumes. One of the interviewees (see 
essay 3) described the contemporary customer-portfolio-management practices of the 
company she worked for as follows: 
“Today the relationship portfolio is a management tool for us, which was not the 
case earlier… We have organized ourselves in teams by therapeutic sectors, and in 
these teams some people are responsible for the customers, and other people for the 
products [refers to clinical research and medical information]. We try to define what 
needs the customers have and, respectively, what needs our products have. Then we 
combine these needs so that our information is synchronized and take advantage of 
these subfields jointly. It is extremely challenging to manage this kind of network, 
since you can‟t be quite certain who the decision maker is and what [institutional] 
position he or she has.” 
 
Advances in biotech and promissory genomic technologies have profoundly changed R&D 
practices and expanded the organizational fields in the pharmaceutical business. The rapid 
development of new technologies boosted the growth of innovative, highly specialized 
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R&D companies in the industry, which challenged the traditional in-house R&D functions 
of research-based organizations. Constant pressure to innovate and make risky investments 
resulted in a wave of mergers (for further details see e.g., Mittra, 2007) and the emergence 
of co-operational research networks in the industry. 
 
Changing constituent relations in the business resulted in the mimicking of relational 
structures with research collaboration. One of the interviewees analyzing the relational 
outcomes of the merger (see essay 4) describes this change in the industry and the 
mimicking as follows: 
“In the biotech field people are working much more with - for example - small 
external research groups. We were not doing this enough within X [refers to the 
acquiring corporation] in the past. We were relying more on our own research 
capacity…I think we will go more and more external as well. I think this is a 
general trend in the pharmaceutical industry, because it is so difficult to find a NP 
[new product] or NC [new compound] and everybody is looking and shopping 
around for them and that is why companies are targeting some start-ups…” 
 
The cognitive dimension 
 
The pharmaceutical case companies systematically organize and sponsor various training 
programs and frequent detailing, which are considered CME for health-care professionals.  
This sponsored CME co-operation consolidates interaction with normative institutions (e.g. 
co-operation with the leading Finnish scientific Medical Society Duodecim) and thereby 
shapes or preserves existing collective, professional cognitive templates. As a result, 
cognitive institutions emerge and repeated prescribing actions are cast into a pattern by 
means of habitual action. Existing relational structures and processes are preserved despite 
institutional disruptions and the expanding organizational field. For example, the interview 
data of the third essay indicates that the imprinting mechanism preserves the structures and 
processes of prescribing, and the bypassing mechanism preserves habitual prescribing by 
physicians. These mental processes of enactment create stability and stagnation in the 
expanding organizational field. Research-based companies have more time to adapt to the 
generic substitution by re-evaluating their strategic relationships and restructuring the 
customer portfolios, since it takes time for the new, generic actors to build the relationship 
due to imprinting and bypassing. The following statement by a medical director from one 
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of the case companies studied in the essay three describes the habitual action and 
preservation of structures and processes well: 
“Our drug market was split in two when generic substitution started: the generic 
market and the branded market, on which our business rests … A change is on the 
way. But, for time being, the majority of physicians have ignored the whole issue of 
substitution…“ 
 
The interview data presented in the essay 1 provides other examples of the relevance of 
actor cognitions for the relationship management practices and performance of networks. 
The on-going marketization of Finnish healthcare expands the existing organizational fields 
by new private actors. The interviews indicated that prevailing cognitions of change and 
related decision making are heterogenic; especially there is much heterogeneity in the way 
management perceives the changes in the network level. 
 
The governance of health care networks is decentralized and has parallel arrangements for 
service production and funding at the municipal level. This arrangement is preserved by 
imprinting and is sacrosanct. The outcome is 1) increased variety of regional normative 
order resulting in the quality and dynamics of relationships which can be controlled by 
patterns of personal trust and/or power, and 2) enhanced spontaneous order, resulting in 
diversity in methods of delivering services, which hinders possibilities of orchestration and 
creates production overcapacity (a partially optimal outcome at the national level). 
 
The influence of the expanding organizational field could be summarized as an increasing 
trend towards the use of business networks as the economic structure in the pharmaceutical 
and healthcare business. Due to institutional disruptions, old hierarchical structures are 
assuming more and more network-like characteristics. Constituent relationships between 
actors are changing, and relationship-management practices are being adapted accordingly. 
On the other hand, slowly changing actor cognitions create rigidities, resistance to change 
and heterogeneity in the way management perceives the changes on the network level. The 
outcome of this is habitual action in management decision-making and partial structural 
optimization on the organizational level, resulting in a sub-optimal outcome on the network 
level and the need to orchestrate the change. 
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4.1.2. Legitimacy, co-operative relationships and institutional capacity 
 
The findings of this study are in line with prior literature (e.g., Greenwood, Suddaby and 
Hinings, 2002): regulative and normative ascendance prevails over actor conformity in a 
highly institutionalized market. Consensus is essential, building legitimacy in the eyes of 
social stakeholders. However, regulators and normative institutions (e.g., trade 
associations) in the healthcare and pharmaceutical businesses are also related to the 
unavoidable political endowment inherent in the healthcare market. The definition of 
legitimacy adopted in this dissertation (see Chapter 3.3. Applications of institutional theory 
in relationship management) therefore highlights its acceptance and approval by external 
constituents (Suchman, 1995) and its achievement through isomorphism. Striving for 
legitimacy results in isomorphic relational structures and relationship-management 
practices. 
 
The regulative dimension 
 
Regulative authorities exercise their power by imposition or inducement. This exercising of 
coercive power or will is often beneficial to society at large (Oliver, 1991; Baron, 1989), 
and is therefore perceived to be legitimate. Legislative changes have paved the way for the 
marketization of healthcare in Finland. Municipalities are no longer responsible for the 
production of essential healthcare, only for organizing it. For example, the law covering the 
planning and state subsidy of social and healthcare passed in 2003 allows municipalities to 
organize the services in five different ways, namely: 
1) produce the services themselves 
2) co-operate with other municipalities and produce the services jointly with them 
3) join a federation of municipalities that produces services 
4) purchase services from the state, other municipalities, federations of municipalities 
or private service providers 
5) provide service users with vouchers (the users choose an authorized producer and 
the municipalities cover the cost within the limits of the voucher). 
The outcome of this is the erosion of traditional hierarchical market structures and the 
emergence of complex business networks. This contemporary trend towards more 
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liberalized and market-accommodating healthcare, with competitive bidding and tender 
processes (in the municipalities among internal purchasers and providers, and between the 
municipalities and/or federations of municipalities and other municipalities or private 
service producers) has boosted non-orchestrated and spontaneous change. This process has 
resulted in inefficiencies (see essay 1 and e.g., Lauridsen et al., 2007; Pekurinen and 
Häkkinen, 2005; Nguyen and Häkkinen, 2005; Häkkinen and Joumard 2007; Lister, 2005; 
OECD, 2005; Häkkinen and Järvelin, 2004). It is proposed in essay 1 that the orchestration 
of counter-measures in Finnish healthcare networks is possible provided that the outcomes 
and/or threats of spontaneous ordering are understood. Key orchestration processes include 
managing knowledge (about relevant alternatives), monitoring the legitimacy of 
appropriation and ensuring network stability for the provision of essential services. As in 
other contexts, the role of hub actors in carrying out these processes is vital. 
 
The exercise of power by regulative authorities typically forces actors in business networks 
to restructure relationship patterns and interaction processes, whether they are expected or 
unexpected (e.g., the cases in essay 2).  However, given that co-operative relationships and 
interactive channels of communication with regulative authorities are perceived to be 
legitimate, imposed institutional disruptions and their negative influence on business can 
sometimes be resolved through negotiation and consensus. The following comment by one 
of the interviewees, who had worked for over twenty years on regulatory and marketing 
assignments, describes well how co-operation in the form of reciprocal interaction between 
the pharmaceutical industry and its regulators can happen (for more details see essay 3): 
“Taking care of relationships, building and maintaining them, is at the core of our 
performance. In contemporary business the right kinds of relationships are 
important…business situations change rapidly [refers to EU legislation, which has 
changed local import processes]…we are capable of negotiating, adapting…there 
might be a chance to negotiate more favorable terms. For example, in the last twelve 
months I have updated [specifies later during the interview: close to ten times] our 
wholesale license with the National Agency for Medicines [NAM]. It helps when 
you know these people. For example, when this factory license issue with the 
imports from non-EU countries came up, it looked as though our operations here in 
Finland would come to an end. But then I telephoned this person in NAM and 
realized that we could work it out…” 
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The case company referred to above was able successfully to settle its wholesale license 
and import issues in negotiation with the local authorities about what the new EU rulings 
meant, how they were interpreted in other EU countries, and how they could be interpreted 
in the case of importing from non-EU countries into Finland. The company has substantial 
institutional capacity and a legitimate position, especially in the field of R&D, being in the 
top tier of research-intensive pharmaceutical MNCs. It utilized its institutional capacity, 
avoided having to discontinue the import of medicines for clinical research, and was able to 
carry on business with its customers and research partners. 
 
Actors possess varying institutional capacities. There are differences in the 
availability of the instruments required to take action (e.g., authoritative power) and 
in the capability to legitimately utilize them (e.g., imposition by regulative orders). 
The findings of this dissertation indicate that in terms of networks, the actors’ 
institutional capacities are influenced by 1) the actors’ own actions and 2) the actions 
of others, which are mediated through relationships. Relationship patterns and how 
they are managed in business networks therefore have an influence on institutional 
capacity, and vice versa. 
 
Part II gives several examples of the interplay between institutional capacity and 
relationship-management practices. One instance is described in essay 2 in 
connection with the third case, “Generic vs. research-based companies”. The 
imposition of the law of generic substitution caught the PIF trade association by 
surprise, and it was unable to take action, to agree on a mutual focus or to mobilize 
collective action. As a consequence of this absence of institutional capacity and the 
framing of activities, PIF failed to influence the content of the law, although this was 
largely unrelated to the tension that existed between generic and research-based firms. Its 
internal dispute over the law brought the tension to the surface, ultimately driving the 
generics to start their own interest group. This further eroded PIF‟s legitimacy as an 
institutional entrepreneur in the eyes of its members and of socio-political actors, which 
were lobbied by the industry. The emergence of the new interest group split the lobbying 
and influencing activities into two camps, generic vs. research-based companies. The 
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outcome of this was that the companies restructured some of their relationship portfolios in 
order to develop their competitiveness and to influence their operating environment. 
 
The normative dimension 
 
Cohesion in industrial and strategic networks can support the legitimacy of action. Further, 
it can strengthen the institutional capacity of the actors and their role as normative 
institutions, and provide them with a mandate to negotiate with / face regulative authorities. 
Essay 2 presents a case study of Pharma Industry Finland (PIF). PIF as a strategic network 
is defined by fairly clear boundaries, because without a thorough understanding of the 
organizations that belong and do not belong to the network it is difficult for the members to 
agree on shared goals, and its management will be difficult. Strategic networks often have 
one or more hub organizations that tend to take the initiative in terms of development and 
management, and other players with a less visible or less powerful role. The findings 
presented in essay 2 are in line with prior research: 1) hub organizations are unlikely to 
have complete control over the network‟s strategy making, but they could play a key role in 
establishing the need for collective action as valid, reliable, and useful (e.g., Rao, 2001); 2) 
synergy in vested interests is turned into cooperation, and collective action is mobilized and 
maintained (Garud, Sanjay and Kumaraswamy, 2002). For example, the fifth case analyzed 
in the essay concerns how PIF utilized its strategic cohesiveness and collective power by 
appealing to the European Commission about Finnish pricing and reimbursement 
processes. The European Court of Justice ultimately found that Finland was breaking the 
transparency rules of governing decisions on special reimbursements for medicinal 
products, and dishonoring given deadlines. The following comment by an executive praised 
the collective power of PIF: 
“I think PIF and its influence on the market is the most important channel for us…A 
single company cannot have an eminent position – the field and the trade 
association are the actors.” 
 
On the other hand, abusing the role of a hub could set off a legitimacy trap: some members 
of the strategic network will view entrepreneurship activities as not being in the best 
interests of the field as a whole. This will decrease the strategic cohesion of the network 
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and its capability to mobilize collective action. In addition, maintaining collective action 
may be difficult because others may want to challenge the institution (PIF as the normative, 
authorizing institution in the field) when it transforms or a new one emerges, for example. 
Failure to mobilize all network members behind a common strategy in a strategic network 
erodes the legitimacy of common efforts, ultimately leading to failure in network-wide 
institutional entrepreneurship. As such, it is proposed in essay 2 that legitimacy traps and 
collective action are strongly linked to the strategic cohesiveness of networks and their 
ability to act as legitimate normative institutions that are mandated to negotiate with the 
regulative authorities, for instance. 
 
The cognitive dimension 
 
Pharmaceutical companies and physicians‟ associations have a long and strong tradition of 
co-operation in the knowledge-intensive fields of clinical research and further occupational 
education. The chairman of the Finnish Medical Association (FMA), quoted in essay 3, 
supports the common view that the medical profession and the pharmaceutical industry 
cannot be separated from each other: 
“It would be an absurd idea, but the interaction between the parties must be 
transparent... pharmacotherapy will not develop without knowledge flow between 
the industry and the profession.” 
 
Nevertheless, there are strong voices arguing that there is a conflict of interest in this kind 
of set-up, with physicians playing multiple roles in the sensitive issues of severe illness, 
government spending on drugs, and the personal interests of professionals in gatekeeper 
positions. The findings of this dissertation are in line with prior research: the standards of 
socially acceptable behavior are questioned in the changing institutional environment (see 
also Gallego, Taylor and Brien, 2009; Blumenthal, 2004; Studdert, Mello and Brennan, 
2004). The legitimacy of physicians‟ associations derives from the control of institutional 
information and the degree to which they are considered the leading, objective, expert 
organizations in the field. This further gives them the ability to strategically influence their 
environment and the business. The data indicates that some of these professional 
institutions face procedural-legitimacy concerns, and an increase in institutional 
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discontinuity has been observed, as in the foundation of the Centre for Pharmacotherapy 
Development and its physician network in order to promote rational pharmacotherapy. 
However, cognitive institutional aspects (Meyer and Rowan, 1991) have an impact on the 
advancement and outcomes of these changes. In principle, the traditional role system and 
the action scripts of the business network between the industry and the medical profession 
are being preserved. For example, the PIF code for the marketing of medicinal products 
was revised, not rewritten, and so far there has been no radical imposition of new marketing 
regulation by the authorities. 
 
On the other hand, globalized pharmaceutical business has created domain pressures and 
legitimated – to some extent - the utilization of relationships as channels of influence for 
regional socio-political interests. The innovative pharmaceutical industry has traditionally 
had a strong home base in Western European countries. The Trade Related aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement changed the principles of patent protection 
and established the patenting of medical substances. However, it also increased commercial 
pressures in the form of shorter patent-protection times, which reduced the pay-back time 
of R&D investments and boosted parallel imports and generic competition from emerging 
markets (e.g., India). Essay 4 is a study of the merger of two pharmaceutical companies, 
and describes how imports from the emerging markets were considered to have triggered 
the increased pressure to contain production costs in Western European sites in the M&A 
process. This newly established research-based company is a major player in the business, 
and was therefore expected to serve regional socio-political interests in terms of protecting 
the European pharmaceutical industry (concerning employment and growth prospects at 
innovative high-tech industrial sites, for example). More relational resources were allocated 
to political relationships in order to secure interaction channels for regional socio-political 
institutions and to seize the legitimate opportunity to negotiate more favorable terms of 
business. 
 
In sum, in the pharmaceutical and healthcare business the legitimacy of the actors‟ 
objectives and value creation in business networks are subject to the acceptance and 
approval of the constituents of society. These constituents could be external to the networks 
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in question (e.g., common cognitive templates) and / or actors in them (e.g., regulators or 
socio-political authorizing agents). Further, legitimacy is typically achieved through 
isomorphism, which characterizes relationship-management practices and relational 
patterns, as in the pharmaceutical business networks under study. 
 
4.1.3. Relational isomorphism: the outcome of institutional interplay 
 
Isomorphism is identified from the interview data as mimicking the behavior of and/or 
adopting relationship-management practices and relational patterns that are perceived to be 
a standard in the business, or are similar to competitors‟ CRM behavior. The concept is 
broadly defined in this study, and comprises “institutional isomorphism” (Kondra and 
Hinings, 1998; Scott, 1987; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) and “competitive isomorphism” 
(Kostova, Roth and Dacin, 2008; Hannan and Freeman, 1977). Nevertheless, research-
based pharmaceutical companies are typically MNCs, and in their global business they 
confront diverse institutionalized rules with which their subunits cope in national and/or 
regional markets. The rich case-study data provides many explanations of why actors in 
business networks mimic others and adopt standard relationship-management practices and 
relational patterns, resulting in substantial similarity among pharmaceutical companies on 
the national/regional (meso) and international (macro) levels. 
 
These explanations are classified into three broad categories, and discussed in the following 
sections in relation to the dimensions and related pressures in the institutional environment. 
 
The regulative dimension 
 
High volumes characterize the European ambulatory-care market and its pharmaceutical 
sales. However, care is highly institutionalized and its cost is often restricted by general 
practitioners‟ (GPs) budgets or other incentives to reduce the bill for pharmaceuticals (e.g., 
reference pricing). From the pharmaceutical industry‟s standpoint the profitability of 
relationships with GPs is decreasing, and the trend is expected to continue due to various 
market-wide regulative pressures. The outcome is a general trend to focus on specialists 
who are typically the first-tier prescribers of innovative medical substances that have patent 
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protection and higher margins. Isomorphism in customer targeting due to regulative 
pressures is observable across the industry. 
 
The M&A case described in essay 4 is an example of this relational isomorphism in the 
pharmaceutical industry. The maturation of some brands and their level of substitution in 
the regional, high-volume ambulatory-care markets were considered crucial factors 
influencing the redefinition of the customer and the focusing on specialists instead of GPs 
in the newly established company. The interviewees admitted that their corporate-level 
CRM strategy was to some extent influenced by the general trend in the industry: 
relationships with GPs were becoming less profitable, and this was expected to continue 
due to regulative imposition. It was therefore thought that relational resources would yield 
higher profits in the specialist branch. According to the interviewees, the outcomes 
included the deinstitutionalization of some long-term CRM practices, the termination of 
some customer relationships, and the restructuring of CRM portfolios in the therapeutic 
area under study. For example, some R&D and CME projects aiming at growth in mature, 
high-volume ambulatory-care markets were cut. One of the interviewees described this as 
follows: 
“Yes, the relationships have changed. In fact we‟ll do less and less in this specific 
field. The reorganization has had this impact…life-cycle management of products 
and at the same time life-cycle management of relationships.” 
 
The normative dimension 
 
The pharmaceutical industry and its marketing practices are regulated in accordance with 
various laws. In addition, the industry has agreed on voluntary codes of marketing among 
its international federations, which are often similar to the regional- or country-specific 
normative guidelines on the control of marketing. Examples include The European 
Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations (EFPIA) “Code on the promotion 
of prescription-only medicines to, and interactions with, healthcare professionals” and 
“Code of practice on relationships between the pharmaceutical industry and patient 
organizations”, and “The code of the pharmaceutical marketing practices of the global 
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research-based pharmaceutical industry” followed by The International Federation of 
Pharmaceutical Manufactures & Associations (IFPMA). 
Finland is a pioneer in the auto-regulation of pharmaceutical marketing. The first voluntary 
controls date back to 1959, and the most recent update came into force on 1 July 2008 (see 
e.g., Pharma Industry Finland, 2008). The Finnish code operates on a voluntary basis, but 
PIF member companies are committed to following it. A breach of the agreed ground rules 
could lead, at worst, to fines of tens of thousands of Euros. This long tradition and respect 
for common rules have created tight normative pressure to follow the code. The current 
version covers the validity of medicines, consumer and competition legislation, as well as 
international pharmaceutical-marketing norms, and lays down the ground rules for 
marketing medicines. It also sets out codes of conduct covering good medical-sales-
representation practices, co-operation between the pharmaceutical industry and patient 
organizations, and health-awareness and other information on health and diseases targeted 
at consumers. This all-embracing normative order has induced mimicking and habituality in 
marketing practices, and relational patterns and interaction processes among companies. 
PIF as a normative institution has incorporated marketing practice into its authorized 
isomorphic activities in Finland.  Still, by voluntarily imposing stricter normative medical-
marketing codes PIF and its members have avoided the imposition of new restrictive 
legislation that loomed large due to socio-political pressure. 
On the general level, all PIF members have agreed upon the Code of Medicinal Marketing. 
Nevertheless, as described in essay 2, on the level of actual marketing practice there has 
been some disruption in industry cohesiveness and in the respect for common rules. Some 
members argued that the competitive situation required companies to bend the rules. 
However, it was not always the competitive situation that drove them to go against the 
normative code and isomorphic practice. Some MNCs were more open to bending the rules 
than others, having values that allowed them to do so. As such, they were decoupling 
themselves from the local normative code. On the other hand, this type of behavior could 
erode their legitimacy as it is typically achieved through isomorphism. It could also 
eventually catch PIF in a legitimacy trap if and when its role as the normative institution in 
the market is widely questioned. 
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The cognitive dimension 
 
As prior research has shown, actor cognitions and shared cognitive business templates are 
resistant to change and tend to change slowly, and in turbulent environments habitual action 
and mimicking are often adopted as standard responses to uncertainty (e.g., Meyer and 
Rowan, 1991; Zucker, 1983 and 1977; Gill and Stern, 1969; Berger and Luckman, 1966). 
In terms of relationship-management practices, the outcome of habitualizing pressures is 
rigid, change-resistant business networks on the international (macro) and national or 
regional (meso) levels, characterized by isomorphism. 
 
For example, essay 4 describes how the pre-merger institutionalization of isomorphic 
relationship-management practices surfaced as resistance to change. The joint customer 
relationships in the newly established organization faced new managerial challenges: 1) 
recognition of the institutionalization and its influence on managerial practices, and 2) the 
organizational unlearning of some habitualized practices. Both merging organizations were 
characterized by isomorphic business behavior, and were systematically organizing and 
sponsoring various training programs and frequent detailing as CME for health-care 
professionals. The interviewees typically described this isomorphism as an international or 
macro-level phenomenon, as “a general trend in the pharmaceutical industry” and “the way 
every company is doing it”. This sponsored CME co-operation consolidated interaction 
with normative institutions (e.g., with specialist scientific medical societies), and thereby 
shaped or preserved existing collective, professional cognitive templates. As a result, some 
relationship-management practices were cast into a pattern by means of habitual action, and 
became resistant to change. 
 
Nevertheless, the findings indicate that relational isomorphism also exists on the national 
and/or regional level. As described in essay 4 in the case involving merging companies, all 
the interviewees from the global marketing team emphasized that there was significant 
ambiguity surrounding the local relationships and customer-portfolio-management 
decisions. The portfolios were not selected at a particular point in time or for a particular 
market. For example, there was regional variation in the level of market maturation, and in 
perceptions of the influence of the institutional context on the business. The customer base 
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and the relationships took time to develop, and they were subject to habitualization. 
According to the interviewed team, the outcome of this was isomorphic regional and/or 
country-specific CRM practices. One of the interviewees stated: 
“If you want to utilize the potential globally you have to look at the different 
regions…cope with differences from country to country.” 
 
Therefore, as concluded in essay 4, local institutionalized CRM practices were not 
harmonized by force across the subunits during the merger. Indeed, they could have 
influenced the legitimacy of the meso-level changes arising from the macro-level 
redefinition of the customer and the restructuring of customer-relationship portfolios. 
 
In sum, it could be concluded that regulative, normative and cognitive pressures enhance 
isomorphism in relationship-management practices and relational structures in 
pharmaceutical business networks. Regulative restrictions create industry-wide 
isomorphism in the targeting of customers. A normative order guides the content of 
interaction with customers into uniform processes, and slowly changing actor cognitions 
foster habitual action and mimicking. 
 
4.2. Managerial contributions 
 
This dissertation contributes to the research on inter-organizational business networks and 
related management practices. The majority of prior studies in this field model the 
environment in terms of tasks and therefore do not mention the influence of institutions on 
business-relationship management in their managerial contributions. The aim of this study 
is to enhance understanding of why and how the dynamics of the institutional environment 
affect relationship-management practices, and how networks and companies as actors in 
them cope with the pressures involved. 
 
The present study shows how institutional dynamism is transmitted through customer 
relationships in business networks. The focus in this endeavor was on the dynamics of the 
institutional environment, the conceptualization of its processes, and the exploration of 
their impact on organizational relationship-management practices. The findings highlighted 
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the impact of the relational governance of the institutional environment on pharmaceutical 
and healthcare business networks and relationship-management practices. Dynamic 
institutional environments and the concomitant disruptions and institutionalization 
processes exert pressure on economic actors. The outcomes include changing 
organizational fields, transient perceptions of legitimacy, and isomorphism to which the 
actors adapt and/or react by acting as institutional entrepreneurs. Business networks as a 
form of market structure are reshaped, and management practices are influenced. For 
example, the Finnish healthcare regulative authorities are powerful enough to impose 
constraints on marketing measures to which economic actors have to adapt. On the other 
hand, institutional dynamism could also create new business opportunities. This study thus 
underlines the importance of understanding the influence of the dynamics in the 
institutional environment on business relationships, and how companies can utilize this 
influence, to some extent, by acting as institutional entrepreneurs while following their 
business aspirations and interests, engaging in collective action via strategic networks, for 
example. In sum the management practices of inter-organizational relationships in 
healthcare and pharmaceutical business networks could be broadly classified as activities of 
adaptation and of influencing. 
 
This dissertation is explorative, the aim being to describe real-world phenomena rather than 
develop normative managerial decision models. Nevertheless, as suggested in the essays 
comprising Part II, it is possible to draw some modest managerial ramifications from the 
rich data. These are presented in the following sections. It is important to relate these 
findings to the uncertainty factor in business-network dynamics, namely that management 
can never know for sure or fully control what the counterpart will or could do (e.g., 
Anderson, Havila and Salmi, 2001). Certain types of reactions can only be anticipated, 
especially in the case of business relationships in the public interest involving potential 
economic gain (e.g., unmet medical needs and their public funding). One of the 
interviewees quoted in essay 4 described this uncertainty related to management practice as 
follows: 
“You know, when you speak about relationships, which take a very long to build, 
usually you are very careful about changing things” 
 
 68 
Still, when there is mutual interest and intention, and the ability to jointly develop and 
utilize relationships as channels of influence and adaptation, it is easier to anticipate the 
reactions of counterparts in the business network. Further, the network could then be co-
operationally managed, to a certain degree, through reciprocal relationship-management 
activities that coordinate and control. For example, institutional entrepreneurs could change 
the prevailing institutionalized coordination and control mechanisms in business networks 
by influencing the institutional environment and the pressure it exerts on the market. 
 
In the following chapters the managerial implications of this research are being presented 
and their summary is in the table 5 below.  
 
Table 5. of the main managerial implications. 
 
Level of exchange Managerial implications 
All levels (macro, meso and micro) Build up the ability to sense institutional changes 
and the capacity to utilize them. 
Macro: a Beveridge-style healthcare 
system consisting of business 
networks  
Orchestrate the marketization process across 
business networks and institutions in order to 
counteract the negative outcomes of spontaneous 
ordering. 
Meso: the business network Build up the ability to sense institutional changes 
and assess if a network-wide or stand-alone 
entrepreneur strategy is more suitable in order to 
fulfil business aspirations. 
Micro: dyads, customer-relationship 
portfolios 
Seek a wide customer portfolio that challenges the 
conventional boundaries of customership and 
enforces stronger reciprocal relationships between 
economic and institutional actors in order to sense 
and shape the institutional environment.  
Make changes in customer-relationship-
management practices in order to cope with 
isomorphic pressures and habitual action, and 
utilize actor-specific inducement in order to avoid 
the negative effects of deinstitutionalization. 
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4.2.1. The need for orchestration across the levels of Finnish healthcare 
 
It is suggested in essay 1 that the marketization of Finnish healthcare could result in 
spontaneous ordering. Inherent in this concept is the idea that harmonious evolving order 
arises from interaction among decentralized, atomistic and heterogeneous economic agents 
(Hayek, 1937; Castells, 1996; Tikkanen and Parvinen, 2006). Further, this order could not 
be designed by a social planner but emerges spontaneously from a seemingly complex 
network of interaction. Planned order, on the other hand, rests on purposefully designed 
governance structures in a societal context (e.g., Loasby, 2000). According to the findings 
from the interview data on Finnish healthcare decision makers‟ perceptions of 
marketization, spontaneous change processes could lead to the partial optimization of 
resources and sub-optimal structures in healthcare networks. The caveats of non-
orchestrated change include rigid and institutionalized networks and the inability of 
healthcare organizers to partner strategically. Deeply rooted ideological institutions, 
isomorphism and mimicking stifle innovation during reforms. In addition, time pressure 
seems to lock service producers into old-fashioned, habitual operational modes. In short, 
there is a clear need for orchestration across different levels in the changing healthcare 
environment. 
 
Actor cognitions play a vital part in understanding the interplay of planned and spontaneous 
ordering. Knowing about the nature of the underlying economic ordering is also a key issue 
in the manageability of Finnish healthcare networks and the orchestration of their 
marketization. It is proposed in essay 1 that the orchestration of counter measures is more 
likely once the corresponding spontaneous ordering process and its likely outcomes are 
understood. With a view to supporting managerial decision-making and enhancing 
consensus in change, research on the orchestration of healthcare networks should integrate 
cognition as a central determinant, and span different levels of analysis. Just as spontaneous 
and planned processes permeate the institutional, network, organizational and individual 
levels of healthcare, so should orchestration. 
 
Orchestration as a concept is traditionally attributed to organizational-level control of 
complex work (Karreman and Alvesson, 2004). Hinterhuber (2002) extended this to 
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incorporate the value chain, concluding that the orchestration of an extended network of 
diverse partner companies leads to superior financial results. Dhanaraj and Parkhe (2006, 
659) define network orchestration as “the set of deliberate, purposeful actions undertaken 
by the hub firm as it seeks to create value (expand the pie) and extract value (gain a larger 
slice of the pie) from the network.” Orchestration in this study is considered a network- and 
institutional-level phenomenon. It is proposed that the new trajectories of planned order and 
orchestration in service-provision networks should be taken into consideration in analyses 
of the healthcare business and its management. These trajectories are illustrated in Figure 5 
below. Further research on institutional entrepreneurship and strategic nets could give 
fruitful support to managerial decision-making and enhance the orchestration of healthcare-
service-provision networks. 
 
Figure 5. New and recent trajectories of planned order and orchestration 
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4.2.2. Institutional pressures shape cohesiveness in strategic networks 
 
The case study presented in essay 2 shows how the institutional environment can increase 
or decrease strategic cohesiveness in a network, thus having a potential impact on the 
success of collective action. It is argued that changes in the institutional environment may 
cause friction between the interests of actors and decrease the cohesiveness of a strategic 
network, and further, they may erode the network‟s position as an institution in the 
organizational field. A managerial ramification of this is that, in order to be successful, 
companies and networks must constantly evaluate the changes in the institutional 
environment and assess how these changes will affect them. 
 
Another managerial contribution of the study concerns the findings that 1) the cohesiveness 
of network activities has an impact on the success of institutional entrepreneurship, and 2) 
failure to mobilize all network members behind common goals could erode the legitimacy 
of the chosen strategy. Companies should therefore evaluate the matters that can be dealt 
with through collective institutional entrepreneurship, their own entrepreneurial activity, or 
simultaneous approaches. Available resources, timing, and the strategic value of the issue at 
hand may be used as decision-making criteria. However, using an individual strategy such 
as institutional entrepreneurship may undermine the collective power of the network. It 
may be impossible to resolve some situations without network-wide cooperation, and 
companies must therefore build up the capability to strategize together, even when a 
common ground is difficult to find. These managerial implications are summarized in Table 
6. 
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Table 6. Managerial implications: institutional pressures on the cohesiveness of a strategic 
network 
 
Finding Managerial implication 
Institutional changes can increase or 
decrease the cohesiveness of the strategic 
network.  
Build capabilities to sense changes in the 
institutional environment and assess the 
impact of these changes on the network, 
your own company, and other network 
members. 
The cohesiveness of the network‟s 
institutional-entrepreneurship activities 
varies; companies can adopt a mutual or a 
stand-alone strategy. Changes in 
cohesiveness influence the success of 
institutional entrepreneurship. 
Build capabilities to evaluate if a network-
wide or stand-alone entrepreneur strategy is 
more suitable in the face of an institutional 
change and to strategize effectively when a 
network-wide strategy is chosen. 
Failure to mobilize all network members 
behind a common strategy erodes the 
legitimacy of common efforts, ultimately 
leading to failure in network-wide 
institutional entrepreneurship. 
Build capabilities to mobilize other network 
members behind a chosen institutional-
entrepreneurship strategy.  
 
 
4.2.3. Institutional influence and adaptation through customer-relationship-portfolio 
management 
 
The findings of the study reported in essay 3 suggest that pharmaceutical companies would 
do well to seek a wide customer portfolio that challenges the conventional boundaries of 
customership, and seek benefits through „lobbying‟ and coordination among competitors. A 
company has a choice determining the extent to which it is the instigator, rather than the 
target, of normative initiatives and other institutional changes. By continuing to develop 
and enforce stronger reciprocal relationships between economic and institutional actors 
companies can actually create value by shaping their institutional environment. The same 
applies to recognizing aspects of pragmatic, procedural and cognitive legitimacy in co-
operation and interaction with other companies in the industry. 
 
Furthermore, having a range of relationships with various socio-political actors facilitates a 
company‟s ability to sense institutional disruptions and their emergence. From a marketing 
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perspective, developing this type of sensing is an investment that will result in a better fit 
with the institutional environment, and the capability to seize the opportunities arising from 
institutional disruptions. This translates into responsiveness to change and a better ability to 
cope with legitimacy concerns. 
 
Thus, the main managerial implication of the study presented in essay 3 reflects the 
standard institutional-entrepreneurship argument that management seeking to induce 
change in institutions should be sensitive to the emergent discontinuities, which are a 
critical source of leverage. The findings indicate that it is not so much the possession of 
overwhelming resources as understanding network dynamics, steering institutional co-
evolution, and satisfying actor cognitions that are key managerial issues in institutionalized 
marketing contexts. Further, it is also a question of adopting influencing and adaptation 
strategies. The existence of two different customer-portfolio-management approaches to the 
same issue in the case companies - “social capital” and “high-powered incentives” - 
demonstrates the variety of responses to institutional change. Institutional strategies based 
on high-powered incentives are more likely to require extensive resourcing than strategies 
based on social capital, which are driven by social skills. 
 
The pharmaceutical industry has created a “mandate” to participate in dialogue with the 
regulative agencies and validating agents. However, the regulators and normative 
institutions in the business are also subject to the unavoidable political endowment inherent 
in healthcare systems. Marketing practices are therefore contingent on three related factors 
in the evolving institutional environment: 
 
(1) the accessibility of necessary channels of influence and adaptation inside the healthcare 
socio-political system (e.g., the ability to cope with varying political power balances on the 
municipal level), 
(2) the legitimacy of objectives and value-creation activities in the eyes of social 
stakeholders (e.g., profits arising out of public-private partnerships), and 
(3) the degree to which domain consensus exists among the actors in the pharmaceutical 
business (e.g., contracting out essential parts of primary healthcare services). 
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Before attempting to derive value from being institutional entrepreneurs companies should 
check whether the above-mentioned preconditions for successful action are in place. It is 
customary to claim that this is hard to do, but the results of the study reported in essay 3 
indicate that channels can be opened, legitimacy can be improved, and consensus can be 
reached. 
 
Last but not least, the study results indicate that understanding and developing institutional 
influencing and adaptation mechanisms on the customer-relationship-portfolio level 
comprise a key success factor for pharmaceutical companies. This seems to hold true for 
institutional entrepreneurship and the management of customer portfolios independently. 
The managerial implications are the clearest on the relationship level: it appears that 
relationships are essentially channels of influence and adaptation. Efforts should be made to 
develop explicit practices (resembling supply-chain or distribution-channel management) 
involving the use of relationships as channels for institutional marketing. Given the 
indication in the study that cognitive institutions preserve existing marketing practices, 
practical activities should be people-based and media-mediated, and should exploit public 
interest (see also Ulaga and Eggert, 2006). 
 
The managerial ramifications of influence and adaptation through customer-portfolio 
management are summarized in Figure 6 on the following page. 
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Figure 6. Outcomes of influence and adaptation through customer-portfolio management 
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and contraception). Further, some of the industry‟s outputs are inherently difficult to 
measure at the time of their inception (e.g., improvements in public health and increased 
life expectancy as a result of new innovative products). It is therefore concluded that the 
industry embraces itself in socially accepted procedures, which are a standard in the 
business, and by so doing fosters procedural legitimacy. This striving for procedural 
legitimacy had an impact on the merging companies and the restructuring of their 
relationship portfolios during the integration process. Figure 7 illustrates this sequence. 
 
Figure 7. Institutional interplay: the integration of relational resources during the merger of 
two pharmaceutical corporations.  
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The managerial contributions lie in the proposition that CRM practices are contingent upon 
how isomorphic pressures and habitual actions are coped with, and how the actors utilize 
the institutional arrangements during the merger. The newly established multinational 
network organization has layers of CRM practices. One of these layers comprises the 
practices mandated by the meta-institutions of healthcare, and may be surprisingly similar 
across subsidiaries (e.g., co-operation with professional associations for the sponsorship of 
continuing medical education for health-care professionals). Another, consisting of 
practices mandated by the headquarters, may be subject to pressure from the host country in 
terms of compliance with and responsiveness to the local normative and regulative 
domains. Therefore the integration process calls for flexibility with the schedule of the 
restructuring of CRM portfolios, and with the termination of some relationships. Another 
managerial ramification is that the possible negative effects of the deinstitutionalization and 
imposition resulting from changed institutional arrangements tend to be reparable. For 
example, the right forms of inducement could reverse disenchantment and restore the 
confidence that has been damaged by the discontinuation of valued traditions. It could also 
facilitate collective understanding about new procedures, resources, rights, duties and 
power relationships in the newly established organization. 
 
4.3. Limitations and avenues for further research 
 
Business-network and neo-institutional theories highlight the dynamic approach and the 
time aspect. The phenomena and units of analysis used in this study are by nature dynamic, 
and susceptible to continual change. For example, customer relationships build up over 
time, and both the history and the future expectations of the involved parties influence how 
they evolve (e.g., Grewal and Dharwadkar, 2002; Uzzi, 1997; Ring and Van de Ven, 1994). 
In addition, institutional pressures, constraining processes of organizational 
homogenization and isomorphism (e.g., Whitley, 2003), institutionalization and 
deinstitutionalization take their time. The time perspective is relational in this study: past, 
present and future dimensions are inherent in the descriptions of the interviewees and the 
secondary material from the case studies. This continual change and theory generation 
could perhaps be better addressed in longitudinal studies and case comparisons across time 
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rather than in unique “snapshots” of complex phenomena (e.g., Essay 4 and the study of the 
merger). On the other hand, whatever the method, dynamic networks and institutions are 
self-acting, amorphous phenomena, which can never be wholly captured by research. 
Therefore it is not possible to establish a range of generality in order to pin down the 
conditions under which the findings of this dissertation will invariably recur. 
 
The complexity inherent in embeddedness, network boundaries and the organizational 
structure is a weakness in this study. The researcher defined the limits of the network 
organization, the strategic network and the business networks under study a priori on the 
basis of the organizational field (e.g., in the case presented in essay 4 according to the 
corporate HQs, the subsidiaries and other first-tier counterparts of the customer 
relationships defined by the interviewees). Nevertheless, networks and institutional 
boundaries and contexts are inherently dynamic, vague and porous. Therefore, when 
defined a priori the organizational field as the unit of analysis could lack some relevant 
actors and brush aside connections and structural aspects of influence and adaptation via 
intentional networking. In addition, this type of analyzing within a known network limits 
the findings somewhat to what has already been constructed as the reality ex ante, 
concerning the prevailing institutions and their influence, for example. 
 
Despite the limitations of this study, the integration of neo-institutional theory with the 
analysis of business-network and relationship management may provide an interesting 
avenue for further research. Institutions provide the meaning structure for a particular social 
arrangement. During institutional disruptions variation in the degree and kind of 
connectedness between actors in a network may provide clues as to the threshold points at 
which business networks take hold or break down. For example, highly interconnected 
social systems may reinforce coherence and stability, whereas the entrepreneurial 
opportunities institutional disruptions offer some actors may be a predictor of business-
network instability. 
 
Analysis of institutional pressures on business networks may enhance understanding about 
the context dependency of relationship-management practices in the healthcare business. 
Conceptualizing economic actors as social agents who face institutional pressures could 
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shed light on the interpretation and/or construction of the rule and role systems in business 
networks, and the organizational responses to these systems could offer interesting 
directions for theory development. For example, the operationalization of norms or other 
institutional arrangements in connection with the expectation and sanctioning dimensions 
of business networks may offer alternative approaches to the current discussion on 
governance and manageability. 
 80 
References: 
 
Achrol, R. S., Reve, T. and Stern, L. W. (1983). “The environment of marketing channel 
dyads: a framework for comparative analysis.” Journal of Marketing, 47(fall), 55-67. 
 
Aldrich, H. E. and Fiol, M. C. (1994). “Fools rush in? The institutional context of industry 
creation.” Academy of Management Review, 19(4), 645-670. 
 
Allen, P., Ramlogan, R. and Randles, S. (2002). “Complex systems and the merger 
process.” Technology Analysis and Strategic Management, 14(3), 315-329. 
 
Anderson, H., Andersson, P., Salmi, A., Halinen-Kaila, A., Havila, V., Holtström, J. and 
Vaara, E. (2003). “M&A processes in business networks – managing connectedness.” 
Proceedings from the 19th  IMP Conference, Lugano, Switzerland. Available at 
http://www.impgroup.org/paper_view.php?viewPaper=4455. 
 
Anderson, H., Havila, V., Andersen, P. and Halinen, A. (1998). “Position and role – 
conceptualizing dynamics in business networks.” Scandinavian Journal of Management, 
14, 167-186. 
 
Anderson, H., Havila, V. and Salmi, A. (2001). “Can you buy a business relationship? On 
the importance of customer and supplier relationships in acquisitions.” Industrial 
Marketing Management, 30, 575-586. 
 
Anderson, J. C., Håkansson, H. and Johanson, J. (1994). “Dyadic business relationships 
within a business network context.”  Journal of Marketing, 58(4), 1-15. 
 
Andersson, U., Forsgren, M. and Holm, U. (2002), “The strategic impact of external 
networks: subsidiary performance and competence development in multinational 
corporation.” Strategic Management Journal, 23, 979-996. 
 
Araujo, L., Dubois, A. and Gadde, L.-E. (2003). “The multiple boundaries of the firm.” 
Journal of Management Studies, 40(5), 1255-1277. 
 
Araujo, L. and Easton, G. (1996). “Networks in socioeconomic systems: a critical review”, 
in D. Iacobucci, ed., Networks and Marketing. Thousand Oaks, Sage Publications, pp. 63-
107. 
 
Bachmann, R. (2001). “Trust, power and control in trans-organizational relations.” 
Organization Studies, 22(2), 337-365. 
 
Barley, S. R. (1986). “Technology as an occasion for structuring: Evidence from 
observations of CT scanners and the social order of radiology departments.” Administrative 
Science Quarterly, 31, 78-108. 
 
 81 
Barley, S. R. (1990). “The alignment of technology and structure through roles and 
networks.” Administrative Science Quarterly, 35, 61-103. 
 
Baron, D. P. (1989). “Design of regulatory mechanisms and institutions” in Schmalensee R. 
and Willig, R. (eds.) Handbook of Industrial Organization (2
nd
 ed.), Amsterdam, North 
Holland, pp. 1347-1439. 
 
Batt, P. J. and Purchase, S. (2004). “Managing collaboration within networks and 
relationships.” Industrial Marketing Management, 33, 169-174. 
 
Battilana, J. (2006). “Agency and institutions – The enabling role of individuals‟ social 
position.” Organization, 13(5), 653-676. 
 
Baum, J. A. C. and Oliver, C. (1991). “Institutional linkages and organizational mortality.” 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 36(2), 187-218. 
 
Berger, P. L. and Luckmann, T. (1966). The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in 
the Sociology of Knowledge. New York, Doubleday. 
 
Bhaskar, R. (1978). A Realist Theory of Science. Hassocks, Harvester. 
 
Blakie, N. (2000). Approaches to Social Enquiry. Oxford, Polity Press. 
 
Blois, K. (2002). “Analyzing relationships using Macneil‟s and Menger‟s approach to 
exchanges”. Journal of Relationship Marketing, 1 (3/4), 95-109. 
 
Blumenthal, D. (2004). “Doctors and drug companies.” The New England Journal of 
Medicine, 351 (1), 1885-1890 
 
Brito, C. and Roseira, C. (2005). “A model for understanding supply chain networks.” 
Journal on Chain and Network Science, 5(2), 55-63. 
 
Carson, D., Gilmore, A., Perry, C. and Gronhaug, K. (2001). Qualitative Marketing 
Research. London, Sage. 
 
Castells, M. (1996). ”The rise of the network society.” The information age: economy, 
society and culture, Vol. I, Oxford, Blackwell Publishers. 
 
Coffey, A. J. and Atkinson, P. A. (1996), Making Sense of Qualitative Data, 
Complementary Research Strategies, Thousand Oaks, Sage. 
 
Contu, A. and Willmott, H. (2005). “You spin me around: the realist turn in organization 
and management studies.” Journal of Management Studies, 42(8), 1645-1662. 
 
Culyer, A. J., Maynard, A. and Posnett, J. (1990), Competition in Health Care, London, 
Macmillan. 
 
 82 
Cunningham, M. T. and Homse, E. (1992). “An interaction approach to marketing and 
purchasing strategy” in Håkansson, H. (ed.) International marketing and purchasing of 
industrial goods: An interaction approach, Chichester, John Wiley, pp. 323-328. 
 
Dacin, M. T., Goodstein J. and Scott, W. (2002), “Institutional theory and institutional 
change: introduction to the special research forum.” Academy of Management Journal, 45, 
45-57. 
 
Danermark, B., Ekström, M., Jakobsen, L. and Karlsson, J. (2002). Explaining Society: 
Critical Realism in the Social Sciences. London, Routledge. 
 
De Figueiredo Jr., Rui J. P. and Weingast, Barry R. (2005). “Self-enforcing federalism.” 
Journal of Law, Economics & Organization, 21(1), 103-135. 
 
Déjean, F., Gond, J.-P. and Leca, B. (2004). “Measuring the unmeasured: an institutional 
entrepreneur strategy in an emerging industry.” Human Relations, 57(6), 741-764. 
 
Dhanaraj, C. and Parkhe, A. (2006). “Orchestrating innovation networks.” Academy of 
Management Review, 31(3), 659-669. 
 
DiMaggio, P. J. (1988). “Interest and agency in institutional theory”, in Zucker L. G. (ed.), 
Institutional Patterns and Organizations: Culture and Environment, Cambridge, MA: 
Ballinger, pp. 3-22. 
 
DiMaggio, P. J. and Powell, W.W. (1983). “The iron cage revisited: Institutional 
isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields.” American Sociological 
Review, 48, 147-160. 
 
Djelic, M.-L., Nooteboom, B. and Whitley, R. (2005). “Introduction: dynamics of 
interaction between institutions, markets and organizations.” Organization Studies, 26, 
1733-1741. 
 
Djelic, M.-L. and Quack, S. (2003). “"Theoretical building blocks for a research agenda 
linking globalization and institutions." in Djelic, M.-L. and Quack, S. (eds.) Globalization 
and institutions: Redefining the rules of the economic Game, Cheltenham, Elgar, pp. 15-34. 
 
Dorado, S. (2005). “Institutional entrepreneurship, partaking and convening.” Organization 
Studies, 26 (3), 385-414. 
 
Dowling, J. and Pfeffer, J. (1975). “Organizational legitimacy: social values and 
organizational behavior.” Pacific Sociological Review, 18, 122-136. 
 
Dubois, A. and Gadde, L.-E. (2002). “Systematic combining: an abductive approach to case 
research.” Journal of Business Research, 55(7), 553-560. 
 
Easton, G. (2002). “Marketing – a critical realist approach.” Journal of Business Research, 
55, 103-109. 
 83 
 
Easton, G. (2010). “Critical realism in case study research.” Industrial Marketing 
Management, 39, 118-128. 
 
Easton, G. and Araujo, L. (1992). Non-economic exchange in industrial network. In 
Axelsson and Easton (eds.), Industrial networks – A new view of reality, Routledge, 
London, pp. 62-84. 
 
Easton, G. and Poad, M. (2003). “The marketisation of health services; A case research of 
the UK general practitioner fundholding “experiment.” Proceedings from the 19th IMP-
conference, Lugano, Switzerland. Available at 
http://www.impgroup.org/paper_view.php?viewPaper=4325. 
 
Ebers, M. (1999). “Explaining inter-organizational network formation”, in Ebers, M. (ed.), The 
Formation of Inter-organizational networks. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
EHMA (2000), Scientific Evaluation of the Effects of the Introduction of Market Forces 
into Health Systems, Dublin, European Health Management Association. 
 
Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989). “Building theories from case research.” Academy of Management 
Review, 14(4), 532-550. 
 
Eisenhardt, K. M. and Graebner, M. E. (2007). “Theory building form cases: opportunities 
and challenges.” Academy of Management Journal, 50(1), 25-32. 
 
Ellis, N. and Higgings, M. (2006). “Recatechizing codes of practice in supply chain 
relationships: discourse, identity and otherness.” Journal of Strategic Marketing, 14(Dec), 
387-410. 
 
Fawcett, B. and Hearn, J. (2004). “Researching others: epistemology, experience, 
standpoints and participation.” International Journal of Social Research Methodology, 
7(3), 201-218. 
 
Ferlie, E. (1992). “The creation and evaluation of quasi-markets in the public sector: a 
problem for strategic management.” Strategic Management Journal, 13, 79-97. 
 
Ferlie, E. and Pettigrew, A. (1996). “Managing through networks; some issues and 
implications for the NHS.” British Journal of Management, special issue, 7(1), 81-99. 
 
Fligstein, N. (1997). “Social skill and institutional theory.” American Behavioral Scientist, 
40, 397-405. 
 
Ford, D., Gadde, L.-E., Håkansson, H., Lundgren, A., Snehota, I., Turnbull, P. and Wilson, 
D. (1998). Managing Business Relationships, Chichester, John Wiley & Sons Ltd. 
 
Foss, N. J. (1997). “Austrian insights and the theory of the firm.” Advances in Austrian 
Economics, 4, 175-198. 
 84 
 
Gallego, G., Taylor, S. J. and Brien, J. E. (2009). “Funding and access to high cost 
medicines in public hospitals in Australia: decision-makers‟ perspectives.” Health Policy, 
92, 27-34. 
 
Garud, R., Sanjay, J. and Kumaraswamy, A. (2002). “Institutional entrepreneurship in the 
sponsorship of common technological standards: The case of Sun Microsystems and Java.” 
Academy of Management Journal, 45(1), 196-214. 
 
Ghauri, P. N. and Holstius, K. (1996). “The role of matching the foreign market entry 
process in the Baltic States.” European Journal of Marketing, 30(2), 75-88. 
 
Giddens, A. (1979). Central problems in social theory: Action, structure and contradiction 
in social analysis. Berkley, University of California Press. 
 
Giddens, A. (1984). The constitution of society. Cambridge, Polity Press. 
 
Giddens, A. (1990). The Consequences of Modernity. Stanford, Stanford University Press. 
 
Gill, L. E. and Stern, L. W. (1969). “Roles and role theory in distribution channel systems” 
in  Stern, L. W. (ed.), Distribution Channels: Behavioral Dimensions, Boston, Houghton 
Mifflin, pp. 22-47. 
 
Gioia, D. A. and Pitre, E. (1990). “Multiparadigm perspectives on theory building.” 
Academy of Management Review, 15(4), 584-603. 
 
Grandori, A. and Soda, G. (1995), “Inter-firm networks: antecedents, mechanisms and 
forms.” Organization Studies, 16 (2), 183-214. 
 
Granovetter, M. (1985). “Economic action and social structure: the problem of 
embeddedness.” American Journal of Sociology, 91, 481-510. 
 
Granovetter, M. (1992). “Problems of explanation in economic sociology, in Nohria, N. and 
Eccles, R. G. (eds.), Networks and Organizations, Boston, MA, Harvard Business School 
Press, pp. 25-56. 
 
Granovetter, M. and Swedberg, R. (1992). The Sociology of Economic Life, Oxford, 
Westview Press. 
 
Goldberg, W. H. (1983). Mergers: Motives, Modes, Methods. Hampshire, Gower 
Publishing Company Ltd. 
 
Green, J. and Thorogood, N. (2004). Qualitative Methods for Health Research. London, 
Sage Publications Ltd. 
 
Greenwood, R. and Hinings, C. R. (1988). “Organizational design types, tracks and the 
dynamics of strategic change.” Organizational Studies, 9(3), 293-316. 
 85 
 
Greenwood, R. and Suddaby, R. (2006). “Institutional entrepreneurship in mature fields: 
the big five accounting firms.” Academy of Management Journal, 49(1), 27-48. 
 
Greenwood, R., Suddaby, R. and Hinings, C. R. (2002). “Theorizing change: the role of 
professional associations in the transformation of institutionalized fields.” Academy of 
Management Journal, 45(1), 58-80. 
 
Grewal, R. and Dharwadkar, R. (2002). “The role of the institutional environment in 
marketing channels.” Journal of Marketing, 66(3), 82-97. 
 
Gulati, R., Nohria, N. and Zaheer, A. (2000). “Strategic networks.” Strategic Management 
Journal, 21(3), 203-215. 
 
Hadjikhani, A. and Ghauri, P. N., (2001). “The behaviour of international firms in socio-
political environments in the European Union.” Journal of Business Research, 52(3), 263-
275. 
 
Hadjikhani, A., Lee, J.-W. and Ghauri, P. N. (2008). “Network view of MNCs' socio-
political behavior.” Journal of Business Research, 61, 912–924. 
 
Hadjikhani, A. and Thilenius, P. (2009). “Industrial relationships and the effects of 
different types of connections.” Industrial Marketing Management, 38, 679-686. 
 
Halinen, A., Salmi, A. and Havila, V. (1999). “From dyadic change to changing business 
networks: an analytical framework.” Journal of Management Studies, 36(6), 779-794. 
 
Halinen, A. and Törnroos, J.-Å. (1998). “The role of embeddedness in the evolution of 
business networks.” Scandinavian Journal of Management, 14(3), 187-205. 
 
Halinen, A. and Törnroos, J.-Å. (2005). “Using case methods in the research of 
contemporary business networks.” Journal of Business Research, 58, 1285-1297. 
 
Hallén, L., Johanson, J. and Seyed-Mohamed, N. (1991). “Interfirm adaptation in business 
relationships.” Journal of Marketing, 55(April), 29-37. 
 
Hannan, M. T. and Freeman, J. H. (1977). “The population ecology of organizations.” 
American Journal of Sociology, 82, 929-964. 
 
Hargrave, T. J. and Van De Ven, A. H. (2006). “A collective action model of institutional 
innovation.” Academy of Management Review, 34(4), 864-888. 
 
Harrê, R. (1986). The Social Construction of Emotions, Oxford, Basil Blackwell. 
 
Havila, V. and Salmi, A. (2002). “Network perspectives on international mergers: what 
more do we see?” in Havila et al. (eds.), Critical Perspectives on Internationalization, 
Amsterdam, Pergamon, pp. 457-472. 
 86 
 
Hayek, F.A. (1937). “Economics and knowledge.” Economica, 4(Feb), 33-54. 
 
Hayek, F.A. (1945). “The use of knowledge in society.” American Economic Review, 
XXXV (4, Sept.), 519-530. 
 
Hensman, M. (2003). “Social movement organizations: a metaphor for strategic actors in 
institutional fields.” Organizational Studies 24(3), 355–381. 
 
Hiller, H. H. and DiLuzio, L. (2004). “The interviewee and the research interview: 
analyzing a neglected dimension in research.” Canadian Review of Sociology & 
Anthropology, 41(1), 1-26. 
 
Hillman, A. J. and Wan, W. P. (2005). “The determinants of MNE subsidiaries‟ political 
strategies: evidence of institutional duality.” Journal of International Business Studies, 36, 
322-340. 
 
Hinterhuber A. (2002). “Value chain orchestration in action and the case of the global 
agrochemical industry.” Long Range Planning, 35(6), 615-635. 
 
Hirsch, P. and Lounsbury, M. (1997). “Ending the family quarrel: toward a reconciliation 
of “old” and “new” institutionalism.” American Behavioral Scientist, 40, 406-418. 
 
Holstein, J. A. and Gubrium, J. F. (1995). “The active interview”, in Silverman, D. (ed.), 
Qualitative Research, Theory, Method and Practice, Thousand Oaks, Sage Publications 
Ltd., pp 113-129. 
 
Hoffman, A. J. (1999). “Institutional evolution and change: Environmentalism and the U.S. 
chemical industry.” Academy of Management Journal, 42(4), 351-371. 
 
Hoffman, A. J. (2001). “Linking organizational and field-level analysis: the diffusion of 
corporate environmental practice.” Organization and Environment, 14, 133-156. 
 
Hunt, S. D. (2002). Foundations of Marketing Theory: Toward a General Theory of 
Marketing. London, M.E. Sharpe Publishing. 
 
Hurwicz, L. (1993). “Toward a framework for analyzing institutions and institutional 
change”, in Bowles, S., Gintis, H.  and Gustafsson B. (eds.), Markets and Democracy: 
Participation, Accountability and Efficiency, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 
51-67. 
 
Håkansson, H. (1992). “Evolution processes in industrial networks”, in Axelsson, B. and 
Easton, G. (eds.), Industrial Networks: A New View of Reality, London, Routledge, pp. 129-
143. 
 
Håkansson, H. and Ford, D. (2002). “How should companies interact in business 
networks?” Journal of Business Research, 55(2), 133-139. 
 87 
 
Håkansson, H. and Snehota, I. (1995). Developing Relationships in Business Networks. 
London, Routledge. 
 
Håkansson, H. and Snehota, I. (1998). ”The burden of relationships or who’s next”, in 
Naude, P. and Turnbull, P. (eds.) Network Dynamics in International Marketing, 
Pergamon, Oxford, p. 24. 
 
Häkkinen, U. (2005). “The impact of changes in Finland‟s health care system.” Health 
Economics, 14 (51), 5101-5118. 
 
Häkkinen, U. and Joumard, I. (2007).”Cross-country analysis of efficiency in OECD health 
care sectors: options for research.” OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No. 
554. 
 
Häkkinen, U. and Järvelin, J. (2004). “Developing the formula for state subsidies for health 
care in Finland.” Scandinavian Journal of Public Health, 32(1), 30-39. 
 
Häkkinen, U. and Lehto, J. (2005). ”Reform, change, and continuity in Finnish health 
care.” Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, 30 (1-2), 79-96. 
 
Jansson, H., Johanson, M. and Ramström, J. (2007). “Institutions and business networks: a 
comparative analysis of the Chinese, Russian, and West European markets.” Industrial 
Marketing Management, 36, 955-967. 
 
Japp, S. D. and Ganesan, S. (2000). “Control mechanisms and the relationship life cycle: 
Implications for safeguarding specific investments and developing commitment.” Journal 
of Marketing Research, 37(May), 227-245. 
 
Jarillo, J. C. (1988). “On strategic networks.” Strategic Management Journal, 9(1), 31-41. 
 
Johanson, J. and Mattsson, L.-G. (1991). “Strategic adaptation of firms to the European 
singe market – A network approach” in Mattsson, L.-G. and Stymne, B. (eds.) Corporate 
and industry strategies for Europe, Amsterdam, North-Holland, pp. 263-281. 
 
Johnson, M. D. and Selnes, F. (2004). “Customer portfolio management: toward a dynamic 
theory of exchange relationships.” Journal of Marketing, 68(2), 1-17. 
 
Johnson, M. D. and Selnes F. (2005). “Diversifying your customer portfolio.” MIT Sloan 
Management Review, 46(3), 11-14. 
 
Järvelin J. (2002). “Health care systems in transition: Finland.” European Observatory on 
Health Care Systems, 4(1). 
 
Järvensivu, T. and Möller, K. (2008). Metatheory of network management: a contingency 
perspective. Helsinki School of Economics, working paper, W-448, Helsinki. 
 
 88 
Karreman D. and Alvesson M. (2004). “Cages in tandem: management control, social 
identity, and identification in a knowledge-intensive firm.” Organization, 11(1), 149-17. 
 
Keillor, B. D. and Hult, T. M. (2004), “Predictors of firm-level political behaviour in the 
global business environment.” International Business Review, 13 (3), 309-329. 
 
Klint, M. B. and Sjöberg, U. (2003). ”Towards a comprehensive SCP-model for analysing 
strategic networks/alliances.” International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics 
Management, 33(5), 408-426. 
 
Knodel, J. (1993). “The design and analysis of focus group studies, a practical approach”, 
in Morgan, D. L. (ed.), Successful Focus Groups, Advancing the State of the Art, Newbury 
Park, Sage Publications. 
 
Kondra, A. Z. and Hinings, C. R. (1998). “Organizational diversity and change in 
institutional theory.” Organization Studies, 19(5), 743-767. 
 
Kostova, T. and Roth, K. (2002). “Adoption of organizational practices by subsidiaries of 
multinational corporations: Institutional and relational effects.” Academy of Management 
Journal, 45, 215-233. 
 
Kostova, T., Roth, K. and Dacin, M. T. (2008). “Institutional theory in the study of 
multinational corporations: a critique and new directions.” Academy of Management 
Review, 33(4), 994-1006. 
 
Kostova, T. and Zaheer, S. (1999). “Organizational legitimacy under conditions of 
complexity: The case of the multinational enterprise.” Academy of Management Review, 
24, 64-81. 
 
Kähkönen, L. (2007). Näennäismarkkinoiden tehokkuuden rajoitteet ja mahdollisuudet 
paikallishallinnon palveluissa.  Akateeminen väitöskirja, Tampereen yliopisto, Acta 
Universitatis Tamperensis 1277, Tampere, Tampereen Yliopistopaino Oy – Juvenes Print. 
 
Laurila, J. and Lilja, K. (2002). “The dominance of firm-level competitive pressures over 
functional-level institutional pressures: the case of the Finnish-based forest industry firms.” 
Organization Studies, 23(4), 571-597. 
 
Lauridsen, J., Christiansen, T., Gundgaard, J, Häkkinen, U. and Sintonen, H. (2007). 
“Decomposition of health inequality by determinants and dimensions.” Health Economics, 
16(1), 97-102. 
 
Lawrence, P. R. and Lorsch, J. W. (1967). Organization and Environment; Managing 
Differentiation and Integration. Boston, Harvard University Press. 
 
Lawrence, T. B. (1999). “Institutional strategy.” Journal of Management, 25(2), 161-187. 
 
 89 
Lawrence, T. B. and Phillips, N. (2004). “From Moby Dick to Free Willy: Macro-cultural 
discourse and institutional entrepreneurship in emerging institutional fields.” Organization, 
11(5), 689-711. 
 
Leppo, K. (2002). “Pharmaceuticals as a major cost driver in health care expenditure.” 
Socius, 4. 
 
Lewis, M. W. and Grimes, A. J. (1999). “Metatriangulation: building theory from multiple 
paradigms.” Academy of Management Review, 24(4), 672-690. 
 
Lister, J. (2005). Health Policy Reform: Driving the Wrong Way? London, Middlesex 
University Press. 
 
Loasby, B. J. (2000). “Market institutions and economic evolution.” Journal of 
Evolutionary Economics, 10(3), pp. 297-310. 
 
Low, B. and Johnston, W. (2008). “Securing and managing an organization‟s network 
legitimacy: the of Motorola China.” Industrial Marketing Management, 37, 873-879. 
 
Lowndes, V. (2005). “Something old, something new, something borrowed.” Policy 
Studies, 26 (3/4), 291-309. 
 
Lubatkin, M., Calori, R, Very, P, and Veiga, J. F. (1998). “Managing mergers across 
borders: a two nation exploration of nationally bound administrative heritage.” 
Organization Science, 9(6), 670-684. 
 
Luhman, N. (1979), Trust and Power. Chichester, John Wiley & Sons Ltd. 
 
Lukkari, P. and Parvinen, P. (2008). ”Pharmaceutical marketing through the customer 
portfolio: Institutional influence and adaptation.” Industrial Marketing and Management, 
37, 965-976. 
 
Lunt, N., Mannion, R. and Smith, P. (1996). “Economic discourse and the market: the case 
of community care.” Public Administration, 74, 369-391. 
 
Luukkonen, T. (2005). “Variability in organizational forms of biotechnology firms.” 
Research Policy, 34(4), 555-570. 
 
Macneil, I. R. (1980). The new social contract: An inquiry into modern contractual 
relations. New Hayen, Yale University Press. 
 
Maguire, S., Hardy, C. and Lawrence, T. B. (2004). “Institutional entrepreneurship in 
emerging fields: HIV/AIDS treatment advocacy in Canada.” Academy of Management 
Journal, 47(5), 657-679. 
 
Mason, J. (1996), Qualitative Researching. London, Sage Publications Ltd. 
 
 90 
Meyer, J. W. and Rowan, B. (1991). “Institutionalized organizations: formal strategy as 
myth and ceremony”, in Powell, W. and DiMaggio, P. (eds.), The new institutionalism in 
organizational analysis, Chicago, University of Chicago Press. 
 
Meyer, J W., and Scott, R. W. (1992). Organizational Environments: Ritual and 
Rationality. Newbury Park, Sage Publications Ltd. 
 
Meyer, J. W., Scott, R. W. and Deal, T. E. (1981). “Institutional and technical sources of 
organizational structures”, in Stein, H. D.  (ed.), Organization and human services, 
Philadelphia: Temple University Press, pp. 151-178. 
 
Miles, M. B. and Huberman, A. M. (1994). Qualitative Data Analysis: An Expanded 
Sourcebook, (2nd ed.), Thousand Oaks, Sage Publications Inc. 
 
Miles, R. E. and Snow, C. C. (1978). Organizational Strategy, Structure and Process, New 
York, McGraw-Hill. 
 
Miller, S. (2007). “Social institutions”, in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Available 
at http:// plato.stanford.edu/entries/social-institutions. Accessed 16th April, 2008. 
 
Miller, D. and Whitney, J. (1999). “Beyond strategy: configuration as a pillar of 
competitive advantage.” Business Horizons, 42(3), 5-18. 
 
Mittra, J. (2006). “The socio-political economy of pharmaceutical mergers: A case research 
of Sanofi and Aventis.” Technology Analysis & Strategic Management, 18 (5 Dec.), 473-
496. 
 
Mittra, J. (2007). “Life science innovation and the restructuring of the pharmaceutical 
industry: Merger, acquisition and strategic alliance behaviour of large firms.” Technology 
Analysis & Strategic Management, 19(3), 279-301. 
 
Mouzas, S. (2006). “Marketing action in networks.” European Journal of Marketing, 
40(11/12), 1271-1291. 
 
Munir, K. A. (2005). “The social construction of events: a research of institutional change 
in the photographic field.” Organization Studies, 26(1), 93-112. 
 
Munir, K. A., and Phillips, N. (2005). “The birth of the „Kodak moment‟: institutional 
entrepreneurship and the adoption of new technologies.” Organization Studies, 26(11), 
1665-1687. 
 
Möller, K. and Halinen, A. (2000). “Relationship marketing theory: its roots and direction.” 
Journal of Marketing Management, 16(1), 29-54. 
 
Möller, K., Rajala, A. and Svahn, S. (2005). “Strategic business nets: their type and 
management.” Journal of Business Research, 58(9), 1274-1284. 
 
 91 
Möller, K. and Svahn, S. (2003). “Managing strategic nets: a capability perspective.” 
Marketing Theory, 3(2), 209-234. 
 
Möller, K. and Wilson, D. (1995). Business Marketing: An Interaction and Network 
Perspective. Boston, Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
 
Nguyen, L. and Häkkinen, U. (2005). ”Choices and utilization in dental care: public vs. 
private dental sectors, and the impacts of a two-channel financed health care system”, 
Discussion Papers 1/2005 Stakes, available at www.thl.fi and 
http://www.stakes.fi/FI/Julkaisut/Julkaisuhaku.htm. 
 
OECD (2005). OECD Reviews of Health Systems – Finland. Paris. 
 
Oliver, C. (1991). “Strategic responses to institutional processes.” Academy of Management 
Review, 16, 145-179. 
 
Oliver, C. (1992). “The antecedents of deinstitutionalization.” Organization Studies, 13(4), 
563-588. 
 
Oliver, C. (1997). “The influence of institutional and task environment relationships on 
organizational performance: the Canadian construction industry.” Journal of Management 
Studies, 34(1), 99-124. 
 
Olsen, R. F., and Ellram, L. M. (1997). “Buyer-supplier relationships: alternative research 
approaches.” European Journal of Purchasing & Supply Management, 3(4), 221-231. 
 
Opp, K. D. (2001). “How do norms emerge? An outline of a theory.” Mind & Society, 2, 
101-128. 
 
Ott, C. M., and Ivens, B. S. (2009). “Revisiting the norm concept in relational governance.” 
Industrial Marketing Management, 38, 577-583. 
 
Parolini, C. (1999). The Value Net: A Tool for Competitive Strategy. Chichester, John 
Wiley & Sons Ltd. 
 
Patton, M. Q. (1990). Qualitative Evaluation and Research Methods. Newbury park, Sage. 
 
Payne, A. and Frow, P. (2005). “A strategic framework for customer relationship 
management.” Journal of Marketing, 69(4), 167-176. 
 
Pekurinen, M. and Häkkinen, U. (2005). ”Regulating pharmaceutical markets in Finland.” 
Discussion Papers 4/2005 Stakes, available at www.thl.fi and 
http://www.stakes.fi/FI/Julkaisut/Julkaisuhaku.htm. 
 
Pentland, B. T. and Rueter, H. H. (1994). “Organizational routines as grammars of action.” 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 39(3), 484-510. 
 
 92 
Perry, C. (1998). “Processes of a case research methodology for postgraduate research in 
marketing.” European Journal of Marketing, 32(9/10), 785-802. 
 
Pfeffer, J. (1972). “Merger as a response to organizational interdependence.” 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 17, 382-394. 
 
Pfeffer, J. and Salancik, G. R. (1978). The External Control of Organizations: A Resource 
Dependence Perspective, New York,  Harper & Row Publishers Inc. 
 
Pharma Industry Finland (2008). The code for the marketing of medicinal products. 
Available at http://www.pif.fi/tiedostot.. 
 
Plakoyiannaki, E., and  Tsokas, N. (2002). ”Customer relationship management: a 
capabilities portfolio perspective.” Journal of Database Marketing, 9(3), 228-237. 
 
Powell, W.W. (1990). “Neither market nor hierarchy: network forms of organization.” 
Research in Organizational Behavior, 12, 295-336. 
 
Powell, W.W. and DiMaggio, P. J. (1991). “The new institutionalism in organizational 
analysis” in Powell, W.W. and DiMaggio, P. J. (eds.), The New Institutionalism in 
Organizational Analysis. Chicago,University of Chicago Press. 
 
Propper, C. (1993). “Quasi-markets and regulation”, in LeGrand, J. and Bartlett, W. (eds.) 
Quasi-Markets and Social Policy, Basingstoke, Macmillan. 
 
Rao, H. (2001). “The power of public competition: promoting cognitive legitimacy through 
certification contests”, in Schoonhoven, C. B. and Romanelli, E. (eds.) The 
entrepreneurship dynamic: Origins of entrepreneurship and the evolution of industries, 
Stanford, Stanford University Press, pp. 262-282. 
 
Rao, H., Morrill, C. and Zald, M. N. (2000). “Power plays: how social movements and 
collective action create new organizational form.” Research in Organizational Behavior, 
22, 237-282. 
 
Reed, M. (2005). “Reflections on the “realist turn” in organizational and management 
studies.” Journal of Management Studies, 42(8), 1621-1644. 
 
Reinartz, W., Krafft, M. and Hoyer, W. (2004). “The customer relationship management 
process: its measurement and impact on performance.” Journal of Marketing Research, 
41(3), 293-305. 
 
Ring, P. S. and Van de Ven, A. H. (1994). “Developmental processes of cooperative inter-
organizational relationships.” Academy of Management Review, 19(1), 90-118. 
 
Ritter, T., Wilkinson I. F. and Johnston W.J. (2004). “Managing complex business 
networks.” Industrial Marketing Management, 33, 175-183. 
 
 93 
Ritvala, T. (2007). Actors and institutions in the emergence of a new field: a study of the 
cholesterol-lowering functional foods. Publications of Helsinki School of Economics, A-
319, doctoral dissertation, Helsinki, HSE Print. 
 
Ritvala, T. and Granqvist, N. (2006). Institutional entrepreneurs and structural holes in 
new field emergence – comparative case research of cholesterol lowering functional foods 
and nanotechnology in Finland. Working Papers W-411, Helsinki School of Economics. 
 
Ryals, L. (2002). “Measuring risk and returns in the customer portfolio.” Journal of 
Database Marketing, 9 (3), 219-227. 
 
Salmi, A. (1995). Institutionally Changing Business Networks. Analysis of a Finnish 
Company’s Operations in Exporting to the Soviet Union, Russia and the Baltic States. 
Publications of Helsinki School of Economics and Business Administration A-106, 
doctoral dissertation, Helsinki. 
 
Savage, G. T., Nix, T. W., Whitehead, C. J., and Blair, J. D. (1991). “Strategies for 
assessing and managing organizational stakeholders.” Academy of Management Executive, 
5(2), 61-75. 
 
Sayer, A. (2000). Realism and social science. London, Sage. 
 
Schumpeter, J.A. (1942). Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. New York, Harper Row. 
 
Scott, W. R. (1987). “The adolescence of institutional theory.” Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 32, 493-511. 
 
Scott, W. R. (1995). Institutions and Organizations: Foundations for Organizational 
Science. Thousand Oaks, Sage Publications Ltd. 
 
Scott, R. W. and Meyer, J. W. (1983). “The organization of societal sectors”, in Meyer, W. 
and Scott, W. R. (eds.) Organizational environments: Ritual and rationality. Beverly Hills, 
Sage, pp. 129-153. 
 
Seal, W. (2003). “Modernity, modernization and the deinstitutionalization of incremental 
budgeting in local government.” Financial Accountability & Management, 19(2), 93-116. 
 
Selznick, P. (1957). Leadership in administration: A sociological interpretation. New 
York: Harper & Row. 
 
Silverman, D. (2005). Doing Qualitative Research: A Practical Handbook (2nd ed.), 
London, Sage Publications Ltd. 
 
Simon, J., Mandjak, T. and Szalkai, Z. (2009). “Different buying behavioural patterns in 
the Hungarian hospital network.” Proceedings from the 25th IMP-conference, Marseilles, 
France, available at http://www.impgroup.org/paper_view.php?viewPaper=7310. 
 
 94 
Srivastava, R. K., Shervani, T. A. and Fahey, L. (1998). “Market-based assets and 
shareholder value: a framework for analysis.” Journal of Marketing, 62, 2-18. 
 
Stake, R. E. (2000). “Case studies”, in Denzin, N. K. and Lincoln, Y. S.  (eds.) Handbook 
of Qualitative Research  (2nd ed.), Thousand Oaks, Sage Publications Ltd, pp. 435-454. 
 
Stern, L. W. and Reve, T. (1980). “Distribution channels as political economies: a 
framework for comparative analysis.” Journal of Marketing, 44(summer), 52-64. 
 
Storbacka, K., Strandvik, T. and Grönroos, C. (1994). “Managing customer relationships 
for profit: the dynamics of relationship quality.” International Journal of Service Industry 
Management, 5 (5), 21-38. 
 
Streeck, W. and Thelen, K. (2005). “Introduction: Institutional change in advanced political 
economies”, in Streeck, W. and Thelen, K. (eds.) Beyond Continuity: Institutional Change 
in Advanced Political Economies, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 1-39. 
 
Stremersch, S. and Van Dyck, W. (2009). “Marketing of the life sciences: a new framework 
and research agenda for a nascent field.” Journal of Marketing, 73(July), 4-30. 
 
Studdert, D. M., Mello, M. M. and Brennan, T.A. (2004). “Financial conflicts of interest in 
physicians‟ relationships with the pharmaceutical industry – self-regulation in the shadow 
of federal prosecution.” The New England Journal of Medicine, 351(18), 1891-1900. 
 
Suchman, M.C. (1995). “Managing legitimacy: strategic and institutional approaches.” 
Academy of Management Review, 20, 571–610. 
 
Sudarsanam, P. S. (1995). The Essence of Mergers and Acquisitions. New Jersey, Prentice 
Hall. 
 
Sundin, E. and Tillmar, M. (2008). “A nurse and a civil servant changing institutions: 
Entrepreneurial processes in different public sector organizations.” Scandinavian Journal of 
Management, 24, 113-124. 
 
Terho, H. (2008). Customer Portfolio Management – the Construct and Performance, 
Turku School of Economics, academic dissertation series A-4:2008, Tampere, Esa Print. 
 
Terho, H. and Halinen, A. (2007). “Customer portfolio analysis practices in different 
exchange contexts.” Journal of Business Research, 60, 720-730. 
 
Tikkanen, H. and Parvinen, P. M. T. (2006). “The role and interplay of planned and 
spontaneous orders in the network society.” Journal of Business and Industrial Marketing, 
21(1), 38-49. 
 
Touhy, C. (2003). “Agency, contract, and governance: shifting shapes of accountability in 
the health care arena.” Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, 28:2-3(April-June), 195-
215. 
 95 
 
Tsoukas, H. (1989). “The validity of idiographic research explanations.” Academy of 
Management Review, 14 (4), 551-561. 
 
Tuomela, R. (1995). The importance of us: A philosophical study of basic social norms. 
Berlin, Springer. 
 
Tuomela, R. and Bonnevier-Tuomela, M. (1995). “Norms and agreement.” European 
Journal of Law, Philosophy and Computer Science, 5, 41-46. 
 
Turnbull, P. W. (1990). “A review of portfolio planning models for industrial 
marketing and purchasing management.” European Journal of Marketing, 24(3), 7-22. 
 
Turnbull, P.W., Ford, D. and Cunningham, M. (1996). “Interaction, relationships and 
networks in business markets: an evolving perspective.” Journal of Business and 
Industrial Marketing, 11(3/4), 44–62. 
 
Tushman, M. L. and Romanelli, E. (1985). “Organizational evolution: A metamorphosis 
model of convergence and reorientation”, in Research in Cummings, L. L.  and Staw, B. M. 
(eds.) Organizational Behavior, Greenwich, JAI Press, pp. 171-222. 
 
Ulaga, W. and Eggert, A. (2006). ”Relationship value and relationship quality: broadening 
the nomological network of business-to-business relationships.” European Journal of 
Marketing, 40(3-4), 311-327. 
 
Uzzi, B. (1997). “Social structure and competition in interfirm networks: the paradox of 
embeddedness.” Administrative Science Quarterly, 42, 35-67. 
 
Waluszewski, A., Hadjikhani, A. and Baraldi, E. (2009). “An interactive perspective on 
business in practice and business in theory.” Industrial Marketing Management, 38, 565-
569. 
 
Welch, C. and Wilkinson, I. (2004). “The political embeddedness of international business 
networks.” International Marketing Review, 21(2), 216-231. 
 
Westerlund, M. (2009). Managing Networked Business Models: Essays in the Software 
Industry, Publications of Helsinki School of Economics, A 356, doctoral dissertation, 
Helsinki, HSE Print. 
 
White, J. (2003). “Three meanings of capacity; or, why the federal government is most 
likely to lead on insurance access issues?” Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, 28, 
2-3(April-June), 217-244. 
 
Whitley, R. (2003). “From the search of universal correlations to the institutional 
structuring of economic organization and change: The development and future of 
organization studies.” Organization, 10, 481-501. 
 96 
 
Wilkinson, I. (2001). “A history of network and channels thinking in marketing in the 20th 
century.” Australasian Journal of Marketing, 9(2), 23-53. 
 
Williamson, O. (1975). Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. New 
York, Free Press. 
 
Williamson, O. (1981). “The economics of organizations: the transaction cost approach.” 
American Journal of Sociology, 87(3), 548-577. 
Williamson, O. (1985). The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. New York/London Free 
Press. 
Williamson, O. E. (1996). The Mechanisms of Governance. New York, Oxford University 
Press. 
Yin, R. K. (1994). Case Research: Design and Methods (2nd edition), Newbury Park, Sage 
Publications Ltd. 
Zollkiewski, J. M. (1999). Purchase/Provider relationships in the UK National Health 
Service: A marketing perspective. Manchester School of Management, University of 
Manchester Institute of Science and Technology, doctoral dissertation, Manchester. 
 
Zucker, L. G. (1977). “The role of institutionalization in cultural persistence.” American 
Sociological Review, 42, 726-743. 
 
Zucker, L. G. (1983). “Organizations as institutions”, in Bacharach, S. B. (ed.) Research in 
the sociology of organizations. Greenwich, JAI Press. 
 
Zucker, L. G. (1986). “Production of Trust: Institutional Sources of Economic Structure.” 
Research in Organizational Behaviour, 8, 53-111. 
 
Zucker, L. G. (1988). “Where do institutional patterns come from? Organizations as actors 
in social system”, in Zucker, L.G. (ed.) Institutional Patterns and Organizations, 
Cambridge MA, Ballinger, pp. 23-52. 
 
Zucker, L. G. and Darby, M. R. (1997). “Individual and the demand for institutions – star 
scientists and institutional transformation.” American Behavioral Scientist, 40, 502-513. 
 
 97 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART II: Original research papers 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Marketisation and the orchestration of healthcare networks in Finland 
 
 
 
Petri Parvinen and Pirjo Lukkari 
 
 
 
ESSAY 1 
 
 
 
 
 
Essay published in 2010 in the 
Journal of Management & Marketing in Healthcare 
Vol. 3, No 3, pp. 208-223 
 
 
 
DOI: 10.1179/175330310X12736577965847 
Copyright 2010 Maney Publishing 
Reproduced by permission 
Petri Parvinen
is a professor at Aalto
University, School of
Economics (formerly Helsinki
School of Economics). 
His current research interests
include healthcare
management, strategic
marketing, mergers and
acquisitions, governance and
organisational economics. 
His work has been published
in Journal of Management
Studies, European
Management Journal,
Management Decision,
Industrial Marketing
Management and Journal 
of Business and Industrial
Marketing. 
Pirjo Lukkari
is a PhD student at the Aalto
University, School of
Economics and a researcher
in the ValueNet Research
Group funded by the Academy
of Finland LIIKE 2
programme. Her research
interests include industrial
networks, relationship
management and healthcare
systems. 
Introduction
Institutions could be seen as an inherent feature in healthcare networks
as they have an influence on actors: institutional bases are imported into
companies and other service production organisations as underlying
invisible assumptions which shape their performance.1-6 As such they are
organisms characterised by complex actor interests,7-8 heavy regulation
and legislation, influential norms, rules, traditions, peculiar professional
subcultures and continuous political interest. This paper focuses on the
interplay between institutional environment and healthcare networks,
which are conceptualised by the provision of services (see Appendix A).
The paper argues that change of network and its characteristics
(orchestrated eg by institutional entrepreneurs or otherwise coordinated,
planned change) is subject to rivers of activity and actors’ managerial
cognitions, which influence the emergence of planned order, and
challenge the orchestration of changes in Finnish healthcare networks,
eg in the case of marketisation.
Disruptions of institutional environment and organisation-level
governance are known to be related in an interactive way.9 This interplay
can be understood by the analysis of pressures created by the institutional
environment (eg marketisation) and by organisations’ responses to them
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(eg institutional entrepreneurship). Organisations and networks tend to
adapt themselves to institutional pressures through renewing their
governance logics, forms and practices.10
In studying institutional changes, the issue of spontaneous ordering
has emerged.11-12 To stress the role of markets in the functioning of the
modern society, Hayek13 introduced the concept of spontaneous order —
the idea that a harmonious, evolving order arises from the interaction of
decentralised, heterogeneous economic agents. This order could not be
designed by a social planner, but merely emerges spontaneously from a
seemingly complex network of interaction.
Two theoretical approaches, one emerging from the literature of
networks and the other from literature on institutional change, advocate
the antidote to spontaneous evolution. Specifically, the literature on
strategic nets14 and institutional entrepreneurship15-16 maintain the power
and necessity of planned ordering. The present paper proposes that
planned order is conceptually close to the notion of orchestration and
successful institutional entrepreneurship activity could be understood as
one form of it. Traditionally, orchestration has been considered an
organisation-level issue,17-18 and planned order has mostly been related to
the planning of societal and institutional-level structures, norms and
rules. There is a gap in present research and a need to address
orchestration of change processes at the network level (eg intentional
weaving of strategic nets).
Lunt19 provides one of the most comprehensive reviews. They suggest
that four schools of thought can make contributions to our understanding
of the process: neoclassical economics,20 transaction cost theory,21
Austrian economics and the new economic sociology.22 Of these, only
the last two lie close to the network perspective and analysis of
marketisation as an influencing factor of network change with their key
issues of social network relations, interaction processes and non-price
competition.23 Conceptually, this paper aims at exploring the mechanisms
through which institutional entrepreneurship and strategic nets represent
planned order and orchestration. Networks have been argued to be
spontaneously evolving, which inherently contests the idea of their
manageability24 or orchestration of their change processes. A literature
review was conducted to develop an understanding of how institutional
entrepreneurship and the weaving of strategic nets operate. The aim was
to enrich the conceptual understanding of the mechanisms of planned
order in spontaneously evolving contexts by exploring the similarities
between the two theoretical approaches.
Healthcare reforms were selected as the empirical issue for a round 
of interviews as they represent a rich example of the need to exercise
orchestration at the level of networks and institutions. It was observed
that spontaneous change processes could lead to partial optimisation of
resources and suboptimal structures in healthcare networks. The caveats
of non-orchestrated change include rigid and institutionalised networks
and actors — the inability of healthcare organisers to partner
strategically. Deeply-rooted ideological institutions, isomorphism and
mimicking stifle innovation during reforms. In addition, haste seems to
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lock service producers to old-fashioned, habitual operation modes. In
short, there is a clear need for orchestration in the changing healthcare
networks. The key argument is that once the corresponding spontaneous
ordering process is known, orchestration seems more likely. Once likely
partial optimisation outcomes (threats) of spontaneous ordering are
understood, the orchestration of countermeasures is possible.
Theoretical perspectives contributing to the
orchestration of networks
Spontaneous vs planned ordering
A dichotomy between planned and spontaneous orders in the
organisation of economic activity was already highlighted in the Austrian
economics of the 1930s and 1940s,25 and has aroused interest in various
areas of social science, developing into ‘new economic sociology’ in the
early 1980s.26-27 The emphasis on how economic activity is co-coordinated
by groups of people rather than undertaken by isolated individuals has
gained wide recognition and provided a rich critique of recent economic
discourse dominated by neoclassical and to some extent by Austrian
theorists.19 Social network relations and non-price competition are key
issues of new economic sociology which resonate well with an industrial
networks point of view.23 However, the ideas of spontaneous and planned
ordering by the Austrian economics should not be overlooked in the
analysis of changing networks and marketisation within the network
perspective, as the interaction process is one of the key issues in both
schools of thought.
Austrian economics stresses that the more complex the system, the
more central a role limited knowledge will assume, and thus the more
important the influence of spontaneous ordering will become. An
economic system consists of more or less calculative economic agents
with limited knowledge, and spontaneous order arises from the
interaction of decentralised, heterogeneous actors. This spontaneous
order emerges as a result of the cognitive limitations of economic agents
in dealing with the huge amount of ambiguous and fragmented
information relevant to the exchange situation. A market develops as 
an institution, which economises on each agent’s scarce resources of
cognition and focuses the attention of that agent on a particular range 
of options.28
Hayek referred to planned order when discussing the purposefully
designed governance structures in a societal context, eg in a planned
socialist economy. A more recent example is the ongoing Finnish project
to restructure municipalities and their service provision. The project is
endogenously generated, planned institutional change to enhance the
functional rationality and productivity of public services. It is powered
by financial inducements and political consensus of various institutional
actors. The aims of this project are to be realised through the
amalgamation of municipalities and public service organisations into
larger regional and national entities for a more unified market. With this
project, as with any other economic order, purposefully designed orders
appear to be important balancing tools for governing outcomes of market
processes, just like creative destruction seems to be necessary in
unravelling outdated structures and constantly preparing agents for
changes in the rules of the game through innovations.29-30
Networks and strategic nets
Powell31 argues that if economic exchange is embedded in a particular
social structural context, then networks could be seen as a distinctive
coordination form of economic activity. Typical for these network modes
of resource allocation is that transactions occur neither through discrete
exchanges nor purely by administrative fiat, but through networks of
actors engaged in reciprocal, preferential, mutually supportive actions.31
In this study, Finnish healthcare is conceptualised as six different
networks according to the provision of services. However, this type of
resource allocation can result in partial optimisation when actors engage
themselves in actions which are beneficial to themselves or to their own
network, but not to the whole healthcare system.
In networks, spontaneous ordering has been seen to operate through a
‘series of systematic changes in the interconnected network of market
decisions’.30 This would imply that networks are highly spontaneous. On
the other hand, the role of increased planned order has been emphasised,
eg the creation and management of diverse networks of tightening
relationships with few strategic partners and with intentional weaving of
strategic nets as subsystems of network entities.11
In marketing research there are contradictory views concerning the
manageability of networks. Some research suggests that networks are
uncontrollable, unmanageable spontaneous organisms in which both
economic and social dimensions are crucial, and in such structures total
dominance over other actors’ resources and activities is not possible.32-33
Others insist that the manageability of business networks is possible and
have explored intentionality within networks and the pursuit of shared
goals and benefits.34-35 The strategic net has been introduced as a concept
encompassing the ability of organisations to exert intentional influence
on network-level organisation of economic activity.36 In manageability
research preceding the idea of strategic nets, attention has primarily been
paid to network characteristics, the nature of networks as organisations
and intra-network dynamics.14 So far the influence of institutional
changes has been a fairly unaddressed field of research.
Institutional entrepreneurship
Within the marketing discipline, less attention has been paid to
institutional approaches to change. In a highly institutionalised market,
‘power balance’ between actors and extant regulative forces can lead 
to an institutional lock-in and curb spontaneous change processes.
Institutional entrepreneurship, which shapes the institutional
environment and its processes, has been presented as a spontaneous
counterforce that works its way slyly through structures of planned 
order by influencing our shared understandings.15,16,37 Institutional
entrepreneurs (both individual and organisational) thus create new
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channels of influence and adaptation for the actors in the network with
their intentional networking activity powered by social (eg personal trust
and power), technological, competitive and/or regulatory issues (eg
system trust and power). While institutions may appear to give markets
stability, the emergence of new players, ascendance of actors, and
institutional entrepreneurship causes institutional discontinuities and
disruptions.38 Further, these processes of institutional change usually
have an impact on the network.
Propositions on the orchestration of networks
Traditionally, orchestration as a concept has been attributed to
organisation-level control of complex work.17 Hinterhuber39 extended the
notion to value-chain orchestration, concluding that the orchestration of
an extended network of diverse partner companies leads to superior
financial results. Dhanaraj and Parkhe40 define network orchestration as
‘the set of deliberate, purposeful actions undertaken by the hub firm as 
it seeks to create value (expand the pie) and extract value (gain a larger
slice of the pie) from the network’. In this study, orchestration is
becoming a concept of network and institutional perspectives with
analysis of healthcare business and service provision. For example, 
over recent years Finland has followed the general European-wide
convergence towards ‘new public management’ through healthcare
network level imitation and through modelling by norms of ‘quasi-
markets’ ideas. Introduction of market mechanism in the field has shifted
focuses strongly on the exchange-value element of the healthcare, rather
than on the use values delivered: services are effectively commodified
through market measures. Central and local governments have new
primary roles as purchasers and commissioners of services for
empowered consumers. New trajectories for planned order and
orchestration emerge.
Figure 1 depicts the way spontaneous and planned ordering and
orchestration have traditionally been attributed to different levels of
analysis. The way our understanding has changed through rather recent
trajectories of planned order and orchestration (institutional
entrepreneurship and strategic nets) are drawn in the figure.
Based on the theoretical perspectives and the multi-level approach
embedded in them, the following propositions are produced:
• Networks and their heterogeneity create possibilities for partial
optimisation. Decentralisation and mixed funding weave complex
service provision networks in which some actors have multiple roles
and various channels to service facilities and other resources by the
utilisation of personal and/or system trust and power (eg about one-
third of all physicians work in both public and private sectors).
• Marketisation as a spontaneous change process fuels partial
optimisation habits. Network and institutional change both involve 
a variety of subjective actor positions, and a range of organisational,
professional and sociopolitical standings, which all could pursue
conflicting interests and agendas of change.
• Orchestration across levels is needed, because heterogeneity and
spontaneity create significant problems in outcomes.
The Finnish healthcare system resembles those in other Nordic countries
in that it relies mainly on public provision of care and offers universal
coverage of a comprehensive range of publicly-funded health services
paid for mainly out of general taxation41 (for more details see 
Appendix A). The contemporary trend towards more liberalised and
market-accommodating healthcare with competitive bidding and tender
processes has boosted change and created market dysfunction. Recent
research has addressed these inefficiencies,42-46 but so far the issue of
orchestration has not been addressed, when outcomes of the customer
process suffer from the combination of heterogeneous networks and
spontaneous change. Key orchestration processes are managing
knowledge (about relevant alternatives), monitoring the appropriation 
or legitimacy (of changes) and ensuring network stability.40 As in other
contexts, the role of a hub actor in performing these processes is vital. 
In the complex actor interests contexts, the identification, defining and
empowerment of hub actors is the first step in coming up with an
orchestration strategy.
Research approach
The research strategy in this study is deductive. The process started 
with a pure theoretical treatment of the marketisation and orchestration
phenomenon in networks. The core propositions were formed on the
basis of the selected theoretical angles. As the marketisation and
orchestration of healthcare networks in particular was perceived to be a
largely unexplored phenomenon, an exploratory research approach with
the empirical study seemed in order. The aim was to produce a modest
contribution by legitimising marketisation and its orchestration as a
research setting by exploring whether they are active and relevant
determinants of outcomes in healthcare networks. Accordingly, the study
gathered data from interviews in which the theory-based propositions
were not presented to the interviewees, but it was explored whether they
would emerge spontaneously in dialogue and support the propositions.
Researchers interviewed 39 key decision-makers in Finnish healthcare
service organisations or closely-related professional organisations. 
The semi-structured interviews dealt with ongoing, visible, coming or
anticipated marketisation-related changes in the network. The objective of
these interviews was to allow managers to describe their views of changing
healthcare networks in relation to marketisation and coordination in their
own words. The data analysis of transcripted interviews focused on (a) the
search and identification of patterns of spontaneous and planned ordering
within the data (eg descriptions of practical processes) and (b)
interpretation of their meaning to organisations (eg relationship
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management decisions which created partial optimisation, utilisation of
personal and/or system trust and power), and not on the narratives told by
the participants. This interpretive approach provided open, fairly flexible,
experiential and illuminating data to study change processes and
dynamics of marketisation; and operational links needing to be traced
over time with local grounding,47-49 in which interviewees’ descriptions
were a mixture of various levels of actors and their institutional
entrepreneurship and orchestration activities (see Figure 1) in the Finnish
healthcare networks.
The unit of analysis in the interviews was marketisation changes. The
interviews attempted to cover all key marketisation change-related
issues including (a) identifying functions and areas prone to
marketisation, (b) identifying actual ongoing change projects potentially
leading to marketisation, (c) discussing the pace and probability of
marketisation, (d) determining the possible or probable forms of
marketisation (changes in organisations and governance modes), (e)
anticipating the potential mid-run outcomes of current marketisation-
oriented changes and possibilities for partial optimisation, and (f)
discussing the impact and magnitude of marketisation-related changes
(eg in terms of number of employees influenced (personal/system trust
and power)).
Analysis in the interviews focused on the local strategic nets and the
regional parts of the national healthcare network. This was reflected in 
the selection of respondents, as persons responsible for managing and
reorganising healthcare in the six largest cities, six largest municipal
leagues and 15 key hospital districts were covered. The respondents,
typically chief executive officers, chief medical officers or chief planning
officers, all held responsibilities over and information about entire local
strategic nets and/or the regional part of the national healthcare network,
not just single organisations. The interviews overlapped geographically to
the extent that all major regions were covered with a minimum of two
interviews.
Figure 1: New and recent trajectories of planned order and orchestration
Results of the exploratory study
Generally, the interviews provided evidence of the need for orchestrating
the ongoing marketisation-oriented changes.
Result 1: Heterogeneity exists
In the interviews, heterogeneity factors emerged which indicated that 
due to prevailing cognitions of change, decision making by executives
could result in structural and habitual partial optimisation. Researchers
identified that there is much heterogeneity in the way management
perceives the changes in the network. More specifically, there seems to
be little consensus on (a) what the changes are, (b) how they involve
certain types of network actors, (c) what the potential outcomes are, 
and (d) whether and how the changes could be orchestrated.
Typically actor positions, instead of actor characteristics, contributed
to the heterogeneity of perspectives on what marketisation is and how it
is occurring. For example, directors of large organisations tended to play
down the significance of a dramatic change in a single function (eg the
incorporation of all occupational healthcare within a large primary care
organisation). Decision makers in smaller organisations regarded the
same change as a major step towards marketisation. When asked about
the mergers of surgical units, the directors of large organisations
perceived this as a local adaptation in the operational level, which did 
not have network level impact, while the decision makers in smaller
organisations perceived this as a major change of the whole regional part
of the network. There was also variation in the views of directors in large
organisations depending on their perception of their own ability to
influence the changes.
This highlights the relevance of actor cognitions in how decision
makers perceive the marketisation of healthcare networks. Further, this
can be argued to play a critical role in determining final outcomes and
possibilities for partial optimisation.
Result 2: Evidence of partial optimisation exists
The interviews recorded little evidence or opinions for marketisation
bringing immediate or direct cost savings. Contrary evidence of
escalating costs, usually due to earlier miscalculation of costs or witty
profit-maximising business models, was ample. Six respondents
mentioned the same private player whose ability to utilize deficiencies of
public sector human resource management and consecutive staff shortages
led to structural partial optimisation at the organisational level and to a
suboptimal outcome at the network level. On a more general scale, spot
work contracting and new overtime pay schemas were heavily criticised
as features of increased marketisation in the labour market. Furthermore,
five respondents raised, referred to or implicitly emphasised the fact that,
in parts, the healthcare networks are mainly a public good, so orchestration
of some kind is needed anyway. Finally, a respondent poignantly pointed
out that, without orchestration, the general state of overcapacity in many
functions was destined to lead to service price dumping, pile-driving by
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agile institutional actors and other unwanted phenomena if and when
markets opened up.
Result 3: Different marketisation rivers within different networks
Another finding was that marketisation-oriented changes were perceived
to be taking place, in distinct and rather unconnected rivers.50 The first
river was characterised with private involvement and business-like
behaviour, with markets playing an obvious, important part. The key
argument was that of resourcing and capacity utilisation efficiency.
Repeatedly mentioned parts of the healthcare networks were laboratories,
medical imaging, elective surgery and residential elderly care.
A second river consisted of functions in which the most agile private
players were able to exploit the rigidities of the public healthcare
organisations, which have been notoriously slow in adapting to macro-
level or institutional changes in their environments. This was perceived 
to lead to a number of areas of activity going ‘wild’ with marketisation,
usually due to difficult or even desperate situations in the public sector.
These situations included: basic occupational healthcare (large and
numerous employers suddenly started seeking new care providers); health
centre and emergency room worker outsourcing (staff shortages emerging
from union contract rigidities created a shortage of qualified workers,
which private players utilised nimbly); hotelling-type wards (financing 
and investment decision-making gave private players overwhelming
advantages); and dental care (changes in legislation placed such demands
on the public sector that it could most often only manage with extensive
public–private cooperation). These can all be characterised as slip-ups,
where partial optimisation at the organisational level meant that the
benefits of marketisation to the public sector were largely lost
The third river dealt with major changes in organisational roles, which
shifted parts of the public sector to a market-oriented relationship with
the rest of the public system. For example, plans were being made to
incorporate entire hospital districts. Alternatively, service-producing units
in many regions faced being subjected to a strict purchaser-provider
setup, in which public providers would have to fight for patients with
private players in order to maintain their existence.
Within the boundaries of each river, the perceptions of driving forces
and outcomes were again very mixed. This leads back to the third
proposition of the need for orchestration. However, attaining orchestration
seems to be very challenging due to: (a) the continuous spontaneous
ordering processes (coined ‘rivers of activity’), (b) the impact of the
dynamic institutional environment and (c) managers’ cognitive limitations.
Result 4: Substantial network fragmentation exists and 
institutions are fuelling it
Several respondents mentioned that institutional structures were fuelling
network fragmentation and partial optimisation at the organisational
level. The governance of healthcare networks is decentralised and has
parallel arrangements for service production and funding. The
municipalities are free to produce health services themselves, to contract
with other municipalities or to contract with the private sector for their
provisions. This freedom (a) increases the variety of regional normative
order, resulting in the quality and dynamics of relationships which can be
controlled by patterns of personal trust and/or power, and (b) enhances
spontaneous order, resulting in diversity in methods of delivering
services, which hinders possibilities of orchestration and creates
production overcapacity (a partially optimal outcome at the national
level).
In addition, the interviewees described how the networks are further
fragmented by the parallel arrangements for partial National Health
Insurance (NHI) funding in occupational and private health services
(hospital, specialist and occupational health). The municipal and NHI
arrangements are somewhat complementary and overlapping. GP 
gate-keeping is in place for patients who rely solely on municipal health
services; however, this is not the case with respect to private hospital,
occupational health and specialist services. There is a risk of 
supplier-induced demand and overcapacity. The interview data indicate
that parallel arrangements for funding and access to care for private and
public sectors should be harmonised in order to avoid overcapacity.
The informal institutions (traditions, cognitions and opinions) around
private healthcare organisations are also influencing the network structure
and partial optimisation at the organisational level. The respondents referred
to ‘the private sector’ and ‘profit-oriented company activity’ as one and the
same thing. There seems to be a dominant notion about what a private
sector healthcare company looks like, does and aims at: ‘cherry-picker, who
exploits the financing system’. This institution is a major factor in inhibiting
the development of wide-ranging, cross-network private service provision.
This is not a new phenomenon. One respondent accounted that all the
Nordic countries seem to have produced private sector clones of old and
existing public sector operations since the early 1990s.
Contributions
Theoretical contributions
It is proposed that understanding the nature of underlying economic
ordering is a key issue in the manageability discussion.51-52 The key
argument is that once the corresponding spontaneous ordering process is
known, orchestration seems more likely. In the case of healthcare
networks, it is argued that once likely outcomes (threats) of spontaneous
ordering are understood, the orchestration of countermeasures is
possible.
In networks, various reciprocal episodes of interaction can intertwine
or reinforce each other by their content or timeframe, depending on the
role(s) and subjective positions of actors. The range of actors’
relationships and how they are managed as channels of interaction have
an impact on how influence is exerted as an activity of institutional
entrepreneurship and how adaptation to the changing institutional
environment is received at the individual, organisational and network
level. Further, this can enhance spontaneous or planned ordering.
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Based on the evidence on healthcare networks, network-oriented
service production is prone to bringing spontaneous governance 
with it.7 However, there is a difference between the ‘benefits’ of 
network-oriented production and network-oriented governance.
Beneficial spontaneous ordering processes (eg price competition,
emergence of new actors) need planned order in the form of
orchestration mechanisms. In the Finnish interviews, this was evident,
eg in home care and physiotherapist services. Whereas marketisation
created a range of new services and service providers, clear benefits
from marketisation only emerged after service standards (home care)
and administrative recommendations (physiotherapists) were
implemented. This highlights the need for interplay between
spontaneous and planned orders.12
Evolving governance calls for the differentiation of marketing
practices.53 In addition, it calls for various managerial practices which
are subject to the ability to sense the governance mode on the market
sector in which one operates. In this study, institutional disruptions
opened the network to new players and boosted the competitiveness of
the business. This development changes the old patterns of cooperation
and relationships. The network governance mode gains market-like
aspects: relationships are more competitive and price is a means of
communication. Simultaneously, the hierarchical control and authority of
regulative and normative institutions are decreasing, giving rise to a new
kind of cooperation and reciprocal relationships. Healthcare providers
have become more autonomous corporate bodies, which can cultivate
partial optimisation.
However, the interview data suggest that part of the quality and
dynamics of relationships can be controlled by patterns of personal
trust and/or power in a network built on strong institutional governance
structures. Bachmann54 argues that while in a less strongly regulated
system (eg Finnish healthcare networks), social actors, to a large
extent, need to secure the effectiveness of the coordination of their
mutual expectations and interactions on the basis of individual
experiences and resources, the same is neither necessary nor a
promising strategy when the business is built on a strong institutional
framework of governance structures. In the first case, trust and power
are likely to appear as personal trust and power. But, in the case of 
a strong institutional environment, the management of channels of
influence and adaptation is subject to the actors’ ability to utilise both
system and personal trust and power,55-56 which could enhance the
emergence of planned order.
In line with previous literature, it is argued that cognitions play a vital
part in understanding the interplay of planned and spontaneous ordering.
A direct conclusion from this is that research on orchestration should
integrate cognition as a central determinant and span different levels of
analysis. As spontaneous and planned processes permeate institution,
network, organisation and individual levels, so should orchestration. 
The analysis of change in healthcare networks calls for reference to
sociopolitical, economic and subjective actions of action with account of
situated actors’ orientations toward one another and the substance 
of cognition.57
Guiding future research
This study thus legitimises the question of orchestration of marketisation
in healthcare networks, and turns the research to the ‘why’ and ‘how’
questions. Further research with empirical cases or other types of data
are needed in this field in order to generalise the findings for different
health systems. But, as with any research, there are various challenges.
First, the complexity formed by embeddedness and boundaries of
networks and institutions. In this study, the researchers defined the limits
of networks a priori into six different national networks by the provision
of services, but the boundaries of institutions are much vaguer. Secondly,
there is the challenge of time. Networks and institutions are by their
nature inherently dynamic and susceptible to continuous change.
Therefore, this exploratory study of marketisation should be amended
perhaps with longitudinal methods or with other tools of process
research. Thirdly, in theory-generating research, the potential for case
comparisons is commonly viewed as important.58-60 Future research with
multiple cases could allow the comparison of sites or cases and their
specificities related to different health systems and cultures, and establish
the range of generality of findings to pin down the conditions under
which those findings will occur. Despite these challenges, the way is
paved for further research incorporating the institutional perspective
strongly.
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Appendix A: Description of Finnish healthcare
Local government, currently in the shape of 348 municipalities, plays a
leading role both in the provision of care and financing. Municipalities
often cooperate to provide services. Approximately 194 municipal
health centres provide a wide range of primary, preventive, inpatient and
community health services throughout Finland. Viewed from the
perspective of primary healthcare arrangements in many other countries,
they are large units.61 On average, municipalities are small in size and
therefore need to join federations to fund and manage specialist
services. The 20 hospital districts throughout Finland represent such
federations.
Finnish healthcare is both more decentralised and more mixed in its
funding than in other Nordic countries. Some services are financed 
by a ‘parallel’ social health insurance scheme, rather than by general
taxation.62 Private (corporate and out-of-pocket) finance accounts for
almost 25 per cent of total health expenditure, and private providers 
play a significant role in the provision of some services (eg dental and
occupational health services). Physicians in the public health centres 
and hospitals are either employed or have spot work contracts (about
one-third of all physicians work in both sectors).
Networks in the Finnish healthcare could be classified roughly into
six different national networks according to the provision of services.
Some actors operate and have a role in various networks, so these
networks overlap and interact; nonetheless, ownership, funding and
actor-specific business models are different. Municipal health centres
form a nationwide network to provide a wide range of primary,
preventive, inpatient and community health services. Municipal hospital
and specialist services are provided by five university hospitals, 15
central hospitals and about 40 smaller specialised hospitals, which 
form the hospital and specialists services network. Prescribed drugs and
over-the-counter medicines for ambulatory patients are mainly supplied
by about 800 independent pharmacy outlets, which form the
pharmaceutical services network. Employers in Finland are required by
law to provide occupational health services for their employees and
insurance for industrial diseases and accidents. Employers can provide
these services themselves, or can contract out the responsibility to
private providers or to municipal health centres, which jointly form the
occupational health services network. Private medical and dental
practice form a network of their own, as patients can approach a
specialist (only about 7 per cent of all private consultations are with
general practitioners61) directly in the private sector, without referral
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Figure A1: Organisation of health services in Finland61
from a GP, and private specialists can refer patients to public hospitals.
Long-term (institutional and home-based) care for the elderly and
disabled is provided under the auspices of both the health and social
service departments of the municipalities. There is also some private
provision, which is often complementary to the public service offer.
These public and private provisions jointly form the long-term care
network.
Figure A1 provides an overview of the main organisation of health
services in Finland.
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Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to discuss the impact of the institutional environment on
strategic networks including their cohesiveness as well as institutional entrepreneurship activities
conducted by members of these networks.
Design/methodology/approach – The paper presents a case study of the trade association Pharma
Industry Finland (PIF) and its institutional environment.
Findings – Institutional environment and institutional entrepreneurship of a strategic network are
intertwined in various ways. Changes in the institutional environment influence the strategic
cohesiveness of the network and the mutual goals of its network members. As a result, PIF proactively
engages in entrepreneurial activities to realize its interests.
Research limitations/implications – The paper of one network and one institutional environment
is limited in generalizability. Further research is needed to explore if similar results can be obtained in
other contexts.
Practical implications – In order to be successful, companies should be able to sense and evaluate
which matters can be effectively addressed through collective institutional entrepreneurship and/or
the company’s own entrepreneurial activity.
Originality/value – This empirical study contributes to discussions on the theoretical understanding
of strategic networks in relation to institutional environments, institutionally bounded strategizing
in networks, and institutional entrepreneurship in business networks.
Keywords Institutional care, Entrepreneurialism, Health services, Pharmaceuticals industry
Paper type Case study
Introduction
Recent’s pharmaceutical industry can be best understood as a network (Compagni et al.,
2008; Erat and Zorzi, 2007; Gambardella et al., 2001). Drug innovation, as well as the
production, commercialization, and consumption of drugs, involves a variety of actors
including different types of firms, research organizations like universities and public and
private research centers, financial institutions, regulatory authorities, sociopolitical
decision makers, consumers, and professions (Blumenthal, 2004; Studdert et al., 2004;
Abraham, 2002; Collier and Iheanacho, 2002; Dukes, 2002; Eaton, 2001; Montaner et al.,
2001). Therefore, pharmaceutical business cannot be assessed by looking only at the
firms but also at the broader set of institutions and the dynamic interactions between
them (Lichtenberg, 2009; Mittra, 2006; Gambardella et al., 2001; Maynard and Cookson,
2001; Earl-Slater, 1998).
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Studies on the relationship between institutions and healthcare organizations have
shown that institutional features of organizational and business network environments
shape the goals and means of different organizational actors (Kirby, 2006; Guo, 2004).
Institutional environments are thus an inherent feature of business networks that
influence their economic and sociopolitical structures and processes as well as their
strategic choices (Zucker, 1986; Oliver, 1997; Lukkari and Parvinen, 2008). While these
studies address the interplay between institutions and healthcare organizations, they
lack analysis of the interplay between institutions and strategic networks in this field.
This paper examines this interplay in the pharmaceutical industry. First, we analyze
the impact of institutional environments on strategic networks and their strategic
cohesiveness. Next, we investigate how strategic networks influence institutional
environments through institutional entrepreneurship (DiMaggio, 1988; Fligstein, 1997).
For researchers of healthcare management, the relevance of this paper lies in the
understanding of the pharmaceutical business through consideration of its institutional
influencing via strategic networks.
The paper is organized as follows. We start by reviewing how institutional processes
affect strategic networks and how institutional entrepreneurship may influence the
institutional environment. Then, we present our theoretical framework regarding
the interplay between institutions and strategic networks. This is followed by a case
study, through which we discuss and extend the framework. Finally, we present our
conclusions.
Institutional processes affecting strategic networks
Neoinstitutional theory focuses on the interplay between society and institutions,
drawing from the social constructionist approach (Berger and Luckmann, 1967;
Zucker, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1991; Scott, 2001). It views
institutions as social constructs and explains how social reality becomes reinforced, for
example, by regulatory processes involving state agencies and professional bodies
(Greenwood et al., 2002).
According to Scott and Meyer (1983, p. 149), institutional environments are
“characterized by the elaboration of rules and requirements to which individual
organizations must conform if they are to receive support and legitimacy.” In this paper,
we focus on three important processes through which institutional environments affect
strategic networks: regulating, validating, and habitualizing (Grewal and Dharwadkar,
2002). Regulating processes work through their interaction with regulatory institutions,
which exist to ensure the order, accountability, and continuity of healthcare and social
welfare systems (Touhy, 2003). This interaction is characterized by the imposition and
inducement mechanisms used by regulatory institutions to influence different
market mechanisms. Regulatory institutions can impose direct constraints in the form
of authoritative orders or indirect constraints through rigorous rules and regulations
(Grewal and Dharwadkar, 2002). When regulatory institutions do not possess the
institutional capacity to initiate constraints, they can provide valued incentives. These
exercises of power are often beneficial to society at large (Oliver, 1991; Baron, 1989).
However, they are likely to force actors in strategic networks to make changes in
their operations.
Validating processes involve interaction with normative institutions (such as trade
associations and professions) and give rise to standards for socially acceptable behavior
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(Baum and Oliver, 1991; Berger and Luckmann, 1967; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).
Authorization involves the development of rules and codes of conduct by superordinate
actors that are considered legitimate and requires subordinate actors to voluntarily
seek the approval of the authorizing agent (i.e. trade association or labor union).
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) point out that this type of normative pressure is likely to be
found in professional sectors and organizations. They argue that because of mimetic or
normative mechanisms, organizational decision makers adopt institutional designs and
attempt to model their own organizations on patterns that they consider appropriate
or professional. Furthermore, the authors point out that legitimacy frequently goes
hand-in-hand with success.
Habitualization is a base-level institutional process that gives rise to shared cognitive
templates (Meyer and Rowan, 1991). Repeated actions are cast in a pattern, reproduced
with minimal effort, and recognized by actors (Zucker, 1983, 1977; Gill and Stern, 1969;
Berger and Luckmann, 1967). The two primary mechanisms that facilitate these processes
of habitualization are imprinting and bypassing (Grewal and Dharwadkar, 2002).
Imprinting refers to the process through which organizations acquire characteristics at
the time of their inception; subsequent inertia preserves these features and results in
particular structures and performance (Baum and Oliver, 1991). As organizations mature,
they may find it difficult to change or to understand the need for change. In addition,
cultural control often substitutes for structural control, which results in the bypassing
of formal structures and processes (Zucker, 1977). Actors are aware of their role
expectations, irrespective of their organizational affiliation (Meyer et al., 1981), and
existing interaction practices and processes are consequently preserved over time.
Institutional entrepreneurship
The concept of institutional entrepreneurship refers to the activity of leveraging
resources in order to create new institutions or to transform existing ones (DiMaggio,
1988; Fligstein, 1997). The role of individual and organizational activity in institutional
entrepreneurship is highlighted through actor positions and relational connectivity
between actors (Hargrave and van De Ven, 2006; Gadde et al., 2003). Institutions do not
specify a fixed outcome but rather define a context in which actors can produce a
wide range of actions and relationships (Burau and Vrangebæk, 2008; Pentland and
Rueter, 1994). Institutional entrepreneurs adapt to institutions, modify them, and seek
advantageous network positions in order to fulfill aspirations (Maguire et al., 2004,
Garud et al., 2002, Lawrence, 1999). Institutional entrepreneurship can yield results by
partaking in institutional (re)formation and reacting to institutional changes (Hensman,
2003). Disruptions, such as emerging industry rules or new legislative norms, can
facilitate changes in systems of institutions (Selznick, 1957).
Many factors influence the potential for organizations to act as institutional
entrepreneurs. In mature and regulated industries, institutional processes tend to stabilize
(Greenwood et al., 2002); institutional rules take the form of legislation, explicit codes of
conduct, or systemic structures. In a highly institutionalized market, such as
the drug market, there is typically an asymmetrical power balance between extant
regulative authorities and other actors. However, success is not only contingent on
adhering to current rules but also on reacting to opportunities created by institutional
disruptions. By influencing new institutions or transforming existing ones, organizations
can turn favorable attributes into emerging institutional structures (Maguire
et al., 2004).
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There is a complex interplay between institutional environments and strategic networks
pursuing institutional entrepreneurship. Strategic networks can help organizations by
giving them legitimacy in an institutional environment. However, because strategic
networks are also seen as institutional arrangements, the organizations within them are
critically dependent on the processes of institutionalization and the consensus around
activities of institutional entrepreneurship. As Garud et al. (2002) conclude, the process of
institutional entrepreneurship is fraught with dialectical challenges. First, because
mobilizing collective action often creates opposition, entrepreneurs must overcome inertia
and take vested interests in the collective. Second, mobilizing collective action is made
difficult by legitimacy traps: some will view entrepreneurship as not in the best interest of
the field as a whole. In addition, maintaining collective action may be difficult, because
others may want to challenge the new institution as it emerges. We propose that legitimacy
traps and collective action are strongly linked to the strategic cohesiveness of networks.
Interplay between institutions and strategic networks
The institutional environment, through the processes of regulating, validating, and
habitualizing, is likely to influence strategic networks (Figure 1). Strategic networks
are also likely to influence their institutional environment, i.e. to engage in institutional
entrepreneurship. We will focus on this interplay.
Based on the ideas of Jarillo (1988), Gulati et al. (2000), and Mo¨ller et al. (2005), we
define a strategic business network as an intentionally developed and managed
interorganizational cooperation between three or more organizations for the pursuit of
mutually beneficial strategic business goals. Such a strategic network is defined by
its intentionality: strategic networks are intentionally created, developed, maintained,
and managed (Mo¨ller and Svahn, 2003). The existence of these networks is motivated by
the pursuit of strategic business goals and benefits. A strategic network is defined by
clear boundaries; without a clear understanding of the organizations that belong and do
not belong to the network, it is difficult for network members to agree on shared goals.
A strategic network often has one or more hub organizations that develop and manage
the network as well as other players that have a less visible or less powerful role.
Hub organizations are unlikely to have complete control over the network’s strategy,
but they can play a key role in how the need for collective action is framed (Rao, 2001);
how synergy in vested interests is turned into cooperation; and how collective action is
mobilized and maintained (Garud et al., 2002). On the other hand, abusing the role of a
hub could initiate a legitimacy trap and decrease the strategic cohesion of the network.
Figure 1.
Theoretical framework:
interplay between
institutional environment,
strategic network, and
institutional
entrepreneurship
Institutional
environment
Institutional
entrepreneurship
Strategic network
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The success of a strategic network is influenced by its strategic cohesiveness, i.e. the
degree of mutual understanding and acceptance of a future vision and game plan as well
as the degree of framing issues and strategies similarly. If a network is strategically
cohesive, then it is more likely to succeed in achieving its strategic goals and vice versa
(Mo¨ller et al., 2005).
Case study: Pharma Industry Finland
We conducted a case study (Yin, 2003) on Pharma Industry Finland (PIF), a horizontally
aligned strategic network. In 2004 and 2005, we interviewed 25 key persons from
PIF’s internal and external networks, including representatives of pharmaceutical
companies, patient organizations, physician’s associations, and government agencies.
Additionally, we collected secondary material, such as memos, annual reports,
and company-specific information. We analyzed the data by finding themes and
patterns (Miles and Huberman, 1994) using our theoretical framework shown in Figure 1
(Alasuutari, 1996). One of the authors has 12 years of expertise in the industry, including
work with PIF and institutional relationships and regulatory authorities in Finland; this
provided direct access to the informants and documents as well as helped to deepen
the analysis.
PIF is a trade association that looks after the policy interests of the research-based
pharmaceutical industry in Finland. Its objective is to develop the competitiveness of the
industry, relevant research and development activities, and the operating environment
both in Finland and the EU. Its main target of influence is the economic, industrial,
and sociopolitical legislations that govern the pharmaceutical industry. PIF’s members
represent most of the pharmaceutical companies engaged in research, manufacturing, and
marketing of medicinal products in Finland. The case description is based on interview
data and documentary analysis of PIF’s internal memos, unless otherwise indicated.
Figure 2 shows PIF’s internal and external linkages. There are four kinds of actors:
member companies represented on the board, member companies represented on
committees, member companies more loosely involved in network operations, and PIF
staff personnel. The board of directors, expert committees, and staff personnel form the
backbone of PIF. The board sets its strategic goals and steers the expert committees
and the staff personnel. The 12 seats of the PIF board are held by representatives
(usually chief executive officers) of the member companies. The general director of PIF
acts as the secretary of the board. The board meets approximately once a month.
The expert committees prepare and implement the strategic decisions made by the
board. In practice, this means that the committees make available their expertise and
specialized knowledge to the board and staff personnel as requested. Among the expert
committees, the Medicines Policy Committee concentrates on issues related to the prices
and reimbursements of medicines and sickness insurance legislation; other committees
focus on specific sub-goals on PIF’s agenda. In addition to its expert committees,
PIF occasionally sets up ad hoc committees assigned to specific projects, such as drafting
of the Code of Marketing of Medicinal Products, a guidebook for the voluntary control of
marketing medicinal products. The seats of the expert committees are held by
representatives of PIF member companies; one seat in each committee is held by a
member of the board and one seat by a PIF staff member who also acts as the secretary of
the committee.
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The role of the PIF staff is to assist the board and take care of the day-to-day operations
of the association; to accomplish this, the staff frequently engages in discussions with
expert committees. The staff personnel include a general director, director of interest
supervision, communications director, director of government and external affairs, and
other staff (20 persons in total).
PIF is externally networked with a variety of actors, including its main targets of
influence: governmental authorities like the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health
(MSAH), National Agency of Medicines (NAM), Pharmaceuticals Pricing Board (PPB),
Members of the Finnish Parliament, Members of the European Parliament, European
Commission, and Council of the European Union. PIF naturally conducts its public
relation activities with the media and the general public. The European and
international allies of PIF include the European Federation of Pharmaceutical
Industries’ Associations, International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers’
Associations, Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, and Association
of the European Self-medication Industry. Finally, PIF also cooperates with other
industrial and citizen interest groups such as doctor, pharmacist, and patient associations.
We identify several networking situations featuring institutional effects and/or
institutional entrepreneurship. Five of these are selected for closer study, based on their
relative significance for PIF’s development as a strategic network. The findings are
summarized in Table I.
Effects of the increasing political pressure on costs
Political and economical pressure to cut the cost of medicines in Finland increased in
the early 1990s due to recession. One of the industry executives notes that:
Figure 2.
Map of PIF’s internal and
external networks
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[. . .] when the costs of the health care system were being controlled, and the gross national
product dropped, the share of health care costs of the gross national product went up [. . .]
After this, there was this natural reaction by the governmental authorities that something
needs to be done.
This pressure influenced cooperation and strategic cohesiveness at PIF. Members
started to realize that changes were inevitable and that the industry needed to redefine
its strategic focus. However, this new strategic focus was not achieved easily, because
the pressure for change was framed differently among PIF members. In addition, due to
imprinting, it was difficult for the members to commit themselves to a new type of
collective action. One executive explains that it was difficult to define “the issues that we
should look at and [. . .] the focus on which we should build our strategies.”
In other words, the industry’s perceptions of the outside world were still bounded by its
reasonably long history of continuous success. They had witnessed steady growth and
had not yet faced serious challenges that might affect business conditions. It required
several years before PIF members understood the need to find a common goal. In the late
1990s, PIF defined its role as a more proactive strategic actor trying to influence the
political atmosphere and legislation.
To sum up, increasing political and economical pressure to cut the cost of medicine,
which became institutionalized in Finnish society due to the early 1990s recession,
helped PIF to find and define its strategic cohesiveness. In other words, the network
achieved stronger strategic cohesiveness and mutual understanding due to changes in
the institutional setting. As a result, PIF became more proactive as a trade association.
Voluntary control of medicinal marketing
Advertising medicine and medicinal products in Finland was regulated by law and
monitored by the NAM. In addition to these legislative regulations, the pharmaceutical
industry controlled its marketing practices voluntarily through the Code of
Medicinal Marketing. This code was written by PIF based on legislation related to
medicinal products, consumers, and competition as well as the International Code of
Advertising Practice and the provisions introduced by the EU Directive 2001/83/EC on
medicinal products for human use. The reason for this voluntary regulation was to
avoid obligatory legislation, which could be stricter. PIF acted as an institutional
entrepreneur by creating and maintaining standards for acceptable behavior and
validating its institutional capacity to act as the authoring agent. In addition, similar
codes of marketing had been drawn in other Nordic countries, indicating the influence of
mimicking processes, resulting in isomorphism.
Compliance with the voluntary Code of Medicinal Marketing was monitored by PIF.
If a marketing practice was found to break the code, then the company was given a
warning, ordered to discontinue the practice, or sanctioned with a fine. Disagreements
between companies concerning violations were first examined by PIF before they were
brought to the attention of the relevant authorities, namely NAM. The latest code came
into force in 2005 and was stricter than its previous versions, mainly due to sociopolitical
pressure by the authorities, the public, and the media. Many previously acceptable
practices were no longer approved.
At the general level, all PIF members agreed upon the new Code of Medicinal
Marketing. At the level of actual marketing practice, however, there was some disruption
in the cohesiveness of the industry. Some members found the guidelines to be too tight:
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“there were those who thought there was no point in setting too restrictive limits at this
stage, because it would limit our [the whole industry’s] business.” Some companies were
accused of not sticking to the marketing code despite their official commitment to it. Some
argued that competition in the industry required companies to bend the rules. Some
companies were more open to bending the rules than others and had values that allowed
them to do so. This type of behavior could lead to a legitimacy trap.
To sum up, the voluntary marketing regulation by PIF represents an attempt to
influence the legislation in this field or rather to avoid strict regulation. This is an
example of institutional entrepreneurship. PIF members mutually supported this
activity, at least on a general level. Increasing sociopolitical pressure influenced PIF to
draw a stricter set of voluntary regulations. In some ways, this increased the industry’s
cohesiveness: they had to work together in order to avoid stricter, obligatory legislation.
However, the new set of regulations also stirred some uneasiness among firms, some
of which opposed the voluntary regulation and continued to work around it; this
negatively influenced PIF’s cohesiveness. Overall, however, the industry has been
successful in that no new legislation has been introduced. On the other hand, the
increased sociopolitical pressure has worked against the industry, since PIF created
stricter voluntary normative rules.
Generic vs research-based companies
The majority of PIF members represent research-based companies, but a few are generic
companies. Research-based companies focus on discovering, patenting, and marketing
new medicines, while generic companies focus on marketing older medicines that no
longer have patent protection. Tension arises from the fact that research-based
companies benefit from a long period of patent protection, while generic companies
benefit from short periods.
For most of the 1990s, generic and research-based companies maintained comfortable,
side-by-side cooperation. PIF chose to emphasize a balance between these industries.
This benefited patients and society as a whole, because both industries are needed:
research-based companies bring new cures to the market, while generic companies help to
save costs.
However, not everyone in PIF agreed with this approach. Some felt that it led to
indecisiveness and vagueness about PIF’s ultimate goals, since vested interests among
members were different. Whose business interests was PIF promoting? A juxtaposition
existed between member firms. Gradually, generic members started to withdraw
from PIF.
This split was triggered by at least two institutional external factors: new legislation
favoring the generic industry and the subsequent entry of foreign generic companies into
Finland. The new law on generic substitution, which was designed to increase the
substitution of higher priced brand products with lower priced generics, came into effect
in April 2003. PIF opposed the law, which was prepared by the MSAH behind closed
doors. When it was finally brought to the attention of PIF and other interest groups, they
were given little time to submit their comments and propose changes. PIF thus could not
adequately familiarize itself with the law before it was passed; this spurred confusion
among PIF members: “In hindsight, we should have acted more radically [. . .] We weren’t
able to put together a unified, swift, shared policy of what we, as an industry, wanted.”
There was a lack of focus in PIF’s lobbying, because the industry was unable to agree on
a mutual focus.
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As a consequence of this lack of institutional capacity and framing of activities,
PIF failed to influence the content of the law; however, this was largely unrelated to the
tension between generic and research-based firms. Authorities exercised their coercive
power, resulting in imposition. The new law brought the tension between research-based
and generic companies to the surface, ultimately driving the generics to start their own
interest group. This further eroded PIF’s legitimacy as an institutional entrepreneur in
the eyes of its members and external actors. The institutional change thus exposed the
inability of PIF to find strategic cohesiveness.
Proactively changing the pricing, reimbursement, and sickness insurance legislation
Legislation on marketing authorization, pricing and reimbursement of medicines, and
sickness insurance (PRSI) is a key lobbying target for PIF. These issues are directly
linked to the amount of profits that a pharmaceutical company can make, so they are of
great strategic importance to the entire network.
Beginning in the 1970s, PRSI legislation had evolved into a complicated and
bureaucratic system. Since 1998, PIF had a two-level agenda for reforming PRSI
legislation. As a long-term goal, PIF wanted to replace the current PRSI system with a
completely redesigned system in which reimbursements and patient co-payments were
calculated based on total annual costs; all medicines would be funded by general taxation
in the same way. A short-term goal was to promote changes to the current system, which
contained various categories of reimbursements funded by government financing and
out-of-pocket payments, governed by the Social Insurance Institution (Ja¨rvelin, 2002).
Neither of these two goals took priority over the other, as PIF and its members
understood that both goals were equally important. Both were driven by business
interests; the only difference being in their timing. It would take time before the new,
insurance-based system would be accepted and implemented, so there was a need to patch
up the current system first. A fundamental change in the reimbursement system could be
initiated in the near future under the current right-wing government appointed in 2007.
A recent press release by PIF from 2007 called for action:
Reform of the medicines reimbursement system must start from a clean slate. PIF demands
that the Finnish medicines reimbursement system be thoroughly reformed. This was agreed
upon in the new Government programme. The pharmaceutical industry wishes that the work
be initiated as soon as possible so that the reform can be implemented towards the end of this
Government’s mandate [2011].
Strategizing within PIF related to PRSI legislation has not been purely cooperative.
One reason for non-cooperative behavior is that the current PRSI system benefits
some companies more than others, depending on their product portfolios. Some
products receive a higher reimbursement rate, which generally makes it easier to sell
ambulatory pharmaceuticals. While its members appear to support PIF’s argument at
the general level, interviews show that, given the chance, each company will speak for
its own products to get a higher price or a higher reimbursement rate. As this happens,
some member companies question PIF’s institutional capacity and perceive its value as
decreased. For instance, PIF has not been able to hinder wholesale price cuts, which
PPB imposed in the form of 5 percent cuts during the 1990s, with a second round for all
reimbursed medicines in 2006. Overall, PIF has been able to construct a cohesive
strategy with short- and long-term objectives, but there are signs of disruption among
members and the threat of a legitimacy trap.
Strategic
networks
275
Disruptions and international harmonization of regulation
The Finnish pharmaceutical market was fairly non-competitive before the 1990s.
Relationships between companies and authorities were fairly personal. In accordance
with the European Economic Area (EEA) agreement, EU membership, and European
Medicines Agency (EMEA), the Finnish market has opened up and experienced rapid
harmonization of the regulation pushed through by the Finnish health authorities.
This sudden imposition of new constraints caught PIF by surprise; its members did not
analyze what these changes mean.
Initially, PIF and its members did not believe that authorities would enforce the
changes. The industry was used to settling these kinds of situations through informal
discussions with authorities. PIF assumed that business would continue with its prior
habitualized action and that existing processes would be preserved: there would be no
need to find new strategic cohesiveness as a prerequisite for collective action. With the
new EU-related agreements, however, there was no room for discussion, as one of the
interviewees described:
We didn’t realize what changes the EEA contract would bring along [. . .] We didn’t have any
clear agenda, or any clear policy, on what we wanted [. . .] The industry did not actually
believe in the demands.
Eventually, new strategic cohesiveness emerged; habitualized actions were revised;
and PIF set up processes to lobby for changes in marketing authorization, pricing, and
reimbursement. For instance, according to one of the interviewed executives, the new
strategic focus PIF aimed “to make sure that the NAM operated in an efficient manner
[. . .] [and to] monitor the newly founded pricing process.” International comparisons
were made to show that the Finnish system was not as efficient as it could be.
Another example of new strategic cohesiveness was the appeal that PIF made to the
European Commission about the Finnish pricing and reimbursement processes.
The European Court of Justice ultimately found that Finland broke the transparency
rules of governing decisions on special reimbursements for medicinal products and
dishonored given deadlines. One executive praised the collective power of PIF:
I think PIF and influencing via it on the market is the most important channel for us [. . .] A single
company cannot have an eminent position – the field and the trade association are the actors.
The changes in regulative harmonization caused some disruption in PIF, but its members
were able to find consensus on how to frame dramatic changes in the environment and
how to take advantage of the collective power of institutional entrepreneurship. PIF even
found a way to use EU level influence as an institutional entrepreneurship practice.
The new focus has brought some success with it, but the most important impact of the
environmental changes has been the strengthened focus within PIF, which has increased
its legitimacy among its members.
Discussion and conclusions
This paper has examined the interplay of institutional environmental influence on strategic
networks and institutional entrepreneurship by the network. To explore this issue, we
conducted a case study on PIF, a strategic network of Finnish pharmaceutical companies.
We detailed typical dynamics of institutional forces as well as entrepreneurship (Table I). In
general, our findings are in line with other studies (Kirby, 2006; Guo, 2004; Zucker, 1986;
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Oliver, 1997; Lukkari and Parvinen, 2008). We add to earlier studies by providing a detailed
understanding of the institutional interplay in the context of pharmaceutical strategic
networks.
Our case study shows how the institutional environment can increase or decrease
strategic cohesiveness in a network, thus having a potential impact on the success of
collective action. In PIF’s case, there were several different types of institutional forces.
For instance, increasing cost awareness and tightening regulation helped PIF members
to find a mutual strategy, but new legislation also had decreasing effects on PIF’s
strategic cohesiveness. Most importantly, our study reveals how the influences of the
institutional environment on a strategic network and the institutional entrepreneurship
activities by the same network are closely intertwined. For instance, voluntary
marketing regulation is an entrepreneurial activity by PIF to avoid legislative changes.
However, this activity is bounded and influenced by the institutional environment:
external sociopolitical pressures have forced PIF to tighten their regulations.
We identify several types of institutional entrepreneurship activities by PIF
members. Some of these activities were based on a cohesive, mutual strategy and some
were based on a less cohesive strategy. For instance, PIF was united in its efforts to
change the PRSI legislation in both the short and the long term. However, in other cases,
such as when the law on generic substitution was introduced, PIF’s attempts were not
united. The cohesiveness of these activities had an impact on the success of institutional
entrepreneurship. Failure to mobilize all network members behind common goals can
erode the legitimacy of the chosen strategy.
This study has at least three important managerial implications (Table II). First,
changes in the institutional environment may cause friction and decrease the
cohesiveness of a strategic network. In addition, they may erode the network’s position
as an institution in the field. In order to be successful, companies and networks must
constantly evaluate changes in the institutional environment and assess how these
changes will affect them.
Second, companies must evaluate which matters can be dealt with through collective
institutional entrepreneurship, or through a company’s own entrepreneurial activity, or
simultaneous approaches. Available resources, timing, and the strategic value of the
Finding Managerial implication
Institutional changes can increase or decrease
the cohesiveness of the strategic network
Build capabilities to sense changes in the
institutional environment and assess the impact of
these changes on the network, your own company,
and other network members
The cohesiveness of the network’s institutional
entrepreneurship activities varies; companies can
adopt a mutual or a stand-alone strategy for
institutional entrepreneurship. Changes in the
cohesiveness influence the success of
institutional entrepreneurship
Build capabilities to evaluate if a network-wide or
stand-alone entrepreneur strategy is more suitable
in the face of an institutional change and to
strategize effectively when a network-wide
strategy is chosen
Failure to mobilize all network members behind a
common strategy erodes the legitimacy of
common efforts, ultimately leading to failure in
network-wide institutional entrepreneurship
Build capabilities to mobilize other network
members behind a chosen institutional
entrepreneurship strategy
Table II.
Key findings and
managerial implications
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issue at hand may be used as decision-making criteria. However, using an individual
strategy of institutional entrepreneurship may undermine the collective power of the
network. Some situations may be impossible to solve without network-wide cooperation,
so companies must build capabilities to strategize together even on issues where
common ground is difficult to find.
Third, companies must acquire capabilities to mobilize networked action in order to
seize opportunities for change. Both sensing and mobilization capabilities are inherently
dependent on the strength of the relationships that the company has with actors inside
and outside of the strategic network. These linkages are two-way routes: they provide
early signs of forthcoming institutional changes as well as routes for institutional
entrepreneurship.
This paper is limited in its generalizability, as we have looked into only one network
and one institutional environment. Further research is needed to explore if similar
results can be obtained in other contexts. Moreover, this study highlights the need to
understand the interplay between institutions and strategic networks and to mobilize
actors toward collective institutional entrepreneurship. As a result, future research
should examine in detail the various mechanisms by which pharmaceutical companies
can seize these tasks.
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Abstract
This paper discusses the dilemma of managing marketing in institutionalized business contexts. On the basis of a study of pharmaceutical
marketing practices it is argued that business aspirations are dependent on understanding institutional influence and adaptation mechanisms on the
customer-portfolio level. As relationships are perceived as such mechanisms, understanding network dynamics, institutional co-evolution and
actor cognitions are key managerial issues. Furthermore, it is suggested that institutional discontinuities leverage institutional entrepreneurship to a
critical extent.
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1. Introduction
In the marketing discipline institutions are often seen as
forming a general environment (e.g., Johanson & Mattsson,
1991) in which industrial networks are embedded (Granovetter,
1992). However, they could also be considered an inherent
feature of networks, and therefore more than a setting or back-
ground (Zucker, 1986; Salmi, 1995; Oliver, 1997). They have
an influence on network actors, and institutional bases are
imported into companies as underlying invisible assumptions
that shape their performance. This paper presents a case study of
pharmaceutical marketing practices in Finland, which are built
on a strong institutional framework of governance structures.
Institutions are thus an inherent feature of business networks,
and influence their economic and socio-political structures and
processes. This study explores how institutional influence and
adaptation characterize marketing practices in the drug business.
Institutional disruptions, such as new legislative norms, have
been identified as facilitating system changes (Selznick, 1957).
As such, they are potential moments of adaptation and influence
for institutional entrepreneurs. The focus in this paper is on the
drug market in a fairly turbulent institutional context. Fig. 1
illustrates recent major disruptions, which have had a significant
effect on the marketing practices of pharmaceutical MNCs
operating in Finland.
Some of the institutional disruptions in the drug market are
of international origin and are merely reflected in the local
business network. These include the establishment of the
European Medicines Agency (EMEA), the European Economic
Area agreement (the EEA agreement), and membership of the
European Union (EU). Whether the changes in question were
on the European or the local level in the business network made
surprisingly little difference to the way relationships functioned
as channels of influence and adaptation for the MNCs in the
evolving institutional environment (e.g., the Pharmaceutical
Price Board (PPB) ruling concerning reasonable prices and
reimbursement). This suggests that the findings may be
transferred – to some extent – to other European countries,
even though national health systems do have specific local
characteristics.
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Research on institutional and network dynamics has produced
valuable insights into how actor and network dynamics work
(Halinen, Salmi, & Havila, 1999; Garud, Sanjay, & Kumar-
aswamy, 2002), but understanding at the customer-portfolio level
in industrial networks needs to be developed. In addition, studies
on managing relationships tend to be primarily prescriptively
normative and conceptual or theoretical. It therefore appears that
empirical research is needed in this area (Olsen & Ellram, 1997).
Furthermore, there is a gap in our knowledge of customer-
relationship management in institutionalized business contexts,
which theoretically anchored empirical research could fill. This
paper reports on a descriptive study of how managers structure
portfolios and how various industry- and firm-specific character-
istics drive the dimensions on which relationship portfolios are
developed in drug companies across evolving economic and
socio-political structures and processes. The focus is on the
interdependencies between various management decisions, with
an emphasis on an integrated approach to the management of the
company's various business units in the achievement of its long-
term objectives (Turnbull, 1990). As in the case of ethical
pharmaceuticals, the product pipeline and the current product
range drive customer-portfoliomanagement, which functions as a
prescriptive guide to the development and maintenance activities
of relationship management under institutional disruption. In
practice, this means that companies create active relationships
with therapeutic opinion-leaders, court prescribers by various
means, and promote changes in actor cognitions through
information provision, advertising, PR and science-based further
education.
2. Theoretical perspectives on institutional interplay
2.1. The institutional environment and its interplay with networks
The concept of embeddedness in this study refers to an
actor's relations with and dependence upon different types
of networks. These networks form the environment and operate
to condition the actions of the actor (an individual or an
organizational entity, such as a company or an institution, with
an active role in the network), its relationships, and the
outcomes it may achieve (Håkansson & Ford, 2002; Halinen &
Törnroos, 1998; Håkansson, 1992). As such, conceptualizations
of inter-organizational interaction processes and relationships
are subject to the perceived environmental context.
The institutional environment could be defined as an entity
within the institutionalization process, as corresponding institu-
tions, or as themechanisms and channels of influence (control and
co-ordination) that relate to legitimacy in a particular market; a
network of actors embedded in a social system of economic and
socio-political forces (Anderson, Håkansson, & Johanson, 1994;
Easton, 1992; Hurwicz, 1993). Suchman (1995, 574) emphasizes
cognitive belief systems and defines legitimacy as “a generalized
perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are
desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed
system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions.” In the case of
business networks this definition could be expanded with
reference to relational structure. Inter-organizational relationships
function as channels of communication and co-operation (i.e.
drug-industry-sponsored research in public institutions). They
build legitimacy in the eyes of social stakeholders.
Change in the institutional environment could be understood
through the analysis of institutionalization processes: regulat-
ing, validating and habitualizing (Grewal & Dharwadkar,
2002). The processes of regulating represent evident interaction
with regulatory institutions that exist to ensure the stability,
order and continuity of societies and social welfare. Such
processes are manifested in a market as imposition and
inducement mechanisms. These exercises of coercive power
or will are often beneficial to society at large (Oliver, 1991;
Baron, 1989), but they are likely to force actors in business
networks to make changes in their relationship patterns and
interaction processes.
Processes of validating involve interaction with normative
institutions and give rise to standards for socially acceptable
behaviors (Baum & Oliver, 1991; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).
These processes are manifested via authorization mechanisms
and mimicking behavior (Grewal & Dharwadkar, 2002).
Mimicking occurs through organizational imitation (e.g.,
detailing through a sales force that reflects the specialization
of the physicians) or modeling by means of norms or practices
(the training of sales representatives by the Pharma Industry
Finland (PIF) trade association). Authorization involves the
development of rules and codes of conduct that are deemed
appropriate and require drug companies to voluntarily seek the
approval of the authorizing agents (e.g., the trade associations).
Habitualizing processes are the base-level institutional
processes that give rise to cognitive institutions: shared cognitive
templates (Meyer & Rowan, 1991) in which repeated actions are
cast in a pattern, reproduced with minimal effort and recognized
by the actors as that particular pattern (Zucker, 1983, 1977; Gill &
Stern, 1969; Berger & Luckmann, 1966). The two primary
mechanisms that facilitate these processes are imprinting and
Fig. 1. Recent institutional disruptions in the Finnish pharmaceutical market.
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bypassing (Grewal &Dharwadkar, 2002). Imprinting refers to the
preservation of structures and processes over time: Baum and
Oliver (1991) suggest that organizations acquire characteristics at
the time of their inception, and that subsequent inertia preserves
these features and results in particular structures and processes. As
they mature they may find it difficult to change or even to
understand the need for change, since some of the structures and
processes will have become “sacrosanct”, or even symbolic.
Cultural control is often used as a substitute for structural
control in highly institutionalized environments, which results
in the bypassing of these formal structures and processes
(Zucker, 1977). Actors are aware of their role expectations,
irrespective of their organizational affiliation (Meyer et al.,
1981). Role expectations and definitions (e.g., ethical pharma-
ceutical companies innovate and create new knowledge) are the
same across the network (pharmaceutical market) with its
widely shared beliefs (pharmacotherapy will not develop
without free knowledge flow between the industry and the
physician's profession). As such, existing interaction practices
and customer-relationship patterns are preserved in networks.
The interplay between the institutional environment, the
network and relationship management is summarized in Fig. 2.
2.2. The customer portfolio as a means of influence and
adaptation
The portfolio concept has a wide scope of application in
business research (Turnbull, 1990). In contemporary marketing
literature the idea of managing relationships as portfolios pertains
to the aim of optimizing the resources of the firm and creating
value across its customer relationships (Möller & Halinen, 1999;
Reinartz, Krafft, & Hoyer, 2004; Johnson & Selnes, 2005). The
numbers and types of customers a company has could be viewed
as an asset in which to invest (e.g., Storbacka, Strandvik, &
Grönroos, 1994; Ryals, 2002), and its range of relationships
represents its relationship portfolio (Ritter, Wilkinsson, &
Johnston, 2004). The concept of customer-portfolio management
in this paper refers to the development and maintenance of the
relationships that ensure the company's future profitability. In the
marketing of pharmaceuticals it could be described as a balanced-
interaction approach to relationship management, the aim of
which is to identify accurately customers' portfolios and the risks
related to investments in these customers and the respective
returns (Ryals, 2002). Development (design, criteria and efforts to
acquire information), analysis, organizational learning and
responsiveness build up a unified view of the customer across
all contact channels with regard to all customer-facing functions
(e.g., clinical research, medical information, and sales and
marketing business units) (Reinartz et al., 2004). The chosen
identification criteria (e.g., level of investment and related risk)
and the outcomes (e.g., future returns) and single-view building
processes jointly define the boundaries of customer portfolios
(e.g., medical students as potential future prescribers).
Researchers focusing on business networks hold contradic-
tory views concerning the opportunities, restrictions and control
they bring to a company. Some argue that these networks cannot
be managed or controlled since they represent the outcome of
the deliberations, aims and actions of some of the participants,
and no company is at the “hub” or is likely to have complete
control (Håkansson & Ford, 2002). Others take a less stern view
and suggest that relationships and the networks they foster can
be managed to a certain extent, concentrating on exploring
intentionality within them and the pursuit of shared goals and
benefits (Klint & Sjöberg, 2003). A third group of researchers
argue that network manageability is contingent on having clear
boundaries and a focal hub actor, and their attention has
primarily concentrated on network characteristics, the nature of
networks as organizations, and intra-network dynamics (Jarillo,
1988). Despite these contradictory views, however, it has been
suggested that researchers have reached general agreement on
the strategic long-term aspects of the management of relation-
ships (Turnbull, 1990; Ring & Van de Ven, 1994; Plakoyiannaki
& Tsokas, 2002). Due to the nature of the drug market, the
following general aspects of relationship and network
Fig. 2. Outcomes of influencing and adaptation through customer-portfolio management.
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development are emphasized in pharmaceutical marketing and
the management of customer portfolios:
(1) Relationships are inherently dynamic and change over
time (Håkansson 1992; Möller & Wilson, 1995).
(2) Network change is generally considered to be most likely
during institutional discontinuities (Johanson & Matts-
son,1991; Garud et al., 2002).
(3) Institutional changes are characterized by co-evolutionary
and interactive processes in relationships (Greenwood,
Suddaby, & Hinings, 2002; Maguire, Hardy, & Lawrence,
2004).
(4) Outcomes of institutional change are ultimately filtered
through actor cognitions (Rao, Morrill, & Zald, 2000;
Lawrence & Phillips, 2004).
Hunt (2002) points out that there is significant ambiguity
surrounding relationship and customer-portfolio management
decisions: the portfolios are not selected at a particular point in
time, but take time to develop. Investments in a customer
portfolio should therefore be a function of the underlying firm
and industry characteristics (Johnson & Selnes, 2004): what is
typical of the pharmaceutical industry, for example, is its slow
knowledge- and investment-intensive product development
(Pharma Industry Finland, 2006a). The value of any single
relationship must also be considered part of the overall
portfolio, which contributes in a different way to some total
value (Ford et al., 1998). Instead of merely managing individual
relationships a company should consider its whole portfolio
(Turnbull, 1990). In the highly institutionalized drug market this
calls for continuous, intentional networking (Möller & Svahn,
2003).
2.3. Institutional entrepreneurship
Contemporary institutional theory favors a dynamic approach,
according towhich institutions gradually evolve over time and the
role of individual and organizational activity is highlighted
(Meyer & Scott, 1992). Garud et al. (2002) refer to institutional
entrepreneurship as the active formation of institutions as they
emerge (see alsoDiMaggio, 1988; Fligstein, 1997). This literature
also discusses systems of meaning that tie the functioning of
institutions together (DiMaggio, 1988; Aldrich & Fiol, 1994).
Different actors assume different roles – defining, legitimizing,
combating or co-opting – in different systems (Scott, 1995).
Disruptions such as emergent industry rules and new legislative
norms have been identified as facilitating changes in institutional
systems (Selznick, 1957).
In a number of industries marketing activities are closely
related to the institutional and contextual environment in which
the businesses operate. Institutional processes tend to stabilize
in mature and regulated industries (Greenwood et al., 2002), and
institutional rules begin to take the form of legislation, explicit
codes of conduct or systemic structures. Where there are heavy
institutional regulations and constraints marketing success is
contingent not only on adhering to current rules, but also on
reacting to opportunities created by institutional disruptions.
Institutional entrepreneurship can yield results through partak-
ing in institutional (re)formation and reacting to the changes in
order to establish new institutions around the changed setting
(e.g., Hensman, 2003).
Relating institutional entrepreneurship to business (or other)
outcomes, and particularly business success, requires an under-
standing of the mechanisms of value creation. The general
argument is that by influencing new institutions or transforming
existing ones, firms can build favorable attributes into the emerging
institutional structures (Maguire et al., 2004). “An opportunity to
realize interests that they value highly” has been found to drive
activities and thereby the processes of institutional interplay
(DiMaggio, 1988, 14). For example, university clinics receive
substantial support for their research projects from the drug
industry. Success and outcomes have been related to the scarcity of
socially constructed subject positions that limit the number of
actors and interested parties who can succeed in a single institutio-
nal project (Fligstein, 1997; DiMaggio, 1988; Foucault, 1972).
However, marketing success through institutional entrepre-
neurship requires incorporating two additional value-creation
perspectives into this general line of thinking. Both relate to the
fact that at the relationship level, institutional-entrepreneurship
activities (particularly marketing-oriented ones) are subject to the
influence of a diverse network of stakeholders (Maguire et al.,
2004). Firstly, such activities need to have a degree of legitimacy
among the stakeholder network in order to prevail. Again, this is
particularly true in the case ofmarketing-oriented activities, given
the aggravated sense of agency in these high-powered business
contexts. Maintaining legitimacy is naturally a constraint, but it
can also add to the value creation by revealing the need to visibly
expand the market to be divided among the stakeholders.
Fig. 3. Emphases of different perspectives on institutional interplay.
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Secondly, as is emphasized in marketing research (e.g., Salmi,
1995; Garud et al., 2002), institutional-entrepreneurship activities
need to correspond with actor cognitions. Actors and their actions
are critically dependent on the surrounding processes of
structuration, and this favors emergent strategies and practices
(Lawrence, 1999; Lawrence & Phillips, 2004). Both marketing
and institutional entrepreneurship are ‘regulated’ by the way
socially constructed realities perceive efforts, and thus institu-
tional interplay needs to be sensitive to stakeholder cognitions.
Fig. 3 summarizes the theoretical discussion. It illustrates the
different perspectives on institutional interplay, all of which
have an impact on how customer portfolios are managed and
structured in evolving economic and socio-political processes.
3. Research approach
Some “prior instrumentation” and structuring of the research
design are often desirable. Pure induction without theoretical
reference might prevent researchers from benefiting from
previous work, just as pure deduction might prevent the
development of new and useful theory (Carson, Gilmore,
Perry, & Gronhaug, 2001; Miles & Huberman, 1994). The
abductive approach to case research (Dubois & Gadde, 2002;
Coffey & Atkinson, 1996) is well suited to the examination of
why and how real-life phenomena occur (Lee, 1999; Yin, 1994).
In our research we adopted an explicit sampling strategy in
order to identify three comparative cases of pharmaceutical MNCs
and institutional actors in the Finnish market. The unit of analysis
was the case company and its network-customer portfolios, and the
boundaries were limited to the organizational field: organizations
that, on the aggregate, constituted a recognized area of institutional
life (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). The virtue of this unit of analysis
is that it directs attention to the totality of relevant actors and
incorporates both connectedness and the structural aspects of
influence and adaptation via intentional networking.
The case companies were deliberately selected on the basis
of the postulated theory and could be characterized as:
(1) major players in the Finnish market (active actors whose
joint market share was 26.3% in 2005) with
(2) somewhat different product portfolios and company
profiles and
(3) an interest in the focal study.
This selection was sufficiently representative in that the
companies shared some homogeneous (they were all members
of PIF and followed the same normative code for the marketing of
medicinal products, for example) and some contrasting character-
istics: one was strong in generics and was largely owned by local
healthcare professionals, the second dominated certain therapeutic
fields and the third covered all major therapeutic sectors. This type
of combination is believed to produce information of greater depth
than would be the case with homogeneous selection (Knodel,
1993), and some generalizing is justifiedwhen general phenomena
are under investigation (Stake, 2000; Mason, 1996).
In business studies, the “asymmetrical encounter” of the
interview (Green & Thorogood, 2004; Hiller & DiLuzio, 2004;
Fawcett & Hearn, 2004; Holstein & Gubrium, 1995) is in
imbalance with the research object, which is usually relatively
more powerful than the researcher and strictly controls access to
the data. The management's interest in the case facilitates access
to the primary and secondary data and provides the basis for active
interviewing. As such, this study was not greatly dependent of the
whims of organizations' gatekeepers who would seek to limit
what could be investigated (Silverman, 2005).
The interviews were collaborative, meaning-making encoun-
ters characterized by dialectical analysis of the participants'
descriptions and perceptions of 1) inter-organizational relation-
ships, 2) management-relationship practices and 3) the impact of
the institutional environment and its changes on customer
portfolios and their management practices. The researcher
conducted thirty-seven interviews between November 2005
and February 2006, all of which were recorded for analysis.
Typically the interviewer opened the dialogue by giving a short
presentation of the framework of the study (approximately three-
and-a-half minutes of the average 44-minute sessions). She then
gave the lead to the interviewees, inserting questions when
necessary in order to ensure that all three themes were covered.
The data-analysis process constituted five phases: 1) interpre-
tation and coding, 2) categorization and thematization, 3) the
identification of patterns and the drawing of preliminary
conclusions, 4) generalizing the conclusions within the data,
and 5) considering the generalizations in the light of existing
knowledge (Miles & Huberman, 1994). It was a reasoned
decision not to build the analysis on the use of a software program
as a technical tool for pursuing arguments about data, since it did
not yield any new insights or value. The significance of the data is
typically established throughout the whole interview dialogue in
the diverse examples and descriptions of practices, which are
entwined and rich in descriptive key words, multilingual phrases
and metaphors. It was therefore appropriate to preserve the flow
of the dialogue in this analysis and not to break it up too much.
In taking this approach it is advisable to build various
devices into the research design in order to ensure the accuracy
of the data interpretation (Silverman, 2005). The interviews
took in “both sides of the dyads”. The first interviewees were
representatives of pharmaceutical companies and included 29
members of senior and middle management, chosen according
to their position and responsibilities in the organizational
structure, and the function and/or area of pharmacotherapy they
represented: eight interviews in company A, seven in company
B, and 14 in company C. Secondly, eight interviews were
conducted with institutional representatives CEOs of patient
organizations, presidents of associations and senior civil
servants and directors from government agencies.
4. Institutional change and the evolution of pharmaceutical
marketing practices
4.1. Relationships, channels of influence and adaptation during
institutional disruptions
The Finnish drug market could be considered a typical
example of the European market. It is characterized by the
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interplay of 1) tight regulation, 2) strong normative order in
terms of professions, trade unions and patient associations, and
3) slowly changing actor cognitions. This set-up directs
attention to both the structure of customer portfolios and the
legitimacy of the interaction and value-creation processes. The
importance of co-operative relationships and interactive chan-
nels of communication to both the normative and the regulative
institutions was constantly stressed by all parties involved in the
interviews. One of the subjects from the institutional side (a
National Health Insurance (NHI) director) stated:
“It is essential that we have channels of communication, so
that we hear the arguments of others in this field. Otherwise
we could easily make decisions that could harm the whole
business…”
All of the case companies had interactive relationships
with the regulative and normative institutions, which are
central to their business aspirations (the management of these
relationships is allocated to the departments/business units).
They also recognize the need to cope with and take action to
shape the actor cognitions (corporate responsibility and
citizenship issues were highlighted in the marketing strategies).
As such, they built up relationships across all three dimensions
of the institutional environment and perceived that pragmatic,
procedural and cognitive legitimacy concerns were fairly
balanced. There were sufficient channels of influence and
adaptation to drive the business successfully as an institutional
entrepreneur.
As mentioned earlier, however, the institutional environment
has been quite turbulent in the Finnish market. The case
companies had faced unexpected challenges, which called for
adaptation and proactive influencing. The EMEA, the EEA
agreement and the EU had a profound influence on the local
business network: its procedures and processes of marketing
authorization, wholesale and factory licenses, pharmacovigi-
lance and the provision of medical information are all subject to
the wider European context. On the other hand, new local
regulations such as the factorization of marketing-authorization
and price-application processes raise the expertise of the local
institutional environment and increase its impact on the local
business network. The following comment was made by
someone who had worked for over twenty years on regulatory
and marketing assignments in one of the case companies:
“Taking care of relationships, building and maintaining
them, is at the core of our performance. In contemporary
business the right kind of relationships are important…
business situations change rapidly [refers to EU legislation,
which has changed local import processes]…we are capable
of negotiating, adapting…there might be a chance to
negotiate more favorable terms. For example, in the last
twelve months I have updated [specifies later during the
interview: close to ten times] our wholesale license with the
National Agency for Medicines [NAM]. It helps when you
know these people. For example, when this factory license
issue with the imports from non-EU countries came up, it
looked as though our operations here in Finland would
come to an end. But then I telephoned this person in NAM
and realized that we can work it out…”
Relationships, therefore, are channels of influence and they
are also dynamic channels of adaptation for the case companies
facing institutional disruptions. For example, the above
company was able successfully to settle its wholesale license
and import issues by negotiating with the local authorities about
what the new EU rulings meant, how they were interpreted in
other EU countries, and how they could be interpreted in the
case of importing from non-EU countries into Finland. The
company acted as an institutional entrepreneur and avoided
having to discontinue the import of medicines for clinical
research, for example, and was able to carry on business with its
customers and research partners.
Another issue highlighted by the participants was the range
of relationships and how they were managed as entities and as
customer portfolios across business functions. Traditionally
legislation and well-established norms have regulated the
business to a great extent. They have set a tight framework
for legitimate relationship management and for knowledge-
intensive co-operation between the industry and the physicians.
The changing institutional environment has created new roles
for the actors with the imposition of price and reimbursement
control systems, for example. Some of these new role constructs
have created somewhat contradictory multiple roles for
physicians and their professional associations. The professional
associations in Finland are considered objective, scholarly
opinion-leaders and therefore they carry weight as far as
recommendations for pharmacotherapy are concerned. State
agencies ask for their expert opinions on marketing-authoriza-
tion and reimbursement issues, for example, which have a direct
impact on market penetration and sales volumes. One marketing
director from one of the case companies described their
contemporary customer-portfolio-management practices as
follows:
“Today the relationship portfolio is a management tool for
us, which was not the case earlier… We have organized
ourselves in teams by therapeutic sectors, and in these teams
some people are responsible for the custom, and other
people for the products [refers to clinical research and
medical information]. We try to define what needs the
customers have and, respectively, what needs our products
have. Then we combine these needs so that our information
is synchronized and take advantage of these subfields
jointly. It is extremely challenging to manage this kind of
network, since you can't be quite certain who the decision
maker is and what [institutional] position he or she has.”
4.2. Procedural legitimacy drives change in the network
The influence of the state as a regulator, and of the professional
associations as the validating institutions in the market, was
perceived to be unquestionable and profound by all parties in the
focal study. Various relationships with existing and emerging
institutions in the evolving environment were therefore seen as a
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crucial part of the business and as a basis for building up customer
portfolios. For example, the aim in the Finnish drug market since
2003 has been to curb the growing public spending on medicines
via the NHI through the introduction of generic substitution,
which made the drug companies re-evaluate their business
relationships with pharmacies. A portfolio director from one of
the case companies stated:
“This business is built on customer relationships. The core
thing is the definition of the customer in various market
situations. Defining the custom is not necessarily unambig-
uous…it takes only one new law and the custom changes.”
Generic substitution and the re-evaluation of custom with the
pharmacies has nevertheless led to procedural legitimacy
concerns due to the misuse of the Finnish pharmacy system,
which was built on regional licensing and nationally fixed
maximum prices. Drug companies were buying space by
offering discounts, which were not accounted for in the retail
prices. Under public pressure the industry accepted a ban on
discounts for pharmacies at the beginning of 2006, and customer
relationships with pharmacies were again re-evaluated.
Pharmaceutical companies and physicians' associations have
a long and strong tradition of co-operation in the knowledge-
intensive fields of clinical research and further occupational
education. On the institutional side the Finnish Medical
Association (FMA) holds the view that the professions of
doctor and drug industry cannot be separated from each other:
“It would be an absurd idea, but the interaction between the
parties must be transparent… pharmacotherapy will not
develop without knowledge flow between the industry and
the profession.”
Nevertheless, there are strong voices arguing that there is a
conflict of interest in this kind of set-up with physicians playing
multiple roles in the sensitive issues of severe illness, government
spending on drugs, and the personal interests of professionals in
gatekeeper positions. The standards of socially acceptable
behavior are questioned in the changing institutional environment
(see also Blumenthal, 2004; Studdert, Mello, & Brennan, 2004).
The legitimacy of physicians' associations derives from the
control of institutional information and the degree to which they
are considered the leading, objective, expert organizations in the
field. This further gives them the ability to strategically influence
their environment and the drug business. The data indicates that
some of these normative institutions face procedural legitimacy
concerns about their socially questionable co-operation and
interaction with the drug industry. A rise in institutional
discontinuities has been observed, i.e. the deteriorating role of
some specialist associations as objective expert organizations
and the foundation of the Centre for Pharmacotherapy
Development and its physician network to promote rational
pharmacotherapy. There have been changes in the interaction
processes between actors in the business network (e.g., the
resumption of sponsorship for continuing medical education
(CME) and specialization courses for students), and a revision
of the PIF code for the marketing of medicinal products
(Pharma Industry Finland, 2006b).
4.3. Cognitive institutions preserve existing marketing practices
The case companies systematically organize and sponsor
various training programs and frequent detailing, which are
considered CME for healthcare professionals. This sponsored
CME co-operation consolidates interaction with normative
institutions (e.g., co-operation with the leading Finnish
scientific Medical Society Duodecim) and thereby shapes or
preserves existing collective, professional cognitive templates.
As a result, cognitive institutions emerge and repeated
prescribing actions are cast into a pattern by means of habitual
action. Existing relational structures and processes are pre-
served, and the case companies perceived that the speed of
institutional change had slowed down and that its effects were
less radical since there was time to adapt and influence.
For example, cognitive institutions in the Finnish drug
market seem to hinder the advancement of generic substitution.
The interview data indicates that the imprinting mechanism
preserves the structures and processes of prescribing, and the
bypassing mechanism preserves habitual prescribing by physi-
cians. These mental processes of enactment create stability and
stagnation in a dynamic environment. Institutional change is
less abrupt and companies have more time to adapt to it by re-
evaluating their strategic relationships and restructuring the
customer portfolios. The following statement by a medical
director from one of the case companies describes the habitual
action and preservation of structures and processes well:
“Our drug market was split in two when generic substitution
started: the generic market and the branded market, on
which our business rests … A change is on the way. But, for
time being, the majority of physicians have ignored the
whole issue of substitution…”
There were high hopes of boosting the sales of generics with
the introduction of substitution in April 2003. Progress has been
slow within some therapeutic sectors, and this has had a radical
effect on some generic companies with purely price-driven
marketing strategies that failed to take into account the
influence of the institutional process on the business. These
companies were forced to promptly redirect their customer
portfolios. A sales director from one of the case companies
described this reorientation as follows:
“Since April Fools' day 2003 and generic substitution…
generic companies have quickly changed their approach to
relationship management. They no longer operate on the
“prescriber-customer surface”. That's where they started,
but they quickly “backed up” from there to the pharmacy-
customer interface.”
4.4. The coercive power of regulative institutions changes the
positions of normative institutions
Regulatory institutions act as interpreters and enforcers of
laws, setting the scene for pragmatic legitimacy, and in that role
they interact with various actors in business networks. Networks
evolve in any field of business when actors exercise their will. In
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the case of the Finnish pharmaceutical industry, however,
regulatory institutions are powerful enough to impose direct
constraints by order of the authorities, or indirect constraints via
rules and regulations, both of which mean change. Since
regulatory institutions possess the capacity to institute legal
constraints, they are not inclined to provide valued inducements
to influence networks of actors. They are in a position to use
coercive power when they perceive that there is a conflict with
the societal good or a threat to the best interests of patients. The
tolerance of regulatory institutions was stretched, once again, by
the relative lack of control of expenditure on drugs in Finland
under the NHI (for more details see Leppo, 2002; OECD, 2005).
The pharmaceutical price board exercised coercive power in the
form of a five-percent cut in wholesale prices for all nationally
reimbursed medicines from the beginning of 2006. (Previous
price cuts were forced as a result of national, Nordic and
European price comparisons within the various ATC categories
during the 1990s).
The recurring use of coercive power and imposition by the
regulative institutions has eroded the institutional capacity of
some contemporary normative institutions and facilitated the
rise of new ones. Furthermore, previous impositions have
changed the network positions of some actors and restructured
the relationship portfolios of pharmaceutical companies. The
data from the interviews indicates that some actors are
questioning the PIF's capability of influencing economic,
industry and socio-policy issues and legislation as the unified
association of the research-based pharmaceutical industry. For
example, it is perceived that its institutional capacity and its
relationship value have decreased. The case companies have
reallocated their resources and have forged new, more direct
channels of influence to the socio-political opinion-leaders in
the market, thereby bypassing PIF with their institutional
entrepreneurship. This performance has changed the position of
PIF in the strategic nets of pharmaceutical companies, and has
influenced the perceptions of other institutional actors in the
network. The following descriptive statement on the institu-
tional side came from a civil servant with long-standing
experience in the control of medicinal marketing:
“There was a time when drug companies understood the
joint interests of the business better than they do today.
Companies have become selfish. They focus on their own
interests rather than on the joint good of the whole industry
under PIF…”
5. Discussion and implications
5.1. Theoretical implications and relatedmanagerial ramifications
5.1.1. Dynamic relationships and balanced customer portfolios
The empirical data suggests that there are two sides to the
management of relationships as portfolios across companies'
economic processes and structures. Firstly, customer portfolios
cover the multiple institutional and economic roles of actors.
For example, a physician or a pharmacist may be 1) an
institutional influencer by being an opinion leader (influence
over national recommendations for pharmacotherapy and/or
price issues), 2) a customer with economic value (a prescriber
with substantial volumes and/or a purchasing decision maker),
and 3) a shareholder of a drug company with a personal interest.
Secondly, companies are faced with serving the joint interests of
socio-political actors through the institutional processes and
structures that enable them to cope with dynamic relationships.
Greenwood et al. (2002) claim that regulative and normative
ascendance prevails over actor conformity in a highly institu-
tionalized market, and that shared understanding is crucial. The
results of this study indicate that the above-mentioned balanced
customer-portfolio management forms the basis of a company's
fit into its institutional environment, and thereby may influence
prevailing regulative and normative ascendance over actor
conformity and shared understanding. It could also give rise to
institutional entrepreneurship— the creation of new channels of
influence and adaptation for the actors in a network, their
intentional networking activity being powered by social,
technological, competitive and/or regulatory issues (Déjean,
Gond, & Leca, 2004). It is therefore proposed that the range of
relationships and how they are managed as a portfolio (e.g., as
cross-functional aggregates according to particular pharma-
cotherapies and across a company's business units) affect how
influence is exerted and how adaptation to a changing institutional
environment is received. For example, the case companies have
adopted new customer-portfolio strategies in order to cope with
generic substitution. One has taken full advantage of its
traditionally good pharmacy relationships and is increasing
investment in them in order to increase its generic business. The
other two have taken advantage of cognitive processes and the
slow advancement of generic substitution. They are counteracting
the declining sales of “patent-expired” products by cutting their
further investment in some physician customer relationships, and
at the same time are cautiously investing in pharmacy relation-
ships in order to differentiate their products from the competing
generic substitutes.
5.1.2. Managerial ramifications
A pharmaceutical company has a choice in determining the
extent to which it is the instigator, rather than the target, of nor-
mative initiatives and other institutional changes. By continuing to
develop and enforce stronger reciprocal relationships between
economic and institutional actors companies can actually create
value by shaping their institutional environment. The same applies
to recognizing the pragmatic, procedural and cognitive legitimacy
concerns of co-operation and interaction with other companies in
the industry. The results of this study suggest that companieswould
do well to seek a wide customer portfolio that challenges the
conventional boundaries of customership, and to seek benefits
through ‘lobbying’ and co-ordination among competitors.
Furthermore, the range of dynamic relationships with their
various socio-political actors facilitates a company's ability to
sense institutional disruptions and their emergence. From a
marketing perspective, developing this type of sensing is an
investment that will result in a better fit with the institutional
environment. This translates into responsiveness to change and
a better capability of coping with legitimacy concerns.
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This study demonstrates that these issues are to do with
marketing, and should be treated as critical in terms of the
allocation of marketing and business-development resources,
for example.
5.1.3. Institutional disruption and network change
Local and European institutional disruptions induce network
change by opening it up to new actors and by changing the
governance mode to some extent. New actors (e.g., new generic
companies) have to achieve legitimacy. As Scott (1995)
explains, ideas (e.g., the pricing strategies of generic companies)
achieve legitimacy if and as they are adopted by exemplary
others (i.e. successful institutional entrepreneurs who sense
opportunities and react to institutional changes (Hensman,
2003)) and are thought to provide economic benefits (by setting
standards (Garud et al., 2002)). As such, organizations mimic
others because they anticipate similar benefits. This widespread
mimicry changes the network and its mode of governance,
which is characterized by co-operation and reciprocal exchange
relationships and trust, differing qualitatively from market and
hierarchical modes (Powell, 1990). The interview data indicates
that the mode of governance is evolving in the drug business. It
has gained and lost some of its hierarchical characteristics (i.e.
the influence of the new European authorities over local
authorities) and market-like aspects (generic substitution made
some relationships more competitive and price became a means
of communication). This study highlights the fact that in a
business network with an evolving mode of governance success
in institutional entrepreneurship is subject to a relationship-
mediated capability: the ability to sense and define opportunities
or problems related to institutional processes and to understand
what needs to be or can be done in relation to the available
instruments. For example, the case companies have taken
different approaches to their customer-portfolio management
and they have utilized the different instruments available to them
in coping with institutional disruptions.
5.1.4. Managerial ramifications
The main managerial implication here reflects the standard
institutional-entrepreneurship argument indicating that manage-
ment seeking to induce change in institutions should be sensitive
to the emergent discontinuities as they are a critical source of
leverage. However, the standard “then what” argument that
successful activities relate to actors with sufficient resources
who leverage them in order to create or transform institutions
(DiMaggio, 1988; Fligstein, 1997; Rao et al., 2000) should be
contested.
It is not somuch the possession of overwhelming resources as
understanding network dynamics, steering institutional co-
evolution and satisfying actor cognitions that are key managerial
issues in institutionalized marketing contexts. This is naturally
also a question of adopting influencing and adaptation strategies.
The existence of two different customer-portfolio-management
approaches in the case companies – “social capital” and “high-
powered incentives” – concerning the same issue demonstrates
the variety of responses to institutional change. Institutional
strategies based on high-powered incentives are more likely to
require extensive resourcing than strategies based on social
capital, which are driven by social skills.
5.1.5. Institutional change as a co-evolutionary and interactive
process
The pharmaceutical business is characterized by tight
regulation and a strong institutional order, which jointly define
the proportions of trust and power and their governance over
relationships (Bachmann, 2001). In the focal study the influence
of authorization and acquisition mechanisms seemed to enhance
the co-evolutionary and interactive nature of change and re-
institutionalization by changing the nature of decision-making,
trust and power-dependence in the network relationships. The
data suggests that institutional changes have produced new
kinds of systems of trust and new power balances by decreasing
formalization and centralization in local decision-making. This
development highlights the actors' ability to utilize system and
personal trust, and to exert system and personal power over
customer-portfolio management (Luhman, 1979; Zucker, 1986;
Giddens, 1990). The Finnish pharmaceutical market was fairly
“closed” during the 1980s and local physicians' associations
had strong control over publicly accepted pharmacotherapy
practices. Personal trust in and the power of opinion-leaders
were notable. Since then, however, the market has “opened up”
in accordance with EMEA, the EEA agreement and EU
membership. Pharmaceutical companies have also recently
developed great industry concentration, and this cohesion of
information and interest reveal increasing power to face
regulators (system trust and power).
5.1.6. Managerial ramifications
The pharmaceutical industry has created a “mandate” to par-
ticipate in the dialogue with the regulative agencies. However,
regulators and normative institutions in the drug business are
also related to the unavoidable political endowment inherent in
healthcare systems. Marketing practices are therefore contingent
on three related factors in the evolving institutional environment:
(1) the accessibility of necessary channels of influence and
adaptation inside the healthcare socio-political system,
(2) the legitimacy of objectives and value-creation activities
in the eyes of social stakeholders, and
(3) the degree to which domain consensus exists among the
actors in the pharmaceutical business.
Before attempting to derive value from being institutional
entrepreneurs companies should check whether the above-
mentioned preconditions for successful action are in place. It is
customary to claim this is hard to do, but the results of this study
indicate that channels can be opened, legitimacy can be improved,
and consensus can be reached.
5.1.7. Actor cognitions, regulative cohesion and outcomes of
institutional change
The data suggests that cognitive institutional aspects (Meyer &
Rowan, 1991) have an impact on the advancement and outcomes
of institutional change. For example, they influence how generic
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substitution advances through the market, and how it changes the
role system and action-scripts of the network. The imprinting
mechanism preserves the prescribing structures and processes, and
the bypassing mechanism preserves habitual prescribing by
physicians. The traditional role system and the action-scripts of
the network are also preserved.As such, the coercive imposition of
radical change by regulative authorities is proceeding surprisingly
slowly and companies havemore time and options in adapting to it.
The innovative, ethical pharmaceutical industry aims to create
new standards of pharmacotherapy and to shape actor cognition.
This institutional-entrepreneurship behavior consolidates interac-
tionwith normative and cognitive institutions and ties together the
functions of disparate sets (e.g., professional associations, and
governmental and municipal healthcare organizations). Simulta-
neously, the drugmarket is experiencing industry and institutional
cohesion, which is, to some extent, “harmonizing” the institu-
tional environment and its regulative and normative pressure on
the business. For example, there have been mergers of global
companies and growing co-operation within the industry at the
regional level. The establishment of the regional, regulative
EMEA organization and the other types of regional co-operation
(Canada and the U.S.A., Australia and other parts of Oceania)
between national regulative organizations has improved cohesion
along the regulative dimension. There are also plans to merge
some national regulatory agencies (e.g., Australia and New-
Zealand). On the other hand, there are contradicting forces
influencing the business. For example, the Centre for Pharmaco-
therapy Development works through organizational and personal
networks to promote and implement evidence-based, cost-
effective, rational practices. As a state authority (an expert unit
under the Ministry of Social and Health Affairs) it has influence
over political issues and pharmacotherapy guidelines. Its work
has, to some extent, undermined the CME co-operation between
the industry and the medical profession.
5.1.8. Managerial ramifications
The study results indicate that understanding and develop-
ing institutional influencing and adaptation mechanisms at
the customer-relationship-portfolio level is a key success
factor for companies. This seems to hold true for institutional
entrepreneurship and customer-portfolio management inde-
pendently. The recommendations are most clear on the rela-
tionship level: it appears that relationships are essentially
channels of influence and adaptation. Efforts should be
made to develop explicit practices (resembling supply-chain-
or distribution-channel management) involving the use of
relationships as institutional marketing channels. Given that
the study indicates that cognitive institutions preserve existing
marketing practices, the practical activities should be people-
based and media-mediated, and should exploit public interest
(Ulaga & Eggert, 2006).
5.2. Research implications and limitations
The discussion relating customer-portfolio management and
networks is still very immature, and the present study yields
little evidence of the success of network management. Simul-
taneous customer-portfolio-management activities by other
companies could lead to a near-infinite number of outcome
permutations. Therefore, even though the study confirms the
power and relevance of customer-portfolio management as an
influencing and adaptation mechanism, it does not put forward
any grounded recommendations. Performance and manageabil-
ity merit more attention than they are currently receiving in
research on institutional entrepreneurship and relationship man-
agement. Success should be grasped as an outcome variable.
It is unclear whether this type of study would benefit more
from research on actors and their activities than on institutions,
institutional structures and institutional change. The contribu-
tion of recent research to management practice has remained at
the level of ‘increasing understanding about the relevance of
institutions' (cf. Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; Dorado, 2005;
Déjean et al., 2004). Research on both individual and
organizational actors is inconclusive in terms of whether their
activities have any significant impact at all (e.g., Lawrence &
Phillips, 2004; Maguire et al., 2004; Munir, 2005; Munir &
Phillips, 2005). The same applies to the discussion on network
manageability (Ritter et al., 2004). However, the drug market is
experiencing institutional cohesion that, to some extent, is
“harmonizing” the institutional environment and its pressures
on the business. This trend suggests that research on the level of
relationships and business networks, rather than of institutions,
may be more fruitful since success is often subject to entre-
preneurship and the discovery of opportunities. The results of
this type of research could perhaps also be more transferable to
other countries or regions given the institutional cohesion.
Another problem is that research on relationships, business
networks, institutional change and institutional entrepreneurship
is based on rather different ontological and epistemological
premises. Yet, although some underlying assumptions may
conflict, paradigmatic boundaries are often fuzzy and, to a certain
extent, permeable (Willmott, 1993; Lewis & Grimes, 1999),
thereby facilitating the linking of views created by different
paradigms (Gioia & Pitre, 1990; Ritvala & Granqvist, 2006).
This problem is also reflected in the key findings of this paper.
For example, in stating, ‘The coercive power of regulative
institutions changes the positions of normative institutions', the
authors are assuming that institutions are self-acting, amorphous
phenomena, which can never be wholly captured by research.
Nevertheless, as this study indicates, a research agenda building
on institutional capability at the relationship level and/or the
institutional capability of relationships (not just organizations or
individuals) could offer an intelligible avenue for future research.
The present study is also limited by the methodological
choice. Interviewing key players and analyzing other company-
specific data within a known network limits the findings
somewhat to what has already been constructed as the reality
about the prevailing institutions ex ante. Future research should
avoid stating the obvious and simply writing up what is known
about pharmaceutical marketing and using relationship portfo-
lios in known contexts. Comparative research, cross-border
studies or slightly more mechanical (perhaps semi-quantitative,
semi-qualitative) case studies could increase the objectivity and
generalizability of the findings in this stream of research.
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Abstract 
Purpose: This paper discusses institutional influence on customer-relationship-
management (CRM) practices and the restructuring of portfolios during the merger of 
two pharmaceutical companies. 
Design: An explanatory case study from the perspective of the focal actor.  
Findings: Isomorphic pressures and some organizational conditions are identified as 
relevant factors in the redefinition of the customer, the outcome of which is the 
deinstitutionalization of some CRM practices and the restructuring of customer 
portfolios. It is also proposed that procedural legitimacy drives the change within the 
network organization. 
Limitations: This study is idiographic and explores one case. Further longitudinal 
research is needed in order to generalize the findings. 
Practical implications: CRM practices are contingent upon how isomorphic pressures 
are coped with and how the institutional arrangements are utilized during the merger. 
Originality/value: This empirical study contributes to the discussion on institutional 
influence on customer relationship management in network organizations. 
 
Keywords: Relationship management, merger, institutional interplay, research paper 
1. Introduction 
 
When business organizations mature some of their practices tend to institutionalize, 
turning into established customs or norms that are taken for granted. This habitualized 
action tends to preserve structures and processes over time (Baum and Oliver, 1991). In 
addition, maturing business organizations tend to mimic each other, and isomorphism 
characterizes the business (Scott, 1987; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). The merger as a 
fundamental change of organization could disrupt this institutionalization and mimicking. 
This explanatory case study addresses the research question of how CRM practices – 
particularly customer-relationship portfolios - are influenced by isomorphic pressures and 
deinstitutionalization when pharmaceutical corporations merge.  
 
In the pharmaceutical industry and related application areas various types of strategic 
alliances, collaborative agreements and licensing strategies are increasingly driving 
contemporary innovation and marketing management, thereby creating complex 
relationship networks (Luukkonen, 2005). As with the case company, there are 150 
countries in which products are commercialized by subsidiaries and marketing-
authorization agreements with other companies. Accordingly, the focal case, which 
operates in a therapeutic area
1
 of the pharmaceutical division of a global chemical and 
pharmaceutical corporation, is conceptualized as a business network. The integration 
process primarily involves coping with a variety of customer relationships (Anderson et 
al., 2003) and their management as portfolios (Lukkari and Parvinen, 2008). 
 
                                                 
1
 A branch of medical care pertaining to the cure or the prevention of certain type of diseases, e.g., 
metabolic disorders. 
The issue of change during a merger is considered from two perspectives in this study. 
Firstly, institutionalized organizational behaviors have been defined as stable, repetitive 
and enduring activities that become “infused with value beyond the technical 
requirements of the task at hand” (Selznick, 1957, 17). The force of habit, history and 
tradition within the organization creates value congruence among the members around 
the propriety of re-enacted activities; these activities acquire a rule-like status as 
cognitive templates that render them resistant to change (Meyer and Rowan, 1991). 
Therefore, the merger is a particularly relevant phenomenon for studying change, because 
during the integration period the merging organizations are confronted with a new set of 
practices that could cause them to develop an enhanced awareness of what they do 
(Lubatkin et al., 1998) and an understanding of the need for change.  
 
Secondly, in the context of merger and acquisition (M&A) research, consequential 
effectiveness has been included among the motives driving the integration process (e.g., 
Allen et al., 2002; Havila and Salmi, 2002; Sudarsanam, 1995; Goldberg, 1983; Pfeffer, 
1972; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Penrose, 1959). However, given the fundamental 
interests behind interaction, and the parties involved and the results thereof, management 
can never know what the counterpart will do and therefore can only anticipate certain 
types of reaction (Anderson et al., 2001).  
 
If deinstitutionalization is defined as the erosion or discontinuity of an institutionalized 
organizational activity or practice (Oliver, 1992), then its examination is important for 
several reasons. Deinstitutionalization or the lack of it may explain some range of status 
quo or change in factors that might have an impact on the future success and/or failure of 
the newborn company. In addition, its causes may explain situations in which e.g., 
institutional pressures of legitimacy and isomorphism are most or least likely to have an 
impact on multinational corporations (MNCs). 
 
The results of the focal study indicate that isomorphic pressures have an impact on how 
the customer is redefined. The outcome of this redefinition is that customer-relationship 
portfolios are restructured and some relationship-management practices begin to 
deinstitutionalize in the newborn organization when their legitimacy is questioned. For 
example, analyses of the interview data revealed that during the integration of resources 
some habitualized processes and related actor roles were re-typified and new activities 
and positions were associated with classes of actors. In addition, a set of organizational 
factors relating to habitualized and mimicking behavior were identified as 
institutionalized relationship-management practices, which are vulnerable to erosion or 
rejection over time.  
 
The structure of this paper is as follows. First the theoretical notion of institutional 
interplay with the management of customer relationships as portfolios is introduced: this 
provides a basis for the analysis of the empirical data. The research approach is described 
next. The preliminary analysis facilitated the redefinition of the customer and of customer 
relationship portfolios. Then the focus moves to the way in which procedural legitimacy 
drives change within the merging network organization. The conclusions are presented as 
closing remarks at the end of the manuscript. 
 2. Institutional interplay 
 
Hurwicz (1993) distinguishes between institutional entities and institutional 
arrangements, the term institution (e.g., a social institution; organizations or systems of 
organizations such as companies or corporations) referring to the latter. This distinction is 
useful in terms of understanding actors’ roles and connectivity in the merging network 
organization. It is only by virtue of an institutional arrangement and its constitutive roles 
(e.g., property rights and ownership) that an actor in such as organization can act like a 
person with specifically designated rights and duties when it interacts with other actors 
(Hardgrave and Van De Ven, 2006) and aims to take over the customer relationship 
through acquisition.  
 
2.1. Isomorphic pressures 
 
In this study isomorphism is defined as substantial similarity among companies that 
results from the adoption and diffusion of certain business models, practices, and 
structures, which are established as a standard and legitimate (Kostova et al., 2008). 
Further when business organizations become similar to other business organizations in 
their field of business it tends to enhance the achievement of legitimacy: acceptance and 
approval by external constituents (Suchman, 1995). This achievement of legitimacy 
through isomorphism is subject to relational structure and CRM practices, since inter-
organizational relationships function as channels of communication and co-operation. 
(Lukkari and Parvinen, 2008). 
 
In his recent review of large-scale pharmaceutical M&As Mittra (2007) analyzes the 
merger waves and the changes in the industry. He points out how the concept of 
“institutional isomorphism” (Kondra and Hinings, 1998; Scott, 1987; DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983), and the account of the mimetic process through which bureaucratic 
organizations come to appear increasingly similar as rational actors adopt standard 
responses to uncertainty, nicely capture the ongoing third wave of mergers. According to 
him, this wave of “corporate imitation” became evident when all the major 
pharmaceutical companies invested heavily in promissory genomic technologies in order 
to match their competitors in facing unexpected industry shocks resulting from the 
emerging new technologies and deregulation. The outcome was a rash of oligopolistic 
mergers, which “are defensive response to internal weakness, particularly innovation 
deficit and managerial concerns about R&D efficiency and productivity” (Mittra, 2007, 
283). This was also the case with the merger under study: some products in phase three of 
the clinical trials failed, and a recently launched product was withdrawn from the 
market
2
. There were managerial concerns about the in-house R&D capability and 
pressures to mimic the mushrooming of research collaboration with emerging industrial 
networks of new technologies. Taking over another company enhanced R&D efficiency 
with promising pipeline and know-how in the context of research collaboration on the 
innovative frontier of small molecules and biopharmaceuticals.  
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 Route of new active substance from discovery to patient access takes typically 10 years of research (acute 
and chronic toxicity, pharmacology, and phase 1-3 clinical trials) (e.g., Lee, 2004)   
 However, it is argued in this paper that the constraining process of organizational 
homogenization is also characterized by competitive isomorphism (Kostova et al., 2008; 
Hannan and Freeman, 1977).  Decision makers have learned the appropriate responses 
and have adjusted their behavior accordingly (Hannan and Freeman, 1977). Market 
competition and fitness measures for publicly listed companies characterize decision-
making in the global pharmaceutical business, in which there is considerable free and 
open competition. Consequently, the research question focuses on how the focal newborn 
organization changed its CRM practices and restructured its customer-relationship 
portfolios by redefining its customers on account of the competitive and institutional 
isomorphic pressures it faced during the merger. The data indicates that a process of 
deinstitutionalization involving some pre-merger practices was initiated, and new 
interaction patterns were established.  
 
 
2.2. Deinstitutionalization 
 
Baum and Oliver (1991) suggest that organizations acquire characteristics at the time of 
their inception, and that subsequent inertia preserves these features and results in 
particular structures and processes. Some of these practices or processes tend to 
institutionalize, turning into established customs or norms that are taken for granted 
(Oliver, 1991). These institutionalized practices or processes may be difficult to change, 
and could hinder the integration process during the merger, since the actors may not 
understand the need for change. Some practices may even have become sacrosanct. On 
the other hand, the merger could trigger deinstitutionalization.  
 
According to Oliver (1992, 564), deinstitutionalization refers to the “delegitimation of an 
established organizational practice or procedure as a result of organizational challenges to 
or the failure of organizations to reproduce previously legitimated or taken-for-granted 
organizational actions.” In the case of mergers, deinstitutionalization could be understood 
as a process in which the reproduction of pre-merger legitimated or taken-for granted 
actions is questioned and delegitimated as a result of new institutional arrangements and 
poor performance, or other internal weaknesses. In addition, organizational and 
individual cognitive processes could be questioned and delegitimated because of the 
duality in the institutional structure as agents interact with a wider array of institutions 
(Seal, 2003). For example, the behavior and decisions of actors in the merger could be 
influenced by professional interests, and there may be strong tendencies to copy practices 
from other organizations. According to institutional theory, these kinds of isomorphism 
are driven by normative and mimetic influences (e.g., DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), but 
could also be driven by regulative coercion (Seal, 2003) or inducement. 
 
Explanations of deinstitutionalization in the literature are based mainly on changing 
interpretive schemes and/or institutional resistance to organizational transformation. 
Greenwood and Hinings (1988) devised a framework explaining the delegitimation and 
replacement of interpretive schemes in terms of interaction among contingencies (e.g., 
the environment), power dependencies and commitment. Barley (1986 and 1990) studied 
how the introduction of new technology began to modify and replace institutionalized 
roles and patterns of interaction, leading eventually to the reconfiguration of the 
organization’s institutional structure. Tushman and Romanelli (1985) adopted the 
contingency perspective, highlighting how institutionalized beliefs and schemes brought 
coherence to design archetypes, but also impeded transformation or radical change. 
Oliver (1992) identified a set of pressures (political, functional, social, entropic and 
internal) determining the likelihood that institutionalized behaviors will be vulnerable to 
erosion or rejection over time. Seal (2003) discussed the spontaneous interplay between 
the wider institutional realm, organizational and individual cognitions, and how 
isomorphism could be driven by coercion. Although these frameworks have contributed 
significantly to our understanding of fundamental organizational transformations, they 
focus less on the relational outcomes. In an attempt to fill this gap this study examines 
how some pre-merger CRM practices could become deinstitutionalized when the 
customer is redefined e.g., under isomorphic pressures. 
 
2.3. The restructuring of customer-relationship portfolios  
 
Pharmaceutical companies tend to manage their customer relationships as portfolios in 
which to invest (Lukkari and Parvinen, 2008). This idea of optimizing the resources of 
the newborn company and creating value across its customer relationships is highlighted 
during the merger process (Weston et al., 2004; Hassan et. al., 2007). The numbers and 
types of customers companies have are evaluated as assets in which to invest for 
respective returns with a certain level of risk (Johnson and Selnes, 2005; Reinartz et al., 
2004; Ryals, 2002; Möller and Halinen, 1999; Srivastava et. al., 1998; Storbacka et al., 
1994). The ranges of relationships across customer-facing functions (e.g., medical 
information, sales and marketing business units) represent relationship portfolios (Terho, 
2008; Ritter et al., 2004). These customer-facing functions tend to operate under 
business-specific institutional rules in the form of legislation, explicit codes of conduct, 
and systemic structures when the organizations mature (Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006; 
Greenwood et al., 2002; Zucker, 1988).  
 
Consideration should be given to these institutional rules during the merger because they 
could have an influence on how legitimate changes of interaction patterns arising from 
the restructuring of customer-relationship portfolios are perceived by the parties 
involved. For example, during the integration process some of the organization-specific 
administrative heritage and cognitive templates could begin to deinstitutionalize, 
resulting in the termination of some pre-merger social relationships (e.g., charity 
sponsorship). On the other hand, socially sound practices, which tend to rely on shared 
cognitive templates, serve to demonstrate to the environment and related actors that the 
newborn pharmaceutical division is making a good-faith effort to achieve valued, future 
ends (Seal, 2003; Suchman, 1995) 
 
Researchers in the fields of business networks and M&A hold opposing views on the 
question of whether customer relationships can be taken over, and what kind of 
opportunities and control relationship management brings to a company (i.e. Klint and 
Sjöberg, 2003; Håkansson and Ford, 2002; Anderson et al., 2001). It is assumed in this 
study that customer relationships can be co-operationally managed and taken over in the 
merger given certain institutional arrangements. For example, the ownership of property 
rights could mean that an actor would be able to manage some relationships to a certain 
extent, inducing the desired behavior by means of rewards, for example. However, 
uncertainty could limit this manageability. Firstly, management can only anticipate what 
the counterpart will do (Anderson et al., 1998): it could be lured by better prospects 
offered by a competitor and therefore terminate the relationship, for example. Secondly, 
the capability to manage relationships could be subject to the unintended results of the 
free actions of actors who are motivated by implicit and/or latent collective ends (Miller, 
2007), which create isomorphic pressures for relational patterns. Members of a business 
organization might have a commitment to a collective good (improved health or the 
advancement of pharmaceutical science, for example) as an explicit institutionalized and 
legitimate collective end, even if it is not a chosen criterion in terms of investing in a 
customer relationship.  
 
3. Research approach: abductive case study 
 
The aim of the study was to provide an insight into the ongoing interplay between the 
isomorphic pressures, deinstitutionalization and CRM practices of customer-relationship 
portfolios. To this end, the abductive case study (Dubois and Gadde, 2002; Coffey and 
Atkinson, 1996) was considered to be well suited to the examination of why and how 
real-life phenomena occur (Lee, 1999; Yin, 1994). A focal-actor perspective was adopted 
in this study of the integration process in a network organization. The focus was on the 
change and on the outcomes of the CRM practices arising from the merger, rather than on 
the merger process per se. Isomorphism was identified from the interview data as 
descriptions of mimicking behavior and/or adoption of CRM practices and relational 
patterns, which are perceived to be a standard in the business or which are similar to 
competitors’ CRM behavior. Deinstitutionalization was identified from the interviewees’ 
responses to questions of why some relationships or practices were terminated. 
 
3.1. The sample 
 
An explicit sampling strategy was adopted, since the opportunity to access the data 
opened up shortly after the launch (January 2007), when the processes of integration and 
reorganization were under construction. The pharmaceutical business of the case 
corporation was spread over six therapeutic areas. The unit of analysis used in this study 
was one of these areas, in which the product ranges of the merging corporations were 
considered complimentary and synergies were expected with the integration of 
relationship management and other sales and marketing activities (e.g., cross-selling). 
Particular reliance was placed on interviews. Nevertheless, in order to decrease 
dependence on the whims of the organizations’ gatekeepers in the asymmetrical 
encounter, who could potentially seek to limit and control what could be investigated 
(Silverman, 2005; Green and Thorogood, 2004; Hiller and DiLuzio, 2004; Facett and 
Hearn, 2004; Holstein and Gubrium, 1995); information was acquired from a variety of 
sources. 
 
3.2. The interviews 
 
The marketing management in the focal therapeutic area was organized under a global 
team, which was responsible for the marketing strategies of various product franchises, 
and also supported the subsidiaries and other business partners with their regional or 
country-specific marketing activities.  
 
The interviews with the members of the global marketing team were active encounters 
characterized by dialectical analysis of the participants’ descriptions and perceptions of 
1) customer relationships, 2) related management practices, and 3) the impact of the 
merger on both. The author conducted six interviews at the end of October and in early 
November 2007, all of which were recorded and transcribed for analysis. In each session 
the interviewer opened the dialogue by giving a brief presentation of the study and 
describing the institutional context, since the interviewees were not familiar with them. 
(This description of the main concepts could have biased the study somewhat, but on the 
other hand it helped the subjects to describe and present their perceptions of habitualized 
practices.)  She then gave the floor to the interviewees, asking questions when necessary 
in order to ensure that all three themes were covered. The interviews lasted 36 minutes on 
average. 
 
The seven interviewees were members of the global marketing team and senior managers 
with extensive experience (10-20 years) of marketing in the merging corporations. They 
were chosen on the basis of their position and responsibilities in the organizational 
structure, and the function and/or area of pharmacotherapy they represented. 
Consequently, all major product franchises in the therapeutic area were covered. 
Additional information came from corporation documents and personal correspondence 
with some key persons involved in relationship-portfolio management and related actor-
facing functions in the HQs and in the Nordic subsidiaries (e.g., R&D, medical 
information and regulatory affairs). This verified some conclusions drawn on the basis of 
the interviews, and filled in some of the gray areas that remained.   
 
 
4. Institutional interplay with CRM practices  
 
The emergent deinstitutionalization of some relationship-management practices and the 
restructuring of some relationship portfolios as on outcome of the influence of the 
isomorphic pressures on the redefinition of the customer could be considered the main 
empirical findings of the study. This is illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
--------------- 
Insert Figure 1. about here 
-------------- 
 
 
 
4.1. Isomorphism harnesses the redefinition  
  
The interviewees responded that the two merging corporations were managing their 
customer relationships as portfolios prior to the merger. At first glance of the empirical 
data gathered not much seemed to change as a result of the integration process, since the 
aim remained the same: to optimize relational resources and to create value across 
customer relationships cross-functionally (i.e. between R&D, regulatory affairs, and sales 
& marketing). However, the merging organizations had somewhat contrasting pre-merger 
relationship-management practices (e.g., the level of interaction depending on the 
product, the size and profiles of customer target groups, and corporate cultures). 
Interviewees highlighted that at the beginning of the integration process the managerial 
challenge of restructuring and evaluating the relationship portfolios seemed to lie in the 
ability to recognize and utilize synergies of the integrated resources. In addition they saw 
that the integration process was mainly subject to the following task-environment factors:  
 
1) the therapeutic and technological foci (e.g., on highly specialized and/or general 
practitioners (GPs), thus calling for differentiated relationship-management practices) 
2) the pipeline status (e.g., the innovativeness of new products and brand-line extensions 
in new applications)  
3) internal synergies (e.g., cross-selling to various customer groups)  
4) commercial and relational factors (e.g., the estimated value of prescriptions, customer 
loyalty given unexpected occurrences, and brand strength when the patent expiries).  
 
However, according to several interviewees’ responses the pre-merger institutionalization 
of the CRM practices surfaced as resistance to change. The joint customer relationships 
in the newborn organization faced new managerial challenges: 1) recognition of the 
institutionalization and its influence on managerial practices, and 2) the organizational 
unlearning of some habitualized practices. For example, both merging organizations were 
characterized by isomorphic business behavior, and were systematically organizing and 
sponsoring various training programs and frequent detailing as continuing medical 
education (CME) for health-care professionals. Typically the interviewees described this 
isomorphism as “a general trend of the pharmaceutical industry” and as “a way every 
company is doing it [CRM]”. This sponsored CME co-operation consolidated interaction 
with normative institutions (e.g., co-operation with the scientific medical societies of 
specialists or general practitioners), and thereby shaped or preserved existing collective, 
professional cognitive templates. As a result, some CRM practices were cast into a 
pattern by means of habitual action and became resistant to change. There was a need to 
introduce new unified ways of seeking the approval of the authorizing agents as part of 
the integration process in order to promote the efficient use of the merged relational 
resources. One of the interviewees described this as “there is lack of coordination 
between different functions [refers to internal cross-functional teams and their CRM 
practices with e.g., opinion leaders or other key accounts] and we are currently working 
on to improve this.” 
 
Some of the driving forces and pressures in the pharmaceutical industry (e.g., changes in 
legislation that had shortened the patent-protection time of ethical pharmaceuticals, 
which in turn increased the pressure to innovate and decreased the pay-back time of R&D 
investments) were also identified by the interviewees as enhancing isomorphism. The 
following factors arose from the data as having an influence on the redefinition of the 
customer, which resulted in the restructuring of customer-relationship portfolios, and 
triggered the deinstitutionalization of some relationships: 
1) increasing innovation pressures 
2) changing constituent relations 
3) growing commercial pressures 
4) new types of domain pressures 
 
Based on the empirical data gathered innovation pressures seemed to increase in the 
acquiring corporation due to the threat of innovation deficit when new technologies 
emerged at the industry level. This also changed the constituent relations of the case 
business network. Thus far there had been reliance on the in-house R&D function in the 
acquiring corporation, which now faced great challenges and risky investments with the 
adoption of new technologies. It was considered feasible to revise the R&D function, and 
to mimic others in the business by investing more in relationships of research 
collaboration. A company with a promising R&D pipeline and a tradition of research 
collaboration was taken over. During the integration process this isomorphic action had 
an impact on how the customer was redefined and the customer portfolios restructured.  
One of the interviewees described this development as follows: “In the biotech field 
people are working much more with - for example - with small external research groups. 
We were not doing this enough within X [refers to the acquiring corporation] in the past. 
We were more relaying on our own research capacity…I think we shall go more and 
more external as well. I think this is a general trend of the pharmaceutical industry, 
because it is such a difficult to find a new NP [new product] or NC [new compound] and 
everybody is looking and shopping for them around and that is why companies are 
targeting to some start-ups…” 
 
It was clear through interviewees’ responses that commercial pressures were growing 
mainly for regulative reasons and due to domain pressures. Especially on brands, which 
are prescribed by GPs in ambulatory care with high volumes and which are reimbursed 
by national health insurances, thus having high socio-political interests because of their 
share of national expenditures on drugs. All interviewees saw that changes in the 
legislation related to patent protection
3
 increased commercial pressures in form of shorter 
patent-protection times, which cut down the pay-back time of R&D investments, boosted 
the parallel imports and the generic competition from the emerging markets (e.g., India). 
The maturation of some brands and their level of substitution in the regional, high 
volume ambulatory care markets were seen as crucial factors influencing the redefinition 
of the customer and the focusing on specialists instead of GPs. The interviewees admitted 
that their corporate level CRM strategy was to some extent influenced by the general 
trend of the industry: the profitability of relationships with GPs was decreasing and it was 
expected to continue to decrease. Therefore it was seen that relational resources could 
yield higher profits in the specialist branch. According to the interviewees the outcome 
was the deinstitutionalization of some long-term CRM practices, the termination of some 
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 The Trade Related aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement changed the principles of 
patent protection and established the patenting of medical substances. 
customer relationships, and the restructuring of portfolios in the therapeutic area under 
study. For example, some R&D and CME projects aiming for the growth in mature, high 
volume ambulatory care markets were cut down. One of the interviewees described this 
as: “Yes, the relationships have been changed. In fact we’ll do less and less activities in 
this distinct field. The reorganization has had this impact…life-cycle management of 
products and at the same time life-cycle management of relationships.” 
 
The domain pressures were mentioned to have another effect. One of the interviewees 
mentioned that the imports from emerging markets were considered the factor to the 
increased pressure to contain production costs in Western European sites. But, on the 
other hand he pointed out that there were regional socio-political interests for the 
protection of European pharmaceutical industry (e.g., employment and growth prospects 
of innovative high-tech industrial sites). The newborn organization is a major player in 
the business. Therefore more relational resources should be allocated to political 
relationships in order to secure influence channels for regional socio-political institutions. 
 
 
4.2. Procedural legitimacy drives change 
  
During the interviews some interviewees pondered how the pharmaceutical business 
differs from the other fields of business within the acquiring corporation. They 
emphasized that pharmaceutical business’ outputs and innovative achievements are more 
socially defined and valued (e.g., in the areas of fertility and contraception). Further, they 
saw that some of its outputs are inherently difficult to measure at the time of their 
inception (e.g., improvements in public health and increased life expectancy as a result of 
new innovative products).  Therefore, it was seen by the respondents that the 
pharmaceutical industry embraces itself in socially accepted procedures which are a 
standard in the business, and by doing it fosters procedural legitimacy. One of the 
respondents described this as follows: “If you speak about pharma industry’s 
relationships with authorities or key opinion leaders or physicians, we have to be very 
careful with in the way we deal with these types of relationships. These are usually the 
people who are more sacrosanct than the others…we are in an industry where the image 
has not always been good…” 
 
The public interest and economic activity at stake 
 
While pondering with the unique characteristics of the pharmaceutical industry the 
interviewees highlighted its strong institutional framework of governance structures and 
operational regulation which include a description of the human good that it purports to 
produce. As with the focal case, part of its mission is framed as: “…we develop therapies 
for high unmet medical needs. Through their targeted effect, these help patients to live a 
longer and better life…” (quoted from case-specific promotional material). Thus, public 
interest and globalized economic activity are at stake, and as one of the interviewees 
pointed out: they are evidenced in the competing social, political and functional pressures 
that jointly influence commercial decision-making and customer relationship 
management e.g., with further investment decisions on Western European production 
sites.  
 
Slow knowledge- and investment-intensive product development and life-science 
innovation were mentioned by the interviewees as other characteristics of the 
pharmaceutical industry, which are reflected in its CRM and characterizes the 
information-intensive interaction (e.g., the availability of and ability to utilize the latest 
medical information) with a great variety of customers and other related actors (e.g., 
public research institutes, health authorities and patient associations). Several responses 
of the interviewees verified that the integration process in the focal case was a highly 
variable management activity: each business relationship was specific in its own way, 
given the complexity of the network ties. As an example the interviewees mentioned that 
the merging organizations had fairly different traditions in terms of co-operating with 
patient organizations due to differences in their product ranges and therapies (life-
preserving versus therapies which improve quality of life). 
 
Relationships are reciprocal and take time to develop. Interviewees saw that it is essential 
to acknowledge that potential economic gains in the institutionalized context are subject 
to the mutual intention and ability to jointly develop and utilize existing relationships. 
One of the interviewees described it as “You know when we speak about relationships, 
which took very long to be built, usually you are very careful to change things.” 
Therefore, it was high lighted in interviewees’ responses that collective reciprocity was 
considered an only option in the process of restructuring the customer-relationship 
portfolio, since management could never know or control what the counterpart would or 
could do. Certain types of reactions could only be anticipated, since relationships in the 
public interest (e.g., unmet medical needs and their public funding) could not be subject 
to acquisition, like companies.  
 
The institutional context highlights standards of socially acceptable action that are subject 
to the validation of performance. Often this calls for interaction with regulative 
authorities and authorization by normative institutions. One of the respondents who had 
years of experience of marketing authorizations and other regulatory issues explained 
how the co-operation with various regulative and normative parties was re-evaluated 
during the integration process, the focus being on the efficient utilization of the joint 
relational resources and organizational learning. He mentioned that e.g., some of the 
acquired party’s successful relationship-management practices involving the regulative 
authorities were acknowledged, and efforts to establish them as standard procedure across 
the newborn organization were initiated. 
 
Based on the empirical data gathered it can be summarized that management 
understanding of the ambiguities involved in coping with changing network connections 
was essential. The emphasis in the process of relationship integration was on interaction 
and communication, the aim being to avoid unanticipated consequences for both the 
merging organizations and other related actors. There was no implicit assumption that 
taking over another company would also mean acquiring its customer relationships, or 
that all of its pre-merger relationships would be worth future investment given the 
redefined customer. According to the respondents the key role of marketing management 
and the value of long-term industrial relationships with other actors in the network were 
recognized in the process of strategy formulation in the newborn company. The 
redefinition of the customer in the therapeutic area under study was regarded by the 
respondents as a way of increasing competitiveness and future profits, but also as an 
activity that would jeopardize and bring to an end some existing customer relationships. 
Some of these discontinued CRM practices could be characterized as being subject to 
deinstitutionalization in that an established organizational practice or procedure was 
questioned and its legitimacy was eroded.   
 
The influence of regional institutions on the global business 
 
All interviewees of the global marketing team underlined that there was significant 
ambiguity surrounding the regional relationships and customer-portfolio-management 
decisions. The portfolios were not selected at a particular point in time and for a 
particular market. There was regional variation in the level of market maturation, and in 
perceptions of the influence of the institutional context on the business. The customer 
base and the relationships took time to develop, and they were subject to 
institutionalization (e.g., habitualization). There was variation in the ongoing influence of 
the regional (e.g., the European Medicines Agency (EMEA)) and/or country-specific 
(e.g., local regulative guidelines for medical treatment, and normative codes for 
marketing practices) institutions. According to the interviewed team the outcome of this 
was regional and/or country-specific CRM practices. These were challenging to change 
and harmonize because some of them had become habitualized prior to the merger, and 
some were subject to regional isomorphic pressures. One of the interviewees stated that 
“if you want to utilize the potential globally you have to look at the different 
regions…cope with differences from country to country.” 
 
All global marketing team members admitted that it was challenging to form a unified 
perception of how to optimize the current and future relational resources of the newborn 
company, and of how to create value from its relationships by viewing them as cross-
regional unified assets. As an example it was mentioned that there was some country-
specific variation in terms of: 1) estimating the value of customer relationships; 2) 
recognizing habitualized relationship-management practices and accepting their 
deinstitutionalization (the handling of connectedness among actors and actions internally 
and externally); and 3) recognizing and estimating the impact of regional- or country-
specific institutions on the changes: alongside the changing management practices they 
could have a strong enough effect on local performance to encourage flexibility in the 
adaptation of the global strategy and the termination of some relationships.  
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Prior research is inconclusive in terms of whether the activities of single actors have any 
significant impact on the process of institutional change (e.g., Lawrence and Phillips, 
2004; Maguire et al., 2004) and whether networks and relationships can be managed 
(e.g., Håkansson and Ford, 2002; Ritter et al., 2004), and on the institutional relevance of 
relationship-management practices (e.g., Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006; Dorado, 2005; 
Déjean et al., 2004). This paper discussed how perceptions of customer-relationship 
manageability could be enhanced by focusing on the institutional interplay, and 
recognizing that institutions have an impact on management practices. The practical 
contributions of the paper lie in the proposition that CRM practices are contingent upon 
how the isomorphic pressures are coped with and how the institutional arrangements are 
utilized by actors during the merger. The newborn multinational network organization 
has layers of CRM practices. One of these layers comprises the practices mandated by the 
meta-institutions of health care and may be surprisingly similar across subsidiaries. 
Another, consisting of practices mandated by the headquarters, may be subject to 
pressure from the host country in terms of compliance with and responsiveness to the 
local normative and regulative domains. 
 
Another managerial ramification is that the possible negative effects of the 
deinstitutionalization and imposition resulting from changed institutional arrangements 
tend to be reparable. For example, the right forms of inducement could reverse 
disenchantment and restore the confidence that has been damaged by the discontinuation 
of valued traditions. It could also facilitate the collective understanding of new 
procedures, resources, rights, duties and power relationships in the newborn organization. 
 
Case-study research is particularly welcome in new situations in which only little is 
known about the phenomenon, and when current theories seem inadequate (Eisenhardt, 
1989). It is also strong in the context of change processes in that it allows the study of 
contextual factors and process elements in the same real-life situation (Halinen and 
Törnroos, 2005). However, as with any research there are considerable limitations in the 
focal study, and further research involving other empirical cases and other types of data is 
also needed in this field. First, business-network and neoinstitutional theories highlight 
the time aspect. The unit of analysis used in this study was by its nature dynamic and 
susceptible to continuous change. Customer relationships form over time, and both the 
history and future expectations of the involved parties influence how they evolve (e.g., 
Grewal and Dharwadkar, 2002; Uzzi, 1997; Ring and Van de Ven, 1994). In addition, the 
constraining processes of organizational homogenization and isomorphism take their time 
(e.g., Whitley, 2003). Therefore this exploratory study should be extended through the 
application of longitudinal methods and other tools of process research. Secondly, the 
complexity inherent in embeddedness, network boundaries and the organizational 
structure is a weakness. The researcher defined the limits of the network organization a 
priori on a structural basis (according to the corporate HQs, subsidiaries and other first-
tier counterparts of the customer relationships), but the institutional boundaries and 
contexts are much more vague and porous. Thirdly, the potential for case comparisons is 
commonly considered important in theory-generating research (e.g., Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Yin, 1994), and this is lacking in the focal study. Therefore it is not possible to establish a 
range of generality in order to pin down the conditions under which the findings will 
recur, as would perhaps be possible with a study involving multiple cases. On the other 
hand, the pharmaceutical market is going through a period of institutional cohesion (e.g., 
Mittra, 2006; Blumenthal, 2004). For example, the establishment of regional, regulative 
co-operation (involving Canada and the U.S.A., Australia and other parts of Oceania) and 
plans to merge some national regulatory agencies (e.g., Australia and New-Zealand) have 
increased cohesion along the regulative dimension. This development is, to some extent, 
harmonizing the institutional context and the pressures it exerts on business. Therefore 
the findings of this exploratory case study would perhaps be more transferable to other 
cases in the light of this institutional cohesion. 
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FIGURE 1 
Institutional interplay: the integration of relational resources during the merger of 
two pharmaceutical corporations.  
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